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Abstract 
The liberal debate on egalitarian distributive justice was originally developed with affluent 
occidental countries in mind. We might ask whether the liberal egalitarian distributive 
question has a different answer when we consider countries with a different social justice 
tradition, severe scarcity of resources and institutional weaknesses. Such a theoretical 
answer should in principle better interpret a political conception of social justice for a poor 
society, and within this general distributive principle provide specific theoretical distributive 
criteria for the design of poverty alleviation programmes. 
I claim, as a possible answer to this theoretical question that egalitarianism could be better 
served by using a mixed distributive. I maintain that in extreme scarcity situations 
egalitarians should rather appeal to a moral pluralist view where many factors matter when 
we compare various feasible distributions, not only equality. This "hybrid" distributive view, 
which I have called Progressive Sufficiency would not give ultimate importance to equality; it 
would give priority to the worse off over the better off individuals only under some 
circumstances and would consider that several morally relevant thresholds should be 
clarified. 
Another problem relates to the type of goods upon we should focus when dealing with 
interpersonal comparisons. Three types are commonly distinguished: welfare, resources and 
capability. Progressive sufficiency for instance would recommend thresholds in advantage 
with the first one described in absolute terms and the second and third described in 
progressive increases of benefits, taking as the measure of benefits the average held by the 
proportion of the population within thresholds. Thus we could conclude that both analysis 
either of the distributive criterion and the currency of the distribution naturally fit together in a 
general prioritarian argument with graded steps of benefits. 
My case study is Mexico and some of its recent poverty alleviation programmes (1992- 
2000). In terms of developing countries, the Mexican case is interesting because most of its 
institutions and policies have being inspired by liberal ideas that have succeeded in creating 
a moderately strong economy, but have failed in the fair distribution of scarce resources. 
In relation to poverty definitions, I suggest that if we accept progressive sufficiency we 
should consider poverty in a graded form. The first threshold should be defined in absolute 
terms related to functionings and the second in terms of resources and opportunities. If we 
accept this division we should consider lack of capabilities as a greater moral problem than 
income poverty. I also suggest that in relation to poverty measures, accepting progressive 
sufficiency would present an axiomatization problem, as we would need to solve the problem 
of measuring both linear poverty with the HPI and non-linear poverty with the FGT index. 
In relation to the distributive rule used by the government to apply its social policy, my results 
show that it is unfair to use a very basic sufficientarian approach towards direct benefits. 
Perhaps the most important critique to the social policy is the factor that the level of benefits 
is set not by resource scarcity, but by incentive considerations. I suggest that people under a 
very low level of advantage cannot be made responsible for their actual situation. They 
would have, as far as partial responsibility, but it should not be taken against their well-being. 
Something that Progresa -the main poverty alleviation program- is doing. Furthermore, as 
Progresa holds complete information of the economic situation of each family, it is unfair not 
to attempt to fully contribute to solve the poverty problem. 
"The law ... should moderate opulence and 
destitution... " 
Jose Maria Morelos, 1813.1 
"Land and Liberty" 
Emiliano Zapata's 1913 revolutionary slogan 
I do not offer to the Mexican people the hollow 
phrases of "freedom of conscience", "freedom 
of education" and "economic freedom". I know 
that the first represents the clergy's 
dictatorship; the second represents the 
dictatorship of reactionary groups which 
pretend to oppose the workings of a 
revolutionary regime based in popular culture; 
while the third represents capitalist 
dictatorship. 
Lazaro Cardenas, 1937.2 
1. Social justice and poverty 
Since the publication of John Rawls' book, A Theory of Justice in 1971, 
political philosophers have increasingly discussed how better to interpret the 
egalitarian aim. Part of this theoretical debate is centred on the relation 
between economic growth and how these new benefits might be fairly 
distributed among the population. The answer to this distributive question 
was no longer straightforward equality; some liberal political philosophers, 
like Rawls argued that if growing benefits were to be maintained, inequalities 
should be permitted, provided that the worse off increased their benefits. 
During 1980s and 1990s' liberalisation process, these normative concerns 
influenced policy matters, changing the conception of social justice in most 
developing countries. There is however, growing empirical evidence to 
suggest that the widespread structural liberal reforms implemented since the 
1980s in most developing countries have succeeded in a very small scale in 
Declaration N'' I-' of Morclos' Sentiments of the Nation, quoted from Revcs, J., 1957, p. 29. ('1y 
Oý\ n translation) 
Rabv, D., 1978,1). 13. Quoted from Dulles, J., p. 586. (My own translation) 
1? 
alleviating absolute poverty, while relative poverty and inequality, it is 
suggested, has increased. The small economic gains have not only led a 
growing number of researchers, but also groups in the civil society and 
political organizations to question the entire process of liberalisation. Some of 
the critics have even blamed liberal ideas in general for the suggested 
increase in poverty and inequality. The indiscriminate critique of liberals, as 
well as the growing polarization of the society in the developing world, could 
risk the small achievements during these decades in the area of political, civil 
and human rights. The risk could materialize itself in a return to authoritarian 
and populist governments. 
The liberal debate on egalitarian distributive justice that has influenced the 
liberalisation process around most of the world was originally developed with 
affluent occidental countries in mind. We might ask whether the liberal 
egalitarian distributive question has a different answer when we consider 
countries with a different social justice tradition, severe scarcity of resources 
and institutional weaknesses. Such a theoretical answer should in principle 
better interpret a political conception of social justice for a poor society, and 
within this general distributive principle provide specific theoretical distributive 
criteria for the design of poverty alleviation programmes. 
In this thesis I will suggest a possible answer to this theoretical question and 
enquire into its practical consequences, discussing its implications in poverty 
measures and the design of poverty alleviation programs. In this respect, this 
thesis is an interdisciplinary work drawing on normative political theory and 
social policy, something not usually done in the literature. Partha Dasgupta in 
his work Enquiry Into Destitution, briefly considers distributive problems but 
largely solves theoretical economic problems. Amartya Sen in his famous 
essay "Equality of What? ", discuses mainly the currency of the distributive 
criteria, a contribution that proves to have practical application in discussing 
13 
poverty problems in a more inclusive way in the United Nations Human 
Development Report. 3 
In my case, I have considered distributive problems in the general context of 
developing countries, suggesting an improvement to the sufficientarian 
answer to the distributive problem, an option not well discussed in the 
literature. Such a modified answer, I believe is a better option than other 
distributive answers when severe scarce resources do not allow all 
individuals to reach a relevant threshold. This option presents theoretical 
problems, mainly problems in the definition of morally relevant thresholds. I 
build on this normative conception to discuss whether we can apply this 
conception to the poverty debate. I maintain that the poverty debate can be 
seen naturally as part of the debates about distribution and the currency of 
distribution. 
My case study will be Mexico's recent poverty alleviation programmes (1992- 
2000). In terms of developing countries, the Mexican case is interesting 
because most of its institutions and policies have being inspired by liberal 
ideas that have succeeded in creating a moderately strong economy, but 
have failed in the fair distribution of scarce resources. This failure is clearly 
observable between 1992 and 2000, precisely since the implementation of a 
wider program of economic and institutional liberalisation took root. 
Throughout this period total income in the country increased almost 77% in 
real terms yet the poor lost almost 65% of their relative income share 
between 1992 and the year 2000 (Chapter 6 of this thesis). The wider income 
gap between the poor and the rest of the population is striking, especially in 
the light of the creation of poverty alleviation programmes throughout this 
period. 
The failure of economic liberalisation in fairly distributing income, I suggest, 
emanates from local historical and political problems as well as from 
` Robert 1-. Goodin [et all in The real world of welfare capitalism uses normative political thcoi-vv and 
social policy, combining both to discuss welfare problems. 
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unresolved theoretical problems. Generally it is still being debated how to 
distribute and what to distribute to similarly situated individuals in order to 
promote a just distribution; we could also say that liberal theory has not yet 
answered what are the minimal adequate conditions an individual requires to 
exercise her rights. 
My central argument is that given a domestic political morality problem of 
severe scarcity of socio-economic resources, and the unresolved problem of 
what sort of interpretation to give to social justice in situations of scarcity, a 
just distribution depends on guaranteeing that people reach certain morally 
relevant thresholds. Thus, the relation between liberalisation and an 
improvement in human well-being can be approached in two ways. The first 
would be to provide an adequate interpretation for the liberal egalitarian aim 
under a situation of severe scarcity of resources; and second, to find 
adequate normative objectives for each relevant moral threshold. 
In order to develop my argument, this thesis addresses two basic questions: 
1) What fundamental normative objectives should guide the design of poverty 
alleviation programs? 
2) To what extent do these objectives remain unfulfilled in the case of 
Mexico? 
2. Historical background and set up of the problem. 
A changing conception of the Liberal State has dramatically transformed 
Mexican institutions from the foundation of the Republic in 1810 through the 
end of the twentieth century. Under the influence of European liberal ideas, 
but with local problems in mind, Mexican liberals have created political 
institutions, recreated social institutions and carried through particular socio- 
economic objectives, while debating how better to realise a just society. 
Although many of the most important liberal political actors throughout the 
history of Mexico have debated the nature of a just society, the issue has 
15 
clearly not been settled. Throughout Mexican history there has been a need 
to clearly define a general plural liberal conception of social justice: 
specifically, how should one evaluate social justice and how might one 
achieve it? 
To illustrate, consider the contrasting ideas from three of the most respected 
social fighters of the country cited at the beginning of this introduction. In 
modern terms, for instance, Jose Maria Morelos (1910), a hero of the 
independence movement, supports the idea that freedom and liberties 
guaranteed by law would procure economic growth and a more equal 
society. 4 Emiliano Zapata (1915), a hero of the Revolution, demands the 
immediate reparation of old injustices in relation to land rights, in order that 
the "campesinos" of Mexico might be accorded the opportunity to enjoy 
personal liberty and improve their prosperity and well being. 5 Lazaro 
Cardenas, the most respected post-revolutionary president (1940), by 
contrast, considers the main obligation of the State as not only providing the 
material means for individual prosperity, but also guaranteeing that all people 
enjoy certain basic services and earn enough income. (Benitez, F., 1978, p. 
114-6) 
This historical lack of formal consensus as to what the State should promote 
or, in more general terms, what ought to be understood by social justice, 
could have a direct effect on society itself and not only for developing 
countries. The lack of a coherent idea as to what areas of human life the 
liberal state should focus on, and how to fairly distribute social benefits, I 
suggest might be one of the causes that can lead to a rather erratic social 
development. It could also be suggested that this lack of clarity is one of the 
factors that has created a climate of continuous change in Mexico, 
particularly, with regard to the focus of social policy, sometimes as a result of 
SCC [, immons, W., 1982. 
` See Cordova. A., 1973, p. 147 and John Womack, Jr, 1970, (Appendix 13, Plan de Ayala, Article 7). 
p. 4 0' 
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lack of policy continuity and sometimes because the approach taken was 
plainly wrong, when viewed from a perspective of normative social justice. 
Accepting that liberal thinking is continuously evolving, it usually has been 
agreed that in order for citizens to exercise their basic rights a society needs 
to provide certain social minimum. This general basic agreement of liberal 
thought has been also a matter of debate in Mexican history as the severe 
scarcity of resources has provided for harsh choices and practical 
discrimination between groups in the society, where some have the minimum 
and some not enough resources. I will suggest that Mexican liberal thought 
has in fact tried to deal theoretically and practically with these harsh justice 
choices, something that the anglo-american liberal tradition has neglected. 
I maintain that the Mexican historical liberal tradition can provide the bases 
for a coherent sufficientarian proposal. This normative perspective not only 
can be the bases for a fairer conception of social justice under special 
circumstances of extreme scarcity and institutional weakness , 
but can also 
be applied to the measure and design of poverty alleviation policies, as it 
gives general priority to the worse off. 
Since the beginning of the 1980s, a new approach towards social justice has 
been implemented in Mexico. The supporters of economic liberalisation 
raised two claims, the first being that strict macroeconomic reforms were 
needed for the economy to grow, requiring a reconceptualization of the socio- 
economic priorities being pursued by the State. The second claim was that 
economic growth would improve everyone's life, providing more economic 
opportunities to all in the short term. 
The latter claim is disputed by many, 6 based on the fact that inequality and 
poverty have not decreased since the beginning of the liberalisation process, 
while the economy has grown. Despite this disappointing result the rejection 
of these all encompassing changes cannot be total, because sound 
Sec Allimir, 0., 1998, Szckcly, M, 1998. Alarcon, D, 1998: and Bollvinik, J. 1999.. 
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macroeconomic measures are important and some of these reforms can be 
justified. The problem seems then to lie in whether the State's socio- 
economic priorities provide a fair or unfair distribution of economic burdens 
and benefits. 
Academic debates about justice can seem relentlessly abstract and divorced 
from the real world, but this problem may be avoided by providing an initial 
account of historical constitutional and political debates in Mexico regarding 
the above issues. 
3. Constitutional conception of social justice. 
The conception of social justice advocated by the Mexican State in the 
Constitution of 1917 can be described in terms of a strong agreement 
between constituents for the need of socio-economic reform. In order to 
reach these reforms, constituents gave priority to a strong executive. If the 
extension of attainable liberties to each individual in society was the main 
characteristic of the 1857 Constitution, socio-economic rights such as the 
minimum wage and agrarian reform marked the 1917 Constitution. 
Ricardo Flores Magön whose writings in many ways formed the ideological 
basis of the 1917 Constitution, considered that "... economic freedom is the 
foundation of all liberties, without it there cannot be any liberty... " (Silva, J., 
1973, p. 32) 7 Clearly the Constituent congress of 1917, influenced by 
Magön, drafted a Constitution that placed emphasis in a transfer of wealth, 
by introducing an agrarian reform and the most extensive labour rights for 
workers. These reforms were considered as the way forward in terms of 
securing economic freedom for equal citizens. In this view, the State in order 
to safeguard the interests of equal citizens before the law should intervene in 
favour of the worker, should promote the provision of bank credits to workers, 
and should control the economy to benefit the disadvantaged. 
(1\lvv translation) 
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The general assumption in the drafting of the Constitution and behind many 
of the civil protests demanding the actual realization of these constitutional 
rights, during the 1940s through to the 1980s, was that an unequal social 
background was responsible for the extended inequalities and poverty in the 
country. Thus, society should provide the means to solve these inequalities. 
The egalitarian aim, then, was interpreted as providing individuals with an 
equal share of resources and extended rights to improve their equal 
opportunities for economic freedom. However, this interpretation was not an 
adequate one, either in practical or theoretical terms for the existing scarcity 
of social resources and the weak institutional framework, fostered by the 
party in power (PRI) since 1929 until 2000. 
4. Process of liberalisation. 1983-2000 
The Revolution of 1910 and the Constitution of 1917, completely transformed 
Mexico from being a poor rural country with subsistence agriculture as the 
main activity practiced by an illiterate population, to a moderately rich 
industrial country with a mostly urban literate population. This economic and 
social development was based on an economic model of import-substitution 
industrialisation and government expenditure with large fiscal and trade 
deficits. 
The state followed a developmentalist economic model, promoting economic 
growth and social benefits to specific groups identified as political allies, at 
the cost of greater inequalities and without being inhibited by legal 
constrains. This illegal administration of the power by the party in power led 
to the formation of a political system based in clientelism. In this system, 
political power has usually been a licence to privatise the distribution of 
wealth and political positions among the elite and clienteles. (Heredia, C., 
1994, p. 268) 
19 
The same governments of the Institutionalized Revolutionary Party (PRI) that 
formally promoted political stability, peace and economic development, 
increasingly violated human and civil rights. Examples of this include the 
repression of workers during 1956 the, killings of students in 1968 and the 
dirty war on guerrilla groups in the 1970s. In addition to these events, two 
economic crises, one in 1976 and the other 1982, both caused by corruption 
and mismanagement of the economy of the governing political party, would 
further deteriorate the political system, destroying the few economic 
opportunities that had sustained the political system. 8 
In 1983, several reforms to the Constitution were introduced based upon the 
need to address both the economic and political crises. The underlying belief 
was that Mexican society needed a profound change in political and 
economic practices. Economic developmentalism led by the State should be 
replaced by a liberal market-oriented economic system that would promote 
economic and social opportunities. The state would leave individual wealth to 
individual effort, by focusing on the promotion of economic opportunities, 
while withdrawing from productive activities. 
In 1983, the government of the day incorporated changes to the Constitution 
that encouraged a wide liberalisation of society, both in economic and socio- 
political terms. These measures were adopted in response to a crisis that 
according to Pedro Aspe, then secretary of State responsible for economic 
reform, "involved a strong fiscal contraction, the privatisation and liquidation 
of state-owned firms, trade and financial liberalisation, tax reforms, economic 
deregulation, and a redefinition of the strategy to fight poverty. " (In Panuco, 
H., 1996, p. 186) This strategy was completed with Mexico joining the GATT 
(General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade) in 1986 and later NAFTA (North 
American Free Trade Agreement) in 1994. 
4.1 Shifts in the distribution of benefits and burdens. 
A for a chronicle of governmental mismanagement and repression see Carlos Mlonsivais: ;\ ustedes les 
consta. ERA, 1980. 
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Since 1983 market oriented policies were implemented in order to eliminate 
subsidies to staple goods, such as corn, beans and milk. These reforms were 
justified as measures designed to enhance individual opportunities. Pedro 
Aspe, the junior minister and minister of the exchequer from 1982 to 1994, 
created and implemented economic and social reforms to achieve 
liberalisation objectives. It is worth quoting him at length: 
The constitutional aim of Mexico is a democratic one achieved not 
only through free access to the polls and freedom of speech, but also 
through the right to an education, to a job, to a fair salary, to do 
business, to health, to an adequate pension, to decent housing and 
other basic needs. Our failure on carrying out this mandate lay in 
thinking that the state on its own had to provide everything, without 
respect for the initiatives and creativity of individuals. 
Modernisation [... ] has a profound social dimension. [It has] the 
commitment to respect the initiatives of the community and to promote 
individual achievement [... ] It is aimed at strengthening Mexico 
through unity, progress and social justice. 
The stabilisation of the economy through realistic budget 
management, the privatisation of state-owned enterprises, fiscal 
reform, economic deregulation, financial reform, the liberalisation of 
trade, the renegotiation, of the external debt, and the strengthening of 
land tenure rights is the new way on which the people of Mexico are 
carrying out an ambitious reform of the State. We are facing the 
challenge of making the transition to an open economy and an open 
society. In abandoning its role of proprietor, the state has taken on 
greater solidarity with the need of the poor. (Aspe, P., 1993, p. xi) 
The basic liberal assumption that emerges in Pedro Aspe's writings is that an 
open society and economy, where competition through free markets is the 
norm, provides for the basic needs of the population, as people are offered 
more and better economic and social opportunities than before. In his opinion 
economic growth and productivity would bring more benefits and the market 
would distribute these benefits. 
In order to illustrate the reforms, we can consider the rural areas. The 
Constitution of 1917 formally guaranteed the State's intervention in economic 
areas that were considered relevant to the welfare of disadvantaged groups. 
The agrarian sector was the most regulated. In 1992, Article 27 of the 
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Constitution dealing with communal land property was reformed to withdraw 
the State's intervention in land redistribution. Thus 1) the State would not 
longer be responsible for land redistribution, 2) the communal land would be 
able to be sold, 3) subsidies would be eliminated for most crops and the 
government would no longer bail out farmers debts, and 4) agribusiness 
could operate now up to 2500 hectares. Proof of this rapid transformation, 
which intended to redirect farmers' production to export products and provide 
individual property rights, is given by the technical support offered to farmers 
by the State. If in 1990,59.6% of 'ejidatarios' (communal landowners) were 
given technical assistance, in 1994 only 8.6% had some or any. (Otero, G., 
1999a, pp. 193-195) 
One of the most important liberal reforms of the liberalisation process was 
the fiscal reform of 1989. It is relevant in view of what the State was going to 
distribute from now on and how should it be distributed. The fiscal reform had 
as an explicit aim, a "commitment to social justice", 
A tax reform is not only a matter of economic efficiency, but a 
commitment to social justice. An effective reform has to address the 
need to apply resources to the most pressing needs of the poor, but it 
also has to create the incentives and provide equal opportunities for 
everybody to participate in the formal economy, to produce, compete, 
and achieve a better standard of living. (Aspe, P., 1993, p. 117) 
In order to provide incentives for everybody to participate in the formal 
economy, the reform introduced new tax bands, reducing the cap of income 
tax from 50% to 35%, and providing for a simple tax structure. The tax reform 
incorporated almost a million of new taxpayers and according to Aspe it's 
objective was "a fairer distribution of the tax burden" (Aspe, 1993). The 
overall strategy of the tax reform was to increase the number of taxpayers, to 
modernise the fiscal structure, to provide incentives for production and derive 
more resources to health, education and poverty alleviation. A clear shift from 
giving priority to outcomes, towards giving priority to opportunities was 
underway. 
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Modernisation for the reformers implied that universal benefits were not 
proving efficient, as their goal of reaching the worse off was not being 
attained, thus a complete restructuring of the distribution of benefits 
commenced. The relevant feature of this new distribution process was that 
direct benefits would be targeted to those who needed them most. Crucially 
there was also a shift in the way economic advantage was understood by the 
government. Before 1983, poverty was considered as a failure of the State, 
and from then on, poverty would be considered as a particular problem of 
certain geographical areas and people. Consequently, specific policies were 
created to alleviate poverty in defined areas, whereas previously, universal 
benefits, subsidies, investment in education were viewed as the solution. 
4.2 Poverty alleviation programs during liberalisation. 
The main project of the government from 1988 to 1994, with respect to 
poverty alleviation was 'Solidaridad' or 'Pronasol'. This project directed a 
considerable amount of resources to three main areas, which according to 
Panuco were: 
" Welfare benefits (including the distribution of food bundles, 
vouchers, subsidies to consumption, health and education 
infrastructure improvements, and the provision of electricity, 
drainage, urbanisation, housing and water). 
" Production benefits (mainly rural credit, and loans for the 
acquisition of productive infrastructure and irrigation projects) 
and 
" Regional development programmes (which include the 
construction and repair of roads and highways, as well as 
municipal funds). (Panuco, 1996, p. 207) 
Through this program the State would assist the poor in fending for 
themselves. But clearly this help would be stating clearly that joint 
responsibility existed between the poor and the State. In other words the 
State would support the poor not by providing direct capital resources, but via 
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benefits directed to increase their self-reliability and, crucially avoiding state 
welfare dependence. From 1994 up to 2000, a new program called Progresa 
was underway. Aid was going to be directed only to those individuals 
considered unable to afford a balanced diet and other very basic needs. The 
rest of the poor would have to be helped by the overall economic growth and 
improved opportunities. (Levy, S., 1991, p. 52) 
The general objective was to end the paternalistic State, and promote self- 
reliability in a good macro-economic environment able to provide "the 
benefits of [economic] growth to all members of society". (Aspe, P., 1993, 
p. x) 
4.3 Civil and political rights during liberalisation. 
In terms of individual guarantees and workers rights, the period of 
liberalisation is one of contrasts. In formal terms the law was strengthened to 
protect civil and political rights. For instance Article 21 of the Constitution was 
amended in 1983, eliminating the government's privilege to detain people for 
an administrative fault, reducing the penalty from fifteen days to 36 hours. 
This particular civil right had been guaranteed since the Constitution of 1857, 
however the code considered the State's interest more important than the 
individual interest and allowed for special circumstances, which de facto 
permitted many violations of human rights. 
In the same order of reforms, the figure of ombudsman was created to 
protect human rights. Appointments, at the federal and state levels, had to be 
sanctioned by the legislature. This approval process provided for partial 
independence of the ombudsman, considering that in many states as well as 
in the national chamber of deputies and in the senate, the majority was held 
by the same party (PRI). However, the most important reform during this time 
was the creation of an independent electoral supervisory body in 1995, which 
led to clean presidential elections in 2000, with the electoral defeat of the 
party in power for the last 70 years. 
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5. Summary 
Throughout Mexican history, there has been a pressing need to clearly define a 
plural liberal conception of social justice, how to evaluate and realise it. For 
example Morelos supports the idea that freedom and liberties guaranteed by the 
law would procure economic growth and a more equal society. Morelos idea 
concurs with the intentions of the liberal reforms of the 1980's and 1990's. 
However, the lack of clear improvement in the reduction of poverty and 
inequality suggest that this conception of social justice cannot succeed without 
closer supervision by the state when it comes to economic market outcomes. 
The same can be said of the previous outcome oriented approach. 
This brief introduction suggests that we can trace in all versions of Mexican 
liberalism a general aim of providing sufficient material means and economic 
opportunities to citizens in order for them to start fully exercising their rights. We 
can also trace a concern to benefit the worse off either by attempting to 
universalise benefits, aiming to provide certain minimal outcomes, or by 
focalizing direct benefits and increasing the economic opportunities. The mixture 
of both attempts, reflected in the latest poverty alleviation programs makes the 
Mexican liberal experience interesting. However this general egalitarian aim has 
not historically been adequately described for a situation of severe scarcity of 
social and financial resources and a weak institutional framework. 
I will suggest that liberalisation during the 1980s and 1990s and especially in the 
1990s has not entirely succeeded in their development aims of creating growth 
and reducing absolute poverty, among other things because it has only counted 
on the liberal aim of creating opportunities as a way to reduce poverty and 
inequalities. This not only seems implausible in the short term but unfair to the 
worse off, due to the severe scarcity of social and financial resources that would 
impede any possible autonomous improvement. 
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In the next chapters I will enquire into what conception of social justice could 
better realise the egalitarian aim under scarcity, fulfilling the historical 
objective of Mexican Liberals of providing or promoting a social minimum for 
all Mexicans. In order to do this I will explore how could these theoretical 
discussions provide a fundamental moral aim for poverty alleviation 
programmes. 
My hypothesis is that the egalitarian aim is wrong when it proposes to 
distribute scarcity between similarly situated individuals. Justice requires 
being concerned for the least advantaged members in society, but this 
concern has to take into account available resources, institutional 
weaknesses and the number of people to be benefited. Furthermore, for just 
reasons benefits should be graded and have morally relevant thresholds. 
Thesis Outline 
In Chapter 2I will evaluate the liberal normative question of how to fairly 
distribute resources in situations of severe scarcity. The main contribution of 
this chapter is to propose a progressive sufficientarian approach when 
distributing social resources in a society under severe scarcity. Priority 
should be given to those who are situated below the lowest morally relevant 
threshold of several relevant ones, in an effort to maximise the number of 
people reaching this threshold. 
In Chapter 3I will deal with the question of what area of human experience 
should be taken into account when considering a just distribution. What to 
distribute becomes relevant to evaluate whether the historical social objective 
of the Mexican liberal state has been the adequate one. The main 
contribution of this chapter is that a minimal lower threshold for benefiting 
people has to consider basic human capabilities, while the rest of thresholds 
should consider resources and opportunities. 
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Chapter 4 relates the questions of how and what to distribute to poverty 
measurement and how different just distributive criteria affect these results. I 
will also suggest that the normative approach can provide a different 
perspective for measuring the injustice of an income distribution and thus 
giving grounds to operate the conception of social justice. The analysis of 
poverty and deprivation measures under different distributive criteria 
suggests that in designing poverty alleviation programmes, distributive 
criteria should be taken into account for them to be effective. 
Chapter 5 considers the Mexican case. It provides a detailed analysis of 
poverty alleviations programmes, especially Progresa (1996-2000). The 
chapter considers whether this poverty alleviation program follows the 
normative objective suggested when distributing severily scarce resources. 
The analysis illustrates, how this poverty alleviation program has followed a 
simple prioritarian approach, targeting the poorest without considering further 
direct benefits for the rest of the poor. The programme's design does not take 
into account individual differences in transforming resources into well-being, 
thus inhibiting the development of those targeted. 
Chapter 6 assesses the extent to which the progressive sufficiency normative 
objective remains unfulfilled in the case of Mexico. After providing poverty 
comparable estimates of the last 50 years I provide detailed results on data 
analysis from 1992 to 2000, in relation to deprivation and income poverty. 
Using micro data from household surveys of 1992,1994,1996,1998 and 
2000 I will consider whether the last poverty alleviation program might be 
succeeding. 
In the main overall conclusion, after summarizing my findings I concluded 
that a progressive sufficientarian approach solves some of the problems that 
relational egalitarians have, and some of the problems faced by weighted 
prioritarianism. It offers as well a better form of sufficientarianism. 
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Chapter 2: How should we distribute when our aim is social justice? 
2.1 How should anti-poverty policies distribute scarce resources? 
Equality, Priority, Sufficiency 
There are various general theoretical questions that must be addressed 
when considering which fundamental moral aims should guide the design of 
poverty alleviation programmes. Two of the most important questions to be 
asked are a) how benefits and burdens should be distributed justly, and b) 
what benefits and burdens matter. This chapter addresses the first of these 
questions. It is concerned with the way in which an individual's claim to be 
benefited may depend on a complex range of factors; such as, how badly off 
she is, how much she could benefit, and whether other individuals are better 
off, as well as further aggregative considerations. Before addressing practical 
questions about policy and institutional design, we need to clarify some of 
these prior issues. 
A broad group of political philosophers hold the belief that justice requires 
equality to be one of our main distributive criteria. I will claim, in general, that 
egalitarianism could be better served by using a mixed distributive criteria. 
Progressive sufficiency, as I call this criterion aims to minimise the number of 
persons below different morally relevant thresholds. I believe Progressive 
Sufficiency is a better conception of social justice under severe scarcity than 
Equality. In particular I will advance some ideas as how this criteria can 
better express our just intuitions in distributive problems under situations of 
extreme scarcity. 
I will assume that scarcity means a situation where is not feasible for every 
individual to reach a threshold of a minimal decent life. Incidentally this 
discussion can be applied in some cases in affluent societies where some 
individuals due to brute luck cannot reach some social threshold. 
In discussing competing egalitarian conceptions of distributive justice it is 
customary to distinguish two questions: 
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First: how should resources be distributed between individuals who 
have equal claims to those resources? 
Second: which standard of interpersonal comparison should be 
employed to determine when one individual is better off than another? 
For illustration of the first question, suppose that scarce resources must be 
distributed amongst a group of individuals none of whom is more deserving 
than any other, or has any special entitlement to those goods. Suppose too 
that we have a prior commitment to some form of liberal democracy, and that 
the individuals are co-citizens in such a political community. How should 
resources be distributed? 
There are at least three distinct responses to this question, which can be 
briefly stated as follows. 
Equality: Nobody should be worse off than anyone. 
Priority: Resources should be used to benefit individuals, and more 
weight should be given to benefiting less advantaged than more 
advantaged individuals. 
Sufficiency: Each person should have enough resources. 
I shall argue that under certain conditions of severe scarcity and institutional 
weakness we should favour a sufficientarian rather than egalitarian answer to 
my question, and aim to ensure that as many individuals as possible have 
enough resources to reach certain morally relevant thresholds. This 
conclusion is important because many individuals in developing countries live 
under such conditions. We need to bear those facts in mind when asking how 
egalitarian conceptions of distributive justice, which were originally devised 
with affluent countries in mind, might be applied to developing countries. 
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Equality 
Before presenting the progressive sufficientarian answer to our main 
question, I want to point some difficulties with the two other main responses, 
dealing first with relational egalitarianism. 
In his Lindley Lecture, "Equality or Priority? ", Derek Parfit asks whether 
egalitarians should be concerned with the gap between better off and the 
worse off individuals or should rather only be concerned with benefiting the 
worse off, even if this would increase the gap. Arguing against the first view, 
he writes, 
If inequality is bad, its disappearance must be in one way a 
change for the better, however this change occurs. Suppose that 
those who are better off suffer some misfortune, so that they 
become as badly off as everyone else. Since these events would 
remove inequality, they must be in one way welcome [... ], even 
though they would be worse for some people, and better for no 
one. This implication seems to many to be quite absurd. I call this 
the Levelling Down Objection. ' 
The Objection suggests "if we achieve equality by levelling down, there is 
nothing good about what we have done. ,2 If this conclusion is plausible, then 
relational egalitarianism faces a powerful challenge. Since prioritarianism 
never requires levelling down, it escapes that challenge. The Objection 
therefore supports a preference for prioritarianism over egalitariansm. 
Some, however, claim that the Levelling Down Objection is not as conclusive 
a refutation of relational egalitarianism as it may first appear. Larry Temkin 
has argued that the appeal of the Objection relies upon implicit acceptance of 
Derek Parfit: "Equality or Priority?, in The Ideal of TgquaIity, NI. Clayton & A. Williams (Eds. ), 
Macmillan Press, 2000. p. 98 
Part-it, Op ('it., p. 99 
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the person-affecting principle that one outcome can be better than another 
only if it is better for some individual, and that this Slogan, as he calls it, is not 
always sound. For example, a world in which Saints fare better than Sinners 
is in one way better than a world in which both fare better though Sinners 
fare even better than Saints. 
Note that even if there are some cases in which levelling down is, in some 
respect, welcome, it seems especially implausible to claim that this is true in 
the cases of severe scarcity which are my primary concern. I doubt that it is 
in any respect welcome for more individuals rather than fewer individuals to 
suffer extreme poverty. I conclude there is a reason to reject an unrestricted 
version of relational egalitarianism even if Temkin is correct to claim that the 
key implicit premise of the Levelling Down Objection should be rejected. 
Priority 
One of the clearest moral reasons we have to help someone in need is 
based on a basic humanitarian concern, a concern with the urgency of the 
claims of those who are badly off. Prioritarians generalise from this concern, 
and conclude we should aim to improve each individual's condition but attach 
greater moral urgency to benefiting an individual the worse off she is. 
As an answer to our main question, this conclusion faces what might be 
termed the prioritarian dilemma. The dilemma arises because there are two 
different ways of specifying how much priority to attach to benefiting the least 
advantaged. 
The most familiar prioritarian distributive principle, Rawls's Difference 
Principle, attaches lexical priority to the interests of the least advantaged. It 
doing so it implies that it is preferable to improve the condition of less rather 
than more advantaged individuals no matter how small the improvement the 
first individual undergoes or how large the improvement the second individual 
foregoes. Rawls himself stresses that the Difference Principle should be 
evaluated on the assumption that certain background conditions hold, and so 
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is not committed to lexical prioritarianism in all cases. As I shall now explain, 
there are good reasons for him to withhold support from such an extreme 
view since it neglects too much morally relevant information. 
Indicating the first horn of the prioritarian dilemma, Nagel points out that 
giving lexical priority to the least advantaged does not take into account, "the 
relative quantities of improvement involved, and also the relative numbers of 
persons. "3. In addition, he argues that in some cases it "is more reasonable 
to accord greater urgency to large improvements somewhat higher in the 
scale than to very small improvements lower down". 4 
Nagel's remarks have important implications for cases of severe scarcity with 
which I am especially concerned. In these cases lexical prioritarianism might 
require very large sacrifices for large numbers of badly off individuals in 
exchange for small improvements in the condition of very few individuals who 
are even worse off. Since such a requirement seems implausible, I conclude 
that an unrestricted version of lexical prioritarianism should be rejected. 
Lexical prioritarianism, however, might be replaced by what I shall term 
weighted prioritarianism. Parfit suggests this alternative way of deciding how 
much weight to attach to the interests of the least advantaged. Assuming the 
pluralist view that competing values might justify tempering our concern with 
the least advantaged, he writes: "... benefits to the worse off could be morally 
outweighed by sufficient benefits to the better off. To decide what would be 
sufficient, we must simply use our judgement. "5 
Parfit's suggestion indicates the second horn of the prioritarian dilemma. It 
arises because flexible prioritarianism provides such incomplete guidance in 
addressing my main question of how to distribute resources in cases of 
conflicting claims. In the absence of some method for attaching specific 
weights to benefiting individuals depending on their level of advantage, it can 
` Nagel, T: "Equality" in 01) cit, p. 63 
Nagel, Op. Cit., 1). 76 
Parfit, 01) Cit., p. 101 
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accommodate a huge range of answers. For example, depending up which 
method is adopted, a flexible prioritarian principle might barely be 
distinguishable from either a purely aggregative principle which requires 
maximising the sum of advantages, or a lexical prioritarian principle which 
requires maximising the prospects of the worst off. 
This flexibility might be a theoretical advantage insofar as it enables 
proponents of prioritarianism to argue that some version of their view is likely 
to provide the correct answer to our question. However, without a clearer 
account of that favoured version, their view offers little practical guidance. 
Sufficiency 
I have argued that relational egalitarianism is implausible under conditions of 
severe scarcity, and that prioritarianism veers between extremism and 
practical indeterminacy. Sufficientarianism instead would solve the practical 
prioritarian problem by setting a clear threshold to be reached. In this chapter 
I shall discuss various versions of the sufficientarian claim that in distributing 
resources we should aim to ensure that as many individuals as possible have 
enough. 
According to Harry Frankfurt, there are two ways in which individuals might 
be considered to have enough. The first is to consider that "... a limit has 
been reached, beyond which it is not desirable to proceed", and the second 
is to consider that "... a certain requirement or standard has been met, with 
no implication that a larger quantity would be bad. ,6 Assuming money is the 
measure of advantage, Frankfurt argues in favour of the second version, 
claiming that "enough" would be reached when "the person does not (or 
cannot reasonably) regard whatever (if anything) is unsatisfying or 
distressing about his life as due to his having too little money. " 
The contrast between sufficiency and equality can be shown in two different 
types of case. In the first case of moderate scarcity everyone has their 
6 Frankfurt, 11: "Equality as a moral ideal" in Ethics, 1987. P. 37 
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morally relevant needs satisfied, and they are mostly content with their 
situation. Frankfurt argues that in this case sufficiency is achieved even if 
inequality remains. He also insists that the pursuit of equality loses its moral 
appeal, and might be wasteful since it would harm some people's prospects 
without benefiting anyone. 
When severe scarcity is present the difference between equality and 
sufficiency is even more evident. To illustrate the difference, consider the 
following modification of an example suggested by Frankfurt. Suppose we 
have enough units of medicine to allow some, but not all, members of the 
population to survive; for example, there are 10 people and 40 units of 
medicine, that 5 units are necessary to for survival, and 4 units are necessary 
for a painless death. Under such conditions, it seems plausible to claim that 
an equal distribution of medicine resulting in painless death for each 
individual would be worse than an unequal distribution in which 8 individuals 
survive and 2 individuals die painfully. 
Since this example is a case in which the maximin distribution fails to secure 
a minimally acceptable level of advantage for each individual - i. e. survival 
- it also illustrates how lexical prioritarianism can diverge from 
sufficientarianism, and produce less plausible results. 
A sufficiency view does not require any individual to accept a lower level of 
advantage simply in order to achieve equality, regardless of whether this 
benefits anyone. Thus, it escapes the levelling down objection, though 
depending on how sufficiency is defined it may make certain inequalities 
relevant when evaluating distributions. Sufficiency can also escape the 
problem of unreasonable opportunity costs faced by the extreme version of a 
prioritarian view. However, like weighted prioritarianism it risks being ad hoc. 
Most obviously, it faces the problem of where to draw the line. 
This chapter explores some of these lines of argument in more depth. Its 
specific aim is that of establishing a "hybrid" view, which combines concerns 
underlying each of the three criteria in a coherent manner. I will first discuss 
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equality and the levelling down objection, as well as the instrumental and 
impersonal reasons to oppose certain inequalities. I then move on to discuss 
the family of prioritarian views, considering the critique of the extreme view 
and asking whether the description of the worse off members of the society 
can be made more specific. Sufficiency will be discussed as an incomplete 
view that does not accord ultimate importance to any single value. I argue 
that sufficientarians are correct to insist that thresholds matter, but that it 
would be mistaken to conclude that a single threshold matters. Instead it may 
be more plausible and useful to consider a series of thresholds that specify a 
hierarchy of aims that might be pursued when distributing benefits and 
burdens. 
2.2 Equality 
Assuming a commitment to liberal democracy would require that citizens are 
entitled to exercise a fair share of political power through voting and running 
for office, and that they are obliged to obey the law which results from a 
democratic process. These two minimal conditions of liberal democracy 
might have implications for distributive justice as they could serve as a 
political guide for economic and social policy. 
A basic idea of liberal citizenship would imply that citizens are considered by 
the law as free and equal moral persons, each having a right to equal respect 
and consideration. In order to guarantee equal respect and consideration to 
citizens the state should at least extend their civil and political rights and 
arrange social institutions in a manner that ensures that these rights can be 
fully exercised. By accepting and participating in a democratic process, 
citizens commit themselves to obey the laws arising from the process. 
Society's institutions determine the way in which benefits and burdens are 
distributed among citizens. Citizens are in their right to demand that social 
resources are distributed fairly and sufficiently to exercise their rights. If this 
does not happen, citizens might question their commitment to respect the 
law. However, the normative question of how to adequately interpret equal 
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respect and consideration to citizens in the distribution of benefits and 
burdens remains a matter for discussion. 
The immediate egalitarian answer to our distributive question of how benefits 
and burdens should be distributed between people, none of them, a priori 
more deserving and none with prior special entitlements, has had a clear 
appeal as an ideal. The interpretation of this ideal, however, has been a 
matter of consistent debate in recent years. One of the questions put to 
egalitarians has been whether they value a diminution of the gap between 
the worse and better off for its on sake, or should they give priority to the 
worse off, even if this increases the gap. (Clayton, M. & Williams, A., p. 1) 
Formulated by Derek Parfit, this question naturally leads to a distinction 
between two general types of egalitarianism. First, strict egalitarians would 
claim that an unequal distribution of burdens and benefits among people is in 
itself morally bad, other things equal (its badness may be outweighed by 
other considerations). Thus a reduction of the gap between the worse and 
better off would be considered a moral improvement, other things equal. 
Egalitarians of this type would be concerned with how one group of people 
fare compared to others. They would be concerned, for instance, with their 
relative deprivation. 
On the second less strict interpretation of the egalitarian ideal, egalitarians 
would not consider the gap between people as having much moral 
significance, thus they argue that we should be more concerned with the 
worse off than with the existence of the gap itself. This type of egalitarians 
would be more concerned with the "absolute level of advantage that people 
enjoy: the less well off a person is, the more urgent morally it is to benefit 
her. " (Clayton, M. & Williams, A., p. 3) 
When assessing social and economic policy, this distinction works in so far 
as we might determine whether the structure of benefits and burdens 
prioritises benefits for the worse off, or is more concerned with the reduction 
of the gap between people. For instance, if we consider the poor as the 
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worse off, we could evaluate whether a particular poverty alleviation policy 
has been designed to either reduce the gap between the poor and the non- 
poor or only to address their absolute levels of disadvantage. 
2.2.1 Strict Egalitarianism 
For instance equality of opportunity as a version of strict egalitarianism might 
consider the gap between people in life prospects as unjust in so far as this 
gap has been produced by differences in social backgrounds. That is, it 
would consider poverty unfair only if it were due to reasons not related to the 
individual choices. The aim of equality of opportunity would be to provide a 
fair start to the competition. However if we claim equality of opportunity we 
have to ask what is an opportunity to achieve X? 
We could consider that it might be secured by either: 
(1) There being no legal prohibition on one having x, 
or: 
(2) The fact that X is in one's feasible set, i. e. one could achieve X if one 
chose X. 
In order to guarantee equality of opportunity (2) should be secured. The 
intuitive idea is that as long as it is feasible, a person who would choose X, 
but who seems incapable of achieving it for social reasons beyond her 
control should be given priority. The unequal social and economic 
preconditions surrounding the choice of different life opportunities bias the 
race and perpetuate unfairness in life and in social institutions, thus making 
inequalities hard to justify. 
Accepting that strict equality aims to reduce the gap between people, strict 
egalitarians should not be concerned if the gap reduction is attained following 
other objectives. For instance, we could maximise utility by benefiting the 
poor thereby obtaining a more equal distribution. This might be rejected by 
strict egalitarians because the value of equality has not been followed. For 
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strict egalitarians, however, equality can be of value in different ways. For 
instance it can be instrumentally valuable in terms of its effects, like securing 
the self-respect of the worse off, or intrinsically valuable for other reasons 
than its effects. Intrinsic egalitarians might value equality either as derivative 
from a wider ideal; for example, social cooperation would involve public 
knowledge that everyone is equal. Non-derivative egalitarians by contrast 
attach ultimate value to equality. 
2.2.2 The Egalitarian ideal 
To better understand the egalitarian ideal we need certain clarifications about 
differences in its aims. I will use M. Clayton and A. Williams' taxonomy to 
clarify these differences. 
"... equality might either be instrumentally valuable because of 
its effects, or intrinsically valuable for reasons other than its 
effects. Instrumental egalitarians might aim for equality in order, 
for example, to secure the self-respect of the least advantaged 
or reduce certain forms of social antagonism. Intrinsic 
egalitarians display a less contingent commitment to equality 
[... ] those who are derivative egalitarians value equality as a 
constitutive element of some wider ideal [... ] Unlike instrumental 
and derivative egalitarians, non-derivative egalitarians attach 
ultimate value to the achievement of equality. " (Clayton, M & 
Williams, A., 2000, p. 4-5 
To illustrate these distinctions consider Thomas Scanlon's reasons for 
rejecting inequalities: (Scanlon, T., 2000) 
1) Relieve suffering or severe deprivation; 
2) Prevent stigmatising differences in status; 
3) Avoid unacceptable forms of power or domination; 
4) Preserve the equality of starting places which is required by procedural 
fairness; and 
5) Procedural fairness sometimes supports a case for equality of outcomes. 
38 
Reasons (1), (2) and (3) are clearly instrumental as closing the inequality gap 
will have the beneficial effects of avoiding peoples' suffering, promoting 
people's self-respect and preventing "unacceptable forms of power 
domination". These reasons aim to alleviate suffering, preserve individual 
freedom and autonomy, values which could be described as part of a very 
abstract and formal idea of giving equal consideration to people's 
comparable claims. 
Reason (1) provides the strongest direct argument for action of the three 
instrumental reasons. The relief of suffering is clearly morally more important 
than the securing of self-respect. However, once suffering has been relieved, 
other aspects of human life obviously become relevant. It is a matter of 
discussion whether securing self-respect or securing political control of our 
public lives is a more important reason in aiming for the elimination of 
inequalities. 
Reason (4) can be cast as an example of intrinsic derivative egalitarianism. 
We have moral reasons to believe that eliminating inequalities would make 
things better for some people in terms of fairness. Crucially, this commitment 
to equality will not only benefit those who are being treated unfairly but also 
improve society in terms of other values. Procedural fairness expresses the 
idea of formal equality, laying the groundwork for real equal opportunities, 
which if provided adequately would only leave those socio-economic 
inequalities that are due to differences in talents. As the individual might 
better judge their own skills, differences in outcomes could be considered the 
result of individual choices, leaving space for analysing inequalities as a fair 
by-product of equal consideration. Equality seen from a derivative 
perspective becomes an important value, but not a fundamental one that can 
trump other important political values, like civil or political liberties. 
Reason (5) although the clearest egalitarian reason of all, as it is aiming to 
equalise economic or social outcomes without considering other competing 
values, can also be considered as derivative from a broaden ideal of fairness. 
This type of egalitarian will seek to eliminate all inequalities in the socio- 
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economic areas as part of a wider aim to secure social co-operation, 
considering them to be products of unfair pre conditions in the first place. 
Missing in this lengthy list is a non-derivative egalitarian reason, one that 
simply states that equality is a fundamental value. Although Scanlon does not 
argue in favour of equality for its own sake in his list, such a reason Scanlon 
argues would have the form of a "... straightforward moral ideal of substantive 
equality, [... ] the idea that a society in which people are equally well off (as 
determined by some appropriate measure) is for that reason a morally better 
society. " (Scanlon, 2000, p. 47) 
We might identify this approach as reason (6). Scanlon argues that this 
position lacks the moral urgency of the five outlined above which have 
morally independent value and appeal to different political ideals. However 
the simple moral appeal to a conception of a society where everyone is 
equally well off in socio-economic terms, is an old and strong ideal drawing 
on an ethos where an unequal society is bad, and that the inequality gap 
between people must be closed in order to produce a good, even if the 
achievement of the good produces damages to some or all. 
In this brief taxonomy of reasons, I believe it is clear that only reasons (2), (5) 
and (6) imply a straightforward total elimination of inequalities. The other 
reasons are concerned with equality but do not demand substantive equality 
in all socio-economic aspects. If we take on reasons (2), (5) and (6), it would 
thus seem that inequalities should be avoided not only because inequalities 
have bad effects (instrumental reasons for rejecting inequalities) and do not 
help us to realise our other general moral objectives (intrinsic derivative 
egalitarianism), but also because inequalities are bad in themselves (intrinsic 
non derivative egalitarianism). This taxonomy of forms of egalitarianism 
shows a clear moral pattern, from less stringent to a stricter version of the 
moral value. Types might cut across one another but differences are 
sufficiently clearer to distinguish when one type is being used. 
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Each of these types of egalitarianism is open to different criticisms. One of 
the strongest critiques is levelled at intrinsic egalitarianism of the non- 
derivative form. Egalitarians of this kind, even though they would accept that 
the intrinsic value of equality can still be overridden by other values, would 
have to commit themselves to eliminating inequalities even in circumstances 
where no one would benefit, prompting critics to ask if this form of 
egalitarianism should be rejected. We would still be aiming for equality but for 
other moral reasons, such as those found in the derivative or instrumental 
kind of egalitarianism. However, if we reject egalitarianism of the strict non- 
derivative kind, the case for equality weakens, especially when we consider 
reasons for the redistribution of socio-economic resources in order to reduce 
inequalities where there is no wrong doing, unfairness or bad effects involved 
(Parfit, D., 2000, p. 100). 
2.2.3 Parfit's critique of intrinsic non-derivative egalitarianism. 
Strict non-derivative egalitarians contend that as differences between 
individuals are wrong, the gap has to be closed, notwithstanding the possible 
negative consequences. Central to this approach is a belief that equality is 
one of a few fundamental values. This idea of equality also relies on its 
relational characteristics: those who are worse off are so because there are 
others who are better off. Therefore, if no one is better off, it is impossible to 
claim that someone is worse off in relative terms. Thus in most cases 
eliminating inequality would be good, pro tanto. 
Derek Parfit asks whether egalitarians should be concerned at all with the 
gap between the better off and the worse off, or simply more concerned with 
benefiting the worse off, even if this increases the gap between the two. His 
critique is directed at non-derivative egalitarians claiming that unjustified gaps 
between people are wrong. 
If inequality is bad, its disappearance must be in one way a 
change for the better, however this change occurs. Suppose that 
those who are better off suffer some misfortune, so that they 
become as badly off as everyone else. Since these events would 
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remove inequality, they must be in one way welcome [... ], even 
though they would be worse for some people, and better for no 
one. This implication seems to many to be quite absurd. I call this 
the Levelling Down Objection. (Parfit, D., 2000, p. 98) 
To illustrate the Levelling Down Objection (LDO) let us consider a 
hypothetical example, where the time frame of benefits is the very short term 
and the number of people involved is not a concern. Consider a society 
where differences relate only to income levels, in this society only 10% of the 
population holds the productive assets while the rest are all equally extremely 
poor, though benefits are growing. Paraphrasing Parfit, non-derivative 
egalitarians must admit, that if the rich by a rare coincidence find their assets 
frozen and appropriated by the authorities for military purposes and not social 
development ones, this would be a fortunate coincidence in some way as 
now everyone will be equally poor, by making some worse off than before 
and leaving the poor still very poor. 
The point Parfit emphasises is that such news is not good in any way, and 
that "if we achieve equality by levelling down, there is nothing good about 
what we have done. "(Parfit, D., 2000, p. 99) The change of conditions is worse 
in some ways for everyone and no better in any form for no one. While we 
would be able to claim that equality had been achieved in that people are no 
longer worse off in relative terms, we could not claim that they are better off in 
absolute terms. 
Returning to my example, if we level down the rich, everyone will be poorer in 
absolute terms, although there will not be a relative difference because the 
poverty gap has been closed. The case Parfit is making is that some people 
in this kind of scenario end up worse off than before, but also that equality 
has not helped anyone in any way or made anyone better off. It is clear that 
this situation will not be good for anyone, as the derived benefits from the 
capital invested by the rich will disappear and the abolition of poverty will be 
farther away. The situation where a few are very rich and the rest are equally 
poor seems not to be helped by a relative approach to equality. 
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Furthermore, if we consider that in such a society, ignoring the richest ten 
percent, differences in their relative position would come only from individual 
effort or by accident, the decrease of future benefits caused by the 
expropriation of productive assets, would make their efforts useless. As 
future benefits diminish, those who are economically and socially worse off 
would suffer the most through no fault of their own. Equality in this example 
would not promote a good. The corollary of the Levelling Down Objection is 
that equality in its strictest sense might well damage the better off without 
benefiting the worse off. 
For the above example and its corollary to be convincing we need to accept 
that for strict egalitarians equality has priority over benefiting people, and this 
is not necessarily so, as a strict egalitarian could hold a pluralist view, where 
equality would be a very important value but not the only one. Larry Temkin 
follows this line of thought disputing the validity of the LIDO, by appealing to a 
pluralist moral view. 
2.2.4 Critical assessment of the Levelling Down Objection 
Larry Temkin rejects the (LDO), seeking to preserve the value of strict 
equality; he claims that the LDO has at its root an idea that he calls the 
slogan. 
One situation cannot be worse (or better) than another if there is 
no one for whom it is worse (or better). (Temkin, L., 2000, p. 134) 
The slogan serves the purpose of providing an idea of damage or benefit that 
is strictly tied to individuals. In this sense, all value judgements of damage or 
benefit have to be related to someone. If there is no one to whom such 
judgements can be related, any possible judgement becomes incoherent 
since one cannot damage or benefit a non-existing entity and judgements of 
damage or benefit must be granted in existing persons. Temkin's strategy for 
rejecting the strength of the slogan is to prove that there is at least one 
instance where we might consider the slogan to be inadequate. 
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Temkin appeals to the idea that there are impersonal values that can show 
things to be bad, even if no one is damaged. Temkin also argues that there 
are some impersonal values that can be objective, independent of the way 
they might affect someone. One of these values is proportional justice, which 
Temkin illustrates with an example that distinguishes between the gains 
received by saints and sinners. According to the slogan, values must be 
person-related, so if saints receive what they deserve while sinners receive 
even more, this situation would be better than a situation where each 
receives what they deserve. This conclusion is obviously counterintuitive at 
least in the sense of proportional justice. Temkin expresses the idea in the 
following way. 
"To the question 'how could one situation be worse than 
another if there is no one for whom it is worse? ' one might 
respond, 'it could be worse if it were worse regarding 
proportional justice. ' This would express the view that an 
outcome's being better or worse for people is not all that 
matters, proportional justice does too. " (Temkin, L., 2000, p. 
134) 
An outcome can thus be assessed in different ways, not just in terms of 
benefits and burdens to people. As long as we accept that some values are 
objective, though not necessarily overriding, we can value many situations or 
actions independent of the benefit or harm that accrues to people. Accepting 
that a situation can be unjust or bad even if there is no one involved weakens 
the LIDO, allowing a claim that equality can be said to have value even if 
there is a situation where everyone will be worse off. 
If we accept that the value of equality has an impersonal independent value, 
as Temkin argues, we are committed to saying that an equal situation is in 
some ways always better than an unequal situation. However, Temkin also 
accepts that benefiting people is important. Here we might be confronted with 
an undetermined moral situation as to which value to follow and when. For 
example in cases of life and death, it is not at all clear that equality should 
take precedence, as benefits for one person might be much higher than to 
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the other. It would seem then, that only in cases of lesser moral urgency 
equality would take precedence over possibly smaller benefits. 
The possible balance to be taken in a pluralist view, could be given by the 
limits imposed by the LDO, where benefiting the worse off becomes more 
important. However, once this has been achieved, equality gains relevance, 
although in a derivative way. This in fact would suggest that the strict non- 
derivative idea of equality is undetermined, making it hard to use as a 
political guide. It would seem then that apart from accepting that strict 
equality has some value in Temkin's sense but that benefiting people in 
occasions of moral urgency is more important, in Parfit's sense, we must also 
be concerned with the size of the benefits we are going to distribute and 
whether of not these benefits will make a moral relevant difference, say 
between life and death. In short we have to be concerned with relevant levels 
of advantage. 
2.2.5 Summary 
Parfit asks whether egalitarians should be concerned at all with the gap 
between better off and worse off individuals or simply concerned with 
benefiting the worse off, even if this would increase the gap between the two. 
The Levelling Down Objection is used by Parfit to demonstrate how concern 
for the worse off could be more important than pursuing intrinsic non 
derivative equality. Temkin' answer to this concern is that intrinsic 
egalitarians should hold to their ideal, considering that equality is important 
by its own sake. However, the Levelling Down Objection still shows that 
consequences could be worse for everyone if we pursue pure equality in 
some situations, showing that benefiting people it is some times more 
important. We are thus led to consider a pluralist view, where equality would 
be an important but not the most important value in the assessment of a 
situation. One of these situations to consider would occur when confronted 
by an extreme scarcity of resources, where benefits become relevant if they 
reach an adequate level, not before. In such instances, it would seem we 
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should consider benefiting the larger number of individuals, in order to 
respect equally morally deserving individuals. 
Thus, this section shows us that in considering a distribution, we have to be 
concerned not only with how people fare in absolute terms and how people 
fare relative to each other, but also with the morally relevant levels of 
advantaged people have. I'm proposing that we should accept a complicated 
moral gradient perspective where equality becomes important only after 
certain point where high moral urgency has been given to benefit the worse 
off. This is in fact a kind of complicated sufficientarian view with prioritarian 
and egalitarian concerns. Let us consider first the prioritarian view. 
2.3 PRIORITY 
By far the clearest moral reason we have to assist someone in need is based 
in a basic humanitarian concern, a concern with the "... urgency of the claims 
of those who are worse off ... 
" (Scanlon, T., 2000, p. 42) Suppose we are 
distributing scarce goods amongst a group of individuals, none of whom is 
more deserving, and with none possessing a prior special entitlement to 
those goods. The distributive answer to our humanitarian concern might be 
the following: while we should aim to better individuals, greater moral 
urgency should be attached to benefiting individuals who are worst off. 
This basic humanitarian concern in terms of those who need our help the 
most, according to Scanlon, has three basic characteristics. In the first place 
it can have egalitarian consequences, as a transfer of resources from those 
who are better off to those who are worse off, without concomitant bad 
effects, can close the gap between the two groups. The second characteristic 
is that our concern is strictly directed at alleviating the conditions of the worse 
off, and is in direct proportion to the moral urgency of their claims. Finally, the 
third characteristic expresses the importance we attach to the urgency of 
moral claims: as an individual's situation improves the moral need for 
humanitarian assistance gradually diminishes, eventually disappearing 
entirely when the individual is no longer extremely worse off. 
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Although clear in their objective, our humanitarian concerns, invoking as they 
do a direct moral obligation to avoid damaging people, suffer from two related 
problems: the first is how do we recognise who is worse off and the second 
where do our moral obligations cease to apply? 
2.3.1 Priority view 
Derek Parfit considers a similar view of this same humanitarian concern, a 
view that in principle can solve the indeterminacy of the humanitarian 
concern. He calls it "The Priority View: Benefiting people matters more the 
worse off these people are" (Parfit, 2000, p. 101). Parfit argues that our 
concern for the worse off obliges us to give moral priority to their claims. 
Simply stated we should help most those who need assistance the most. In 
Parfit's view, the moral urgency of some claims compels us to help, usually 
with egalitarian consequences, and our help is also a function of people's 
needs. 
To this point Parfit's view has not differed analytically form Scanlon's 
humanitarian concern for the worse off; however, the third characteristic in 
Scanlon's framework, is stricter than Parfit's view. For Parfit, benefiting the 
worse off does not cease to be a priority when the situation is no longer 
extreme, but only when people cease to be worse off. In Parfit's view, an 
unequal state of affairs that becomes equal would be better not because it 
creates equality, but because the gain to the worse off is more important 
even if the losses for the better off are greater. He uses the following 
example. 
In this manner "benefits to the worse off do more to make 
the outcome better. We could claim that this is why (1) is 
worse than (2). " 
(1) Half at 100 Half at 200 
(2) Everyone at 145 
(Parfit, D., 2000, p. 116) 
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Parfit's point clearly depends on the level of benefits to be lost by the better 
off. If everyone would be equal at 101, there would seem that the losses are 
far greater than the benefits and that they should not be accepted. The 
problem is recognized by Parfit, he argues that as in any other pluralist view 
where we accept competing values, "... benefits to the worse off could be 
morally outweighed by sufficient benefits to the better off. To decide what 
would be sufficient, we must simply use our judgement. " (Parfit, 2000, p. 101) 
This view seems to be indeterminate, especially when the main force of the 
priority view lies in benefiting the one who needs it the most. We could say, 
for instance, that our "judgement" would tell us that benefits to someone who 
has been living in bad conditions for all her life are more important to some 
small benefit which would relieve a rich person from occasional but recurrent 
suffering. InParfit's view we might not accept this. The problem is that we do 
not know what is the relevant sense in which we should consider that 
benefits to the better off outweigh benefits for the worse off. 
This being so in the priority view, in most occasions Parfit's prioritarian view 
would remain committed to benefiting the worse off, notwithstanding the 
consequences to the slightly better off. This conclusion would make Parfit's 
prioritarian view appear in some circumstances too extreme, even if Parfit 
does not demand an absolute priority to the worse off. For instance, 
intuitively we would prefer benefiting someone suffering extremely even if 
the same resources could help a larger number of people to be slightly 
better off. The direct priority to the worse off until they are no longer worse 
off, leaves Parfit's margin of intervention open to interpretation, as intuitions 
could not always be supported. Different interpretations can impose large 
costs on those who are not considered worse off, costs that sometimes 
should not be accepted. Thus the limits to our moral concerns with the worse 
off are not clearly set with Parfit's rationale. 
The humanitarian view, by contrast, limits our concerns in clearer way, 
although the priority given to the worse off is weaker. In the humanitarian 
view we would benefit the worse off only when the moral urgency is extreme 
48 
and when those cases can be described in adequate terms. To assess both 
views consider the alternatives, where the loss from one group is the gain for 
the other. 
(1) Half at 70 Half at 200 
(2) Half at 100 Half at 170 
(3) Half at 120 Half at 150 
(4) Everyone at 135 
Let us say that 70 is an extreme hardship and 100 is the avoidance of this 
hardship. While a move from (1) to (2) is demanded by both the 
humanitarian and the prioritarian concern, a move from (2) to either (3) or (4) 
is indeterminate. We can say that a move to (4) from (2) is better because 
the gains for the worse off count for more, but in view of the losses for the 
better off and the small gains for the worse off we could also say that a move 
to (3) is preferred in the overall situation. That is considering the losses from 
the better off in the original position. Both options (3) and (4) seem equally 
open to the priority view. The indeterminacy in choosing either option would 
suggest us to appeal to the humanitarian version of priority to the worse off, 
where there are clearer limits to transfers between groups, as it only requires 
placing the worse off above certain threshold, (2). However, this threshold 
would necessarily make us reject the claims of those who are worse off in 
relative terms. This option, though clearly limited seems not fair. 
To illustrate this problem consider a pastoral society where 90% of the 
population is equally poor and share the same risk of dying of hunger if 
drought occurs. All of the members of this group share the benefits from the 
economic activities the rich undertake in the short term, decreasing the risks 
of hunger in the long term. If we apply the priority view here, we reach the 
same conclusion as in a derivative egalitarian view, accepting the status quo 
in order not to jeopardise the incoming small benefits. The worse off in this 
case would be those who are at risk and because in this view we do not 
believe in relative comparisons, we are bound to consider that the worse off 
are those who suddenly are in the worst absolute condition. 
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For example, let us assume the rich have a strange and painful hereditary 
illness, which has been incurable but tolerable. However, advances in 
medical science make this cure available to a high cost, a high cost which is 
so expensive it risks the future benefits of the poor as resources would be 
diverted to fund the cure and not the productive activities that grant the long 
term benefits for the poor. Here the priority view would accept that scarce 
resources should be distributed to those who are ill, because the suffering of 
the rich is in the short term worst in absolute terms than the worry of those 
who are at risk of either acquiring the illness or in a moderate risk of dying of 
hunger in the long term. Furthermore, as we are supposed to give absolute 
priority to the worst off, as we are comparing individual's absolute levels of 
need, we should distribute benefits accordingly. Say that in order to 
safeguard partially future benefits for the poor, the economic advisers claim 
that the poor have to co-operate to fund this cure and a goat of each herd 
should be sold, after all, this would not make people worst off in absolute 
terms and would partially safeguard future benefits. 
The above example seems to be unreasonably extreme with people above 
the minimal position; the poor not only would become poorer in the short 
terms but will also increase their chances of famine in the long term. We 
have to remember that scarce resources are being distributed. However we 
do not have in this form of humanitarian prioritarianism a way to limit the 
benefits for the worse off, if the worse off are considered only in short term 
absolute terms. For instance the justification for Parfit's priority view lies in 
the independent moral urgency of people's needs. There is no relational 
characteristic such as that found in the egalitarian view, allowing us to 
assess, in theory, each case considering it in absolute terms and not in 
relative terms. In this way the plea of the worst off person will be dealt with in 
first place and there is no risk of damaging some while benefiting none, as in 
the Levelling Down Objection. However, I suggest that the above example 
shows that we need to appeal to long term worse off characteristics in order 
to assess what are the relevant levels of advantaged that should be 
considered. 
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While preserving a humanitarian prioritarian view, it would seem that we 
require a contrast between positions that can only be given by the egalitarian 
option, as it considers relative concerns and can easily incorporate the long 
term perspective, as it does not depend on the short term worst off position. 
However, a prioritarian could argue that the priority position can claim that 
the long term perspective and the attributed indeterminacy can be solved by 
being more strict in the view and not permit trade offs as in Parfit. 
2.3.2 Strict prioritarian view 
The common argument in favour of the strict priority view is based in the 
appeal to a social contract. The basic idea is that a social contract aiming to 
provide equal respect to everyone must include safeguards for those who are 
left behind. In A Theory of Justice, John Rawls considers that such principles 
of social justice, which would guarantee those safeguards for the worse off, 
could be agreed by rational self interested individuals, behind a hypothetical 
veil of ignorance. In this hypothetical place, the characteristic self-interested 
individuals of the society would lack morally relevant information about the 
positions they will occupy. Thus they will rationally come to choose those 
principles that give priority to the worse off group as they could very well end 
in that group. Rawls' argues that the principles of social justice rationally 
chosen by individuals similarly situated in the original position, will take the 
form of a democratic idea of justice: 
(1) Each person has an equal right to the most extensive scheme 
of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar scheme of liberties 
for all. 
(2) Social and economic inequalities are to meet two conditions: 
they must be (a) to the greatest expected benefit of the least 
advantaged (the maximin criterion); and (b) attached to offices and 
positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity. 
(Rawls, J., 2000, p. 27) 
Both principles of justice as fairness, as Rawls calls it, assess the basic 
structure in the society, and are part of a public conception of justice which 
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helps to solve public conflicts among individuals. One such conflict is over 
fair distribution of benefits to the least advantaged group, the measure of 
which is measured in terms of an index of social primary goods, in a strict 
order of importance, rights, liberties, and opportunities, income and wealth, 
and the social bases of self-respect. These goods are supposed to be 
needed by everyone apart from anything else they want or seek to reach. 
The argument supporting part (a) of the second principle, the maximin rule or 
difference principle, assumes that the natural distribution of talents and social 
positions in society, are moral arbitrary characteristics that should not be 
taken into account when considering a fair distribution. The principle applies 
to luck from natural advantages, but equal opportunities (b), applies to social 
advantages. Rawls considers that those in the original position would not 
choose an egalitarian distribution of talents and social places, as differences 
in talents are an opportunity for mutual advantaged. 
At first sight the [unequal] distribution of natural assets and the 
social contingencies of life-expectations threatens the relations 
between free and equal moral persons. But when the maximin 
criterion is satisfied, these relations may be preserved: no one 
benefits from natural accidents and social contingencies except in 
ways that are to everyone's advantage (recall that inequalities are 
assumed to exist) and, in particular, the least favoured. (Rawls, J, 
2000, p. 32) 
There are various readings to Rawls' maximin criterion, without entering in 
too much detail, suffice it to say that maximin gives absolute priority to the 
worse off group, taking into account individual's whole lives and future 
generations. In this reading, as long as the worse off are made better off, 
benefits to the better off that would safeguard the general overall benefits, 
especially the future prospects for the worse off, should be accepted. We 
have to understand the maximin principle as the best arrangement for social 
institutions to guarantee basic liberties, wealth and income to the least well 
off or in other words, inequalities in wealth and income are unfair only if they 
fail to benefit the least advantaged. (Parfit, 2000, p. 119) 
52 
Now, if Parfit's prioritarian view remains indeterminate as we do not have a 
definite way to decide between providing small benefits to the worse off and 
larger benefits for the better off, the maximin principle suggest that we should 
always give priority to the worse off. 
To illustrate these thoughts consider the following alternatives: 
(1) Half at 70 Half at 200 
(2) Half at 100 Half at 170 
(3) Half at 120 Half at 150 
(4) Everyone at 135 
Considering that Rawls holds a view of primary social goods that can be 
described as a social minimum, say that (100) is this minimum, option (1) 
then, would be rejected as the worst possible situation of the four, as the 
gains to some have made others fall below the minimum. (2) would be an 
acceptable level if there is a dynamic process of increasing bene fits. 
However if we accept the view that we must give absolute priority to the 
worse off in this dynamic process, we would regard the prospect of the 
reduction of future total benefits as not acceptable. Thus, we must accept 
option (3) because it would not damage future prospects of the least well off, 
as option (4) would. Inequalities are accepted not only because they are 
benefiting the worse off but also because they are benefiting them in their 
future prospects. 
The latter approach shows that Rawls' maximin criterion for wealth and 
income permits large inequalities as long as the future prospects or actual 
benefits for the worst off group are clearly forthcoming. However, the way the 
worse off are determined and the absolute priority we must show towards 
them can also have extreme consequences for the next worse off group, 
especially when the principle requires us to maximise the benefits or 
prospects for the worst off groups and then for the second worse off group. 
To illustrate this thought consider a fiscal policy that would take from all 
groups five pounds in order to give the poor ten more pounds in their income 
allowance. Since the policy would also be taking five pounds from the poor, 
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they would end up with only five 'more pounds. However the next 
representative group do not receive any income allowance, they will be five 
pounds worse off in their net income. This net loss will be harder for the next 
worse off group than for the rest of the groups as they could very well drop 
their income to a level similar to the first group. In other words the opportunity 
cost for some is greater that for others. We can further complicate this 
objection, if we consider that the second worse off group is formed by a very 
large number of people. Under this rationale, as long as the better off can 
produce more overall wealth and the worst off can receive growing benefits 
or better future prospects; those above the minimal position but below the 
maximal position could suffer unreasonably large costs. 
2.3.3 Contrasts between priority views 
Taking the priority view in its strictest and most extreme sense, the claims of 
the worst off group have priority over the less urgent claim of the next worse 
off person. However, our concern with the first worst off person can impose 
large costs on the marginally less worse off person. For instance, we prefer a 
small benefit to the worst off, even though with the same resources we can 
provide more benefits to a relatively better off person. Part of the problem 
stems from the level of benefits received by individuals and by the description 
we give of the worst off. 
Rawls' view does not leave any space for compromise. As long as the 
prospects for all are not endangered, the group that is worst off in terms of 
income and wealth has absolute priority. Parfit's view, in contrast, remains 
indeterminate, it does not explicitly give absolute priority to the worse off, 
leaving us with an open judgement about the trade off between levels of 
advantage to the better off and the worse off. The humanitarian concern in its 
turn sets a clear limit to the benefits distributed to the worse off. Such a limit 
is given by a description of the urgency of their claims in terms of extreme 
need. Once this extreme need is addressed however, their claim looses 
moral force. 
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To illustrate the different forms of prioritarianism I have discussed, consider 
the following options. 
a) 70 150 200 
b) 100 151 230 
C) 150 151 300 
d) 145 155 250 
The humanitarian concern would at least demand option b) as the extreme 
urgency of the worse off will cease at 100. Parfit's view and Rawl's view 
would demand option c), not considering option d) on grounds that benefits to 
the worse off count for more and overall more benefits are better than less. 
On what grounds could we select option d) which seems to be less hard for 
those above the minimal position, and furthermore increase equality? 
Thomas Nagel argues in favour of a conception of moral equality that gives 
priority to the urgency of people's claims. 
Something close to unanimity is being invoked. An arrangement 
must be acceptable first from the point of view of everyone's most 
basic claims, then from the point of view of everyone's next most 
basic claims, etc. (Nagel, T., 2000, p. 69) 
The validity of individual claims would come from a type of social contract 
that might ensure placing ourselves in other people's shoes and assess if 
social arrangements are accepted by everyone. As we should also be 
concerned with the moral value we assigned to certain overall outcomes, 
Nagel considers that we need a criterion of unanimity that respects individual 
opinions. In order to respect individual opinions, we must think in terms of 
conflicts of interest between individual claims, seeking the selection of an 
option by these same individuals that is minimally unacceptable. 
The chosen option would have to take into account our own impersonal view 
of our situation and our impersonal consideration of other people's situation. 
In this way we might accept a worse position because we recognise as more 
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important the claims of the worse off. It is in this sense that Nagel's view 
gives priority to the claims of those who have fared worst from social 
arrangements. However, Nagel continues on to argue that giving absolute 
priority to the worse off, as Rawls does, fails to account for "the relative 
quantities of improvement involved, and also the relative numbers of 
persons. "(Nagel, T., 2000, p. 63) This might result in large costs, for instance 
to middle class people, in exchange for very small benefits to a smaller 
number of poor people. 
It is more reasonable to accord greater urgency to large 
improvements somewhat higher in the scale than to very small 
improvements lower down. (Nagel, T., 2000, p. 63) 
Nagel stresses that our moral outlook will be incomplete if we do not take into 
account individual levels of advantage and the relative number of persons 
involved. In a simple one to one comparison, the interest of the worse off 
person would have priority. However, taking into account numbers and levels 
of advantage, we should be equally concerned with the gains and losses with 
respect to relative advantage. 
Returning to the four outcomes discussed above: 
a) 70 150 200 
b) 100 151 230 
C) 150 151 300 
d) 145 155 250 
Nagel's prioritarian view, taking levels of advantage only, I would claim would 
choose option d) as the one which would allow the relatively better off in the 
middle to gain more compared to the relative gains of the worse off from their 
point of departure (a), and the relatively lower gains of the better off, 200 to 
250. Priority has being given to the worse off, but it is not at an absolute 
priority. This view would be supported if we consider the number of people 
involved; levels and number of people have to taken into account at the same 
time to adequately assess options. 
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2.3.4 Summary 
The discussion in this section has shown, in one hand, a progressive grading 
of moral concern. From the humanitarian concern which limits its intervention 
to the elimination of extreme need to a qualified concern with the worse off, 
up to an absolute priority with the worse off. In the other hand this grading of 
concern is related with the specific weights we give to people's different 
claims and to the aggregated numbers of people involved. Derek Parfit offers 
a simile with the idea of increasing marginal utility, where benefits to some 
will matter more than benefits to others. As benefits could matter more to the 
better off, this law could make inequality greater and leave morally deserving 
people without benefits. The simile he proposes is a law of increasing moral 
goodness, where benefits to the worst off will always matter more. Taking 
into account other moral relevant claims, like the number of persons involved 
in the assessed outcome and the level of advantage held before the 
distribution, a graphic of such a law with an increasing relevance provided by 
the direction of the arrow, would have the following form. 
Humanitarian view Moderate Priority Absolute Priority 
The weakest prioritarian option, the humanitarian view where priority is given 
only to those needs that are considered to be extremely urgent, seems to be 
the option with fewer problems. From this option onwards, the problems of 
identifying how much weight to give to the less well off, as well as issues 
about the imposition of large cost on those above the minimal position seem 
to be unnecessarily complicated, leaving much space for disagreement 
between many conflicting interests. 
The problem for the prioritarian view seems to be that our moral concern 
towards for the worse off takes naturally a gradient form, exactly what the 
priority view claims to be its virtue. This gradient has to incorporate other 
parts of our moral outlook, and so complicates our moral judgements, an 
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issue that the priority view was supposed to ease. Thus it seems that the only 
clear-cut answer arises when we are judging the possible outcome of two 
individual competing claims. However, when the number of people and the 
moral weight of their claims enter into the discussion the decision becomes 
indeterminate. 
One way to partially solve this indeterminacy is to propose a distribution that 
would only provide enough to meet minimal requirements of differing moral 
relevance. If we succeed in describing this level of advantage, we would be 
able to give priority to the claims of those who do not have enough to reach 
such differing levels, thereby not only easing our moral description, but also 
providing an account that accords with our other moral concerns. This 
possible distribution would be close to the one called sufficiency, emerging 
from the indeterminacy of the non-extreme prioritarian view. 
2.4. SUFFICIENCY 
I have argued that relational egalitarianism is implausible under conditions of 
severe scarcity, and that prioritarianism veers between extremism and 
practical indeterminacy. A turn to sufficientarianism would solve the practical 
problems of prioritarianism by setting a clear threshold to be reached. In what 
remains of this chapter, I shall discuss various versions of the sufficientarian 
claim that in distributing resources we should aim to ensure that as many 
individuals as possible have enough. 
When we ask how to distribute scarce goods amongst a group of individuals, 
none of whom is more deserving or has a prior special entitlement to those 
goods, we can say that we should aim to ensure, at the very least, that as 
many people as possible have enough of these goods. Our most basic moral 
humanitarian concern supports the idea of giving priority to the worse off as 
long as their condition remains urgent. This urgency will cease when their 
level of advantage has risen sufficiently. A clear example of this basic moral 
concern is the force we give to our moral obligation to help those with 
unsatisfied basic needs. However, when these basic needs are satisfied the 
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strength of their claims over us is weaker. This solution to our distributive 
problem, which we can call sufficiency, depends clearly on our description of 
where to draw the line. 
2.4.1 Contrast with egalitarianism 
As noted earlier a pure form of egalitarianism would promote a situation 
worse for everyone, provided that equality is attained, which Derek Parfit 
claims cannot be good in any way. Instead he proposes a priority view, 
where concern for the worse off has first priority. But, as Nagel & Sen argue 
an extreme version of this idea might impose unreasonably large costs on 
those who are not considered to be worse off, even if they are only 
marginally above the bottom described position. Qualifying this view to allow 
us to give priority to the slightly better off would, however create uncertainty 
about how much weight to give to each individuals claims. In this context, the 
sufficiency approach replies that we do not have to loose the value of 
equality which would provide a clear limit to claims, because as long as we 
provide to people what is enough to reach certain outcomes, we are 
respecting their equal claims. 
According to Harry Frankfurt, we can consider what is enough for people in at 
least two forms. The first is to consider that "... a limit has been reached, 
beyond which it is not desirable to proceed" and the second is to consider 
that like "... a certain requirement or standard has been met, with no 
implication that a larger quantity would be bad. " Frankfurt, considering money 
as the measure of advantage, argues in favour of the second version, 
claiming that "enough" would be obtained when "the person does not (or 
cannot reasonably) regard whatever (if anything) is unsatisfying or 
distressing about his life as due to his having too little money. "(Frankfurt, H., 
p. 37) In describing our basic moral humanitarian concerns with the worse off, 
we are pointing out the individual characteristics that we consider to be bad 
in absolute terms, i. e. suffering, deprivation. The priority we are morally 
obliged to show to people in this situation changes when their situation start 
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to improve, we gradually cease to give moral priority to those who cease to 
have morally extremely urgent needs. 
The preference satisfaction a person obtains when having enough, according 
to Frankfurt, is determined by her interests and circumstances, bad or good. 
Frankfurt argues that a person satisfied with her level of advantage would not 
have any reason to desire more, although she would accept more even if she 
is not actively seeking it. This is one of the reasons Frankfurt criticise 
egalitarians, he claims that as egalitarians are not usually concerned with 
inequalities between the rich and the extremely rich, this shows that they 
should only be concerned with those who have too little according to his idea 
of enough: "The fact that some people have much less than others is morally 
undisturbing when it is clear that they have plenty. "(Frankfurt, H., p. 33) For 
Frankfurt, those morally relevant characteristics that make a life bad or 
unsatisfactory are the only justification for redistribution. The concern has to 
be with the satisfaction of an individual's morally important needs. Thus, 
Frankfurt argues, equality not only fails to provide adequate criteria for 
differences in need satisfaction, but also damages some people's 
expectations. 
Frankfurt's ideas of sufficiency can be understood in terms of reaching a 
threshold that would have the form of a natural equilibrium between people's 
needs and expectations on one hand and resources on the other. Such 
equilibrium is supposed to emerge from autonomous decisions, thus there 
would not be any problem in the resulting levels of achievement. The moral 
appeal of this equilibrium is that it guarantees that as many people as 
possible reach their goals. When addressing the issue of individual 
advantage it argues that it would be morally better that as many people as 
possible reach a sufficiency threshold in the equilibrium sense. By contrast, 
some forms of equality would set an impersonal threshold that while being 
higher or lower than people's expectations might have possible conflicts. 
The contrast between sufficiency and equality can be shown in two opposite 
situations. Consider a situation of moderate scarcity where everyone has 
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their morally relevant needs satisfied and remains mostly content with their 
situation. In this case equality would loose its appeal because differences in 
wealth would be considered products of effort or life's informed choices. Thus 
a search for equality would harm people's outcomes at no benefit for anyone. 
When greater scarcity is present differences between equality and sufficiency 
are more evident. Frankfurt proposes an example to illustrate the distributive 
differences. Suppose we have enough units of medicine to allow some, but 
not all members of the population to survive. Say there are 10 people and 40 
units of medicine, and each person need 5 units to survive. An egalitarian 
distribution, Frankfurt claims would be morally unacceptable, as all would die. 
This is an extreme example of the Levelling Down Objection, as everyone will 
be worse off if we accept an egalitarian distribution. Priority in its case would 
not help either, as the worst off ex ante are all the members and we cannot 
help them all, and ex post would be those two persons who are left to die and 
our distribution cannot maximise their interests. 
In both cases, that of moderate scarcity and that of extreme scarcity, 
egalitarians can respond that although equality is important it is not a 
supreme value. This is more acute in the extreme case, where it is obvious 
that egalitarians would not accept a distribution that leads to the death of 
everyone. The problem is that equality is silent in these types of cases, or 
simply appeals to luck. Instead, Frankfurt argues we should aim to distribute 
enough units of medicine to maximise the number of people who are over the 
threshold. It would be better to save some people than to allow everyone to 
die. The egalitarian claim that nobody should have fewer goods than anyone 
else for reasons beyond her control would be morally mistaken in this case 
as everyone would die. The sufficiency approach would be morally 
acceptable, as it would guarantee that as many people as possible is 
benefited. In this form the sufficiency approach escapes the Levelling Down 
Objection. 
Another important claim can be made in an egalitarian spirit when 
considering thresholds. We can say that when "some people have less than 
enough, no one should have more than enough. "(Frankfurt, p. 31) For 
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Frankfurt this is also mistaken. For instance, adding one unit to the forty units 
of medicine to be distributed among 10 people needing five units to survive, 
would allow us to give one extra unit to one of the worse off people. As each 
individual needs five units to survive, the one unit would not make any moral 
difference. People need to reach the threshold and if this is not possible, one 
additional unit for those who have enough, even when there are others who 
have less than enough, can be morally acceptable. A crude example of this 
would be a policy that took a small amount of resources left after raising as 
many people as possible to the morally relevant threshold, not to further 
advance those under the threshold, but to build a park for those who are 
relatively better off, would be morally acceptable only if we accept that there 
is no other option to bring one more individual to the threshold. 
To illustrate these ideas, recall our example of a pastoral society where 
ninety percent of the population is equally poor and in danger of dying of 
hunger if a drought occurs. If we assume that benefits are increasing slowly 
there are two interpretations open to the sufficientarian distribution proposed 
by Frankfurt: either we accept the risk in waiting for most of the people to 
reach the threshold, and thus maximise the number of people reaching the 
threshold; or, to maximise the number of people above the threshold, we 
redistribute the total resources. Consider both options, the threshold being 
100: 
1) 95% at 70 5% at 200 
2) 50% at 100 50% at 70 
In (1) we are assuming that 95% of the population will reach the threshold in 
the medium term, with a low risk of dying. This situation is morally 
acceptable, because most people would eventually reach the threshold, and 
crucially they will reach it by benefiting from the productive activities of the 
richest 5%. Furthermore, as the resources held by those above the threshold 
are not sufficient to change the circumstances of most, having more would 
not be morally objectionable, from this point of view. In 2) we are assuming 
that we have to maximise the number of people above the threshold 
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immediately, which would allow half of the population to avoid the risk of 
dying of hunger, with all of them loosing future benefits as, say productive 
assets would be dispersed, increasing the risk of the other half to almost 
certain death. 
In terms of the proportion of people, in choosing interpretation (1) we would 
be accepting that a low risk of death for 95% in order to save them all in the 
future is better, than let 50% to die for sure while 50% live for sure in (2). 
Interpretation (2) would only accept that is better to save the most 
immediately. Crucially the above analysis depends on four factors: the 
selection of the threshold level, the number of people involved who might be 
benefited or are actually benefited, the relevant time period, and the moral 
risk factor attached to the exercise of reaching the threshold. 
Now, in a pluralist view, the sufficientarian option solves the problem of 
setting the limits for a distribution, by stating that these limits lie in what is 
enough. It shows for instance that these limits, in cases of extreme need and 
extreme scarcity, lie in providing enough resources to the higher number of 
individuals, as fewer resources for more people would be useless. The 
relevance of a limit described in terms of sufficiency is paramount, if we 
assume it as a standard to be reached. It means that benefits would have no 
meaning unless they reach such a limit. For instance, an individual, ceteris 
paribus, requires 2 500 calories a day to be well fed, if a person limits this 
consumption for long periods of time, malnutrition and its derivative 
consequences take permanent hold. To insist that to a hungry person, we 
could provide less than 2 500 calories a day is just a form of administering 
hunger. 
An example of this situation is humanitarian disasters. Aid usually arrives too 
late when people is already malnourished, needing special care to recover 
and usually there is not enough food to provide 2 500 calories to everyone. It 
is an injustice to provide fewer calories to people. Now, if we want to 
minimise the number of people under the relevant threshold we would be left 
with the grim perspective of selecting those who have more probabilities to 
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survive, something that would not have happened if resources arrived in 
time 
If we assume equal respect to individuals, we would have either to draw 
straws to select people who would be fed or consider other moral criteria. In 
such cases, the criterion is clearly a position of saving those who are more 
likely to survive with fewer resources in order to reach more people. We 
cannot assume equal respect as equal chances to be fed as some 
egalitarians would like it to be, nor we can give priority to the worst off as 
most resources would be quickly spent reaching a fewer proportion of 
people. We would have to assume equal respect by doing what would save 
more individuals. 
In cases where scarcity is moderate, standard sufficientarians would claim 
that a single threshold should be reached; this threshold could have the form 
of a social minimum or average income. They would claim that the moral 
urgency to help people afterwards ceases. As I have argued there are many 
reasons to consider that the moral urgency has not ceased but only 
decreased. In fact prioritarians would say this, but they would differ from 
standard sufficientarians as sufficientarians can require benefits to better off 
to get them to the threshold, not catering for the worse off. We can improve 
on priority and sufficiency by proposing that it would be mistaken to conclude 
that a single threshold matters. Instead it may be more plausible and useful 
to consider a series of thresholds that specify a hierarchy of aims that might 
be pursued when distributing benefits and burdens. 
2.4.2 Conclusion 
Progressive Sufficiency 
Advocates of the sufficiency approach often present their approach as an 
alternative to more egalitarian or prioritarian approaches, and employ only a 
single decency threshold when defining their favoured principle. So 
construed, standard sufficientarianism implies that if a number of distributions 
guarantee enough for each individual, then there is no reason to rank those 
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distributions by means of further egalitarian or prioritarian principles. Despite 
its popularity, it is not obvious that we should accept the standard assumption 
that sufficientarians should employ single threshold principles, and flatly 
reject the convictions that make egalitarian and prioritarian principles 
appealing. Instead, I think it is worth exploring the possibility of employing 
multiple thresholds, and aiming to ensure that as many as possible reach the 
first standard, then the next, and so on. 
For illustration of what might be termed progressive sufficientarianism, 
suppose there is a set of discreet goods lexically ordered, namely a, b, c ... 
Say (a) is the capacity to be well-nourished: (a) has a rank from a survival 
diet (al), to a secure adequate diet (a2), on to a pleasurable diet (a3). The 
individual moral claim for common resources diminishes as a person moves 
from (al) to (a2) to (a3) while others have not yet reached the threshold 
below. 
I would further argue that our collective responsibility to satisfy an individual's 
claim to be benefited diminishes in inverse proportion to the increment of the 
capacity of the individual to achieve the good. In this sense, the approach is 
in overall prioritarian, but sufficientarian in the sense that thresholds are 
morally relevant and after certain stage there should not be any more 
redistribution of common resources. Furthermore as we consider inequalities 
bad for people, we should close the gap within and between thresholds. 
We can imagine a simple process where the first threshold, defined in 
absolute terms, has to be achieved by the highest proportion of the 
population. The second threshold, defined in relative terms between the 
people over the first threshold, would require that everyone has average 
opportunities to reach it. The third threshold could be described in similar 
terms. 
To illustrate consider an example regarding medical services. If we consider 
medical insurance as the measure of advantage, we could argue that we 
have a moral obligation to provide the same basic but ample medical 
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insurance to everyone under thresholds. More expensive insurance should 
be privatively bought. For the basic ample insurance everyone should pay 
according to their income level with a progressive increasing nature, in order 
to subsidise the cost for the lower thresholds. In order to determine price for 
the second and third income threshold, we could either set a fix proportion of 
total income within thresholds or assume an egalitarian way of distributing 
cost within and between thresholds. 
In seeing diminishing relevance for less urgent moral need, the progressive 
sufficientarian resemble the prioritarian. Nevertheless, a difference remains 
in their treatment of individuals who are least advantaged, and can be 
benefited only slightly. The prioritarian claims the fact they are worst off 
always provides some reason to attach greater urgency to benefiting them, 
while the progressive sufficientarian says it all depends on the extent to 
which they can be benefited, and what costs doing so has for others. If we 
can't get them to some relevant threshold, but in benefiting them we would 
jeopardise some other individual reaching that threshold, we are not required 
to attach greater urgency to benefiting them. 
An apparent problem with the above view is its possible rigidity. Suppose that 
by pushing one individual just below the lowest threshold we can move 
everyone else above the highest threshold. Is it wrong to do so? The 
progressive sufficientarian would answer that it is wrong. This is due to the 
nature of the first threshold which is described in absolute terms of 
deprivation, individual's moral claims for resources at this stage are more 
urgent than above. 
A further question for progressive sufficientarians, though one shared with 
other distributive rules, is how to adequately describe the content of 
advantage. We have to answer satisfactorily what benefits and burdens 
matter when distributing and whether my answer to how to distribute imposes 
constrains to the answer of what to distribute. 
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Chapter 3: What should be the focus of social justice? 
3.1 What aspects of human life should anti-poverty policies target? 
Welfare, Resources, Capabilities 
In situations of extreme scarcity of social resources where there might not 
feasibly be enough for everyone, the answer to the distributive problem has 
usually been one of equality (Roemer, 1998, p. 201). I have maintained that 
in this type of situations egalitarians should rather appeal to a moral pluralist 
view where many factors matter when we compare various feasible 
distributions, not only equality. Such as how many people are benefited, how 
much people are benefited, how badly off are the beneficiaries, whether any 
of the beneficiaries are so badly off they would otherwise not have enough to 
reach different morally relevant thresholds and arguably, equality at least 
derivatively insofar as inequality is bad for people. These factors can be 
coherently argued for in a view that maintains a graded sufficientarianism. 
This "hybrid" distributive view, which I have called Progressive Sufficiency, 
incorporates elements from Equality, Priority and Sufficiency. It would not 
give ultimate importance to equality; it would give priority to the worse off 
over the better off individuals only under some circumstances and would 
consider that several morally relevant thresholds should be clarified. 
Though a sufficiency principle may sometimes reject the maximin distribution, 
if the sufficiency threshold is low enough that each individual can reach it, the 
two types of principle need not conflict. So, in evaluating the sufficiency 
approach establishing the relevant threshold is very important. It would seem 
however that this view presents a double problem, not only do we have to 
know what standard of interpersonal comparison should be employed to 
determine when one individual is better off than another, but also what level 
of this standard constitutes enough. 
In making sufficientarian interpersonal comparisons, and establishing the 
threshold, the most appealing answer is to consider individuals' abilities to 
transform scarce resources into need-fulfilment, or what Amartya Sen terms 
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"basic capabilities and functionings'. For instance, for an adult to be well- 
nourished would require income, opportunities, information through 
education, etc. In selecting the relevant capabilities, however, we should bear 
in mind the limited information available to distributive institutions. Sen's 
approach requires more and more information as the functionings progress, 
and this may lead to problems. 
For example, the function of participating fully in public life requires too much 
information about the individual for distributive institutions to make an 
adequate comparisons. Such information might concern not only an 
individual's resources and opportunities, but also her previous decision- 
making. Apart from very basic capabilities where not much choice is open to 
the person as to the level of deprivation he holds, it is questionable whether 
certain capabilities are appropriate measures to assess different 
circumstances between people. 
Multiple thresholds 
Advocates of the sufficiency approach often present their approach as an 
alternative to more egalitarian or prioritarian approaches, and employ only a 
single decency threshold when defining their favoured principle. So 
construed, standard sufficientarianism implies if a number of distributions 
guarantee enough for each individual, then there is no reason to rank those 
distributions by means of further egalitarian or prioritarian principles. Despite 
its popularity, it is not obvious that we should accept the standard assumption 
that sufficientarians should employ single threshold principles, and flatly 
reject the convictions which make egalitarian and prioritarian principles 
appealing. Instead, I think it is worth exploring the possibility of employing 
multiple thresholds, and aiming to ensure that as many as possible reach the 
first standard, then the next, and so on. 
For illustration of what might be termed progressive sufficientarianism, 
suppose there is a set of discreet goods lexically ordered, namely a, b, c, d, 
e. Say (a) is the capacity to be well-nourished, (a) has a rank from a survival 
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diet (al ), to a secure adequate diet (a2), on to a pleasurable diet (a3). The 
individual moral claim for resources would diminish as he moved from (al) to 
(a2) to (a3) while others have not yet reached the threshold below. 
Advocates of this type of view argue that our collective responsibility to 
satisfy an individual's claim to be benefited diminishes in inverse proportion 
to the increment of the capacity of the individual to achieve the good. ' In this 
respect the progressive sufficientarian resemble the prioritarian. 
Nevertheless, a difference remains in their treatment of individuals who are 
least advantaged, and can be benefited only slightly. The prioritarian claims 
the fact they are worst off always provides some reason to attach greater 
urgency to benefiting them, while the progressive sufficientarian says it all 
depends on the extent to which they can be benefited, and what costs doing 
so has for others. If we can't get them to some relevant threshold, but in 
benefiting them we would jeopardise some other individual reaching that 
threshold, we are not required to attach greater urgency to benefiting them. 
Those very basic capabilities that cover deprivation and disabilities only 
cover those aspects that are morally sufficiently needed by any person under 
just social institutions to minimally participate in public life. Just social 
institutions would require that citizens freely chose, under social norms and 
resource constraints how to lead their own life, and apart from very basic 
needs, the capabilities required by a person to do this are very difficult to 
assess, we would require too much information from each individual and 
perhaps would end up accepting the welfarist option that the best measure of 
welfare is how a person regards her own life. Instead of this we could argue 
that after certain urgent requirements, social institutions should guarantee 
that a person has enough resources and opportunities to lead a decent life. 
A seeming problem with the above view is its possible rigidity. Suppose that 
by pushing one individual just below the lowest threshold we can move 
everyone else above the highest threshold. Is it wrong to do so? The 
John Roemer in a minmcu Ims propose something akin to this \ icWW. 
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progressive sufficientarian would answer that it is wrong. This is due to the 
nature of the first threshold which is described in absolute terms of 
deprivation, individual's moral claims for resources at this stage are more 
urgent than above. 
One approach to deal with thresholds is to rank basic capabilities. Only when 
we have maximised the number of people reaching the capability to achieve 
a survival diet we would start with the secondly ranked basic capability. I 
claim this is better than the actual situation whereby a sufficiency approach is 
in place where only one such threshold exists. After this threshold is reached 
there is only an indirect further concern. 
Progressive sufficiency presents the problem of where to draw the line of 
these differently relevant moral thresholds. It also sets constraints as to how 
to characterize these thresholds, due to its graded progressive nature. The 
problem of what should we consider morally relevant in the human 
experience for distributive purposes concerns all forms of distribution, and is 
directly related with how we specify that a person is worse off than another. 
This general problem is one of interpersonal comparison, famously 
addressed by Amartya Sen in his essay "Equality of What? " Depending in our 
answer to this question, egalitarians would establish whether inequality 
exists, prioritarians would use the description to "... identify those individuals 
whose claims are morally most urgent. " (Clayton & Williams, p. 8) 
Progressive sufficientarians, for instance, would use it as the prioritarians to 
identify those individuals whose claims are morally most urgent and minimise 
their number below some low sufficiency threshold, after this level they would 
maximize the number of people reaching the following thresholds. After the 
last threshold, by contrast with prioritarians further benefits are not 
considered even if they are worse off in some sense than other people 
further above. 
On identifying what aspects of human life should we consider in order to 
decide which person is better off than another when distributing burdens and 
benefits, one important subject is the relevance of personal responsibility in 
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the person's condition. We could ask whether we should focus only on 
access to goods or on people's achievements. Suppose that everyone 
accepts that we should help the poor, and two poor persons have access to 
the same help in the form of a job offer, but one of them does not reduce his 
poverty for reasons that can be attributed entirely to him, like rejecting the 
job. If we focus only on access, egalitarians would accept their resulting 
inequality. However, focusing only on access to benefits would not allow us, 
for example, to pay the accident's medical bill of the willing jobless, as he has 
not contributed. I argue that justice at least would demand of us that certain 
thresholds of achievement have to be reached by all. 
However, though important contrasting access with achievement does not 
cover all the problems of interpersonal comparison. Another problem relates 
to the type of goods upon we should focus when dealing with interpersonal 
comparisons. (Clayton & Williams, p. 9) Three types are commonly 
distinguished: welfare, resources and capability. The area we select is 
particularly important, especially when we are considering it for purposes of 
social justice, in particular in a poor society, as success in designing effective 
policies to improve the condition of the poor depends partly on the area of 
human life we select. To illustrate, consider a particular way of earning a 
living, fishing. Suppose two fishermen live in poverty, one called Jesus the 
other Judas. When we design policies to alleviate their poverty, should we be 
concerned with their welfare? As welfare has usually been understood as 
preference satisfaction, should we artificially increase the price of fish in the 
state's depot in order to increase the satisfaction they ultimately derive from 
fishing? 
Two clear problems emerge. Jesus is content with his life, though he has 
almost nothing; after all he has been taught to emulate his name kin, and he 
desires little. We could say that he has cheap tastes, as he is satisfied with 
very little. Judas instead wants much more, as he suddenly realizes that he 
can buy many things that he did not want before. We can say that he has 
developed expensive tastes. If we wish to equalise welfare, it would not be 
clear whether we should benefit all type of preferences or some or just the 
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basic ones. As it is not very clear how to deal with welfare we might want to 
look into resources. 
Perhaps we should provide our two fishermen with better quality tools of 
trade or direct income rebates, if market conditions are against them, so as to 
increase their command over resources? However it seems unreasonable to 
focus only in the amount of resources each fisherman ends with. 
Egalitarians, prioritarians and progressive sufficientarians would argue that 
resources couldn't adequately distinguish between people, after all Jesus has 
born with a gift for fishing and Judas not. A resource metric would seem 
incomplete in the latter respect, as Judas would need more resources to 
compensate for his lack of ability. The metric can be thought also as 
superficial, as both fishermen require resources for improving their lives, but 
in order to improve them they would require much else than only resources. 
(Clayton & Williams, p. 9) Perhaps we should look into a middle way between 
welfare and resources. 
Perhaps we should provide them with the opportunity to acquire different 
skills, so that they could change their trade if necessary, thereby increasing 
their opportunities and capabilities? Although it would seem more appealing 
than the two other options, the capability approach runs into a clear problem. 
Apart from the very basic capabilities, we would not know which capabilities 
to support. The list might be extremely large. 
Perhaps all of these, welfare, resources, and opportunities/capabilities--are 
important and should be targeted in our policy designs. However, different 
goals and constraints can compete with one another and give rise to 
conflicts. Where conflicts arise, we must provide arguments for favouring 
particular claims, arguments that consider whether we are focussing on the 
right aspects of human life, and in a fair way. 
Progressive sufficiency for instance would recommend thresholds in 
advantage with the first one described in absolute terms and the second and 
third described in relative terms. Thus we could conclude that both analysis 
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either of the distributive criterion and the currency of the distribution naturally 
fit together in a general prioritarian argument with graded steps of benefits. 
In the literature on what social justice should be concerned with, three 
answers have been prominent: welfare, resources, and capabilities. I will 
survey these in turn, and consider the relations between them. Other 
answers, which emphasize liberty or responsibility, are also possible, as I will 
indicate along the way. I will survey these answers from two particular 
angles. First from perspective of a poor country, enquiring what does this 
perspective add to the standard debate and second, enquiring whether my 
answer to how to distribute imposes constrains to the answer of what to 
distribute. 
3.2 Welfare as the focus of social justice. 
Welfare can be understood in several ways, one of the more common ones is 
preference satisfaction. However considering individual preference 
satisfaction as a measure of interpersonal comparison in order to distribute 
scarce resources could seem irrelevant if we accept every person's 
evaluation of her own situation as the main form to distribute resources, 
private interests would overcome common ones. According limits, not only to 
the type of preferences that can be included in a distribution but also limits in 
the form of thresholds to the accepted preferences, perhaps could allow 
some objective measure. A distributor could argue that common resources 
should be distributed only to satisfy basic welfare as well as limiting 
resources to a certain common measure of welfare. 
However these restrictions directed to make the welfare criteria more 
objective could still present problems when we compare the welfare of the 
worse off. One of these problems relates to the responsibility every member 
of the society has to respect other people's interests. If we assume that we 
should give priority to benefit welfare achievement in the lower threshold, it 
could very well be that the gap between the individual welfare and the 
threshold has to be filled without any contribution from the individual. If there 
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is no contribution when it is due, either in effort or in resources, this would 
restrict the possible benefits coming to other individuals as more resources 
would be needed to benefit individual welfare achievement. 
The latter problem is related to the cheap and expensive tastes problems 
where the welfarist faces a dilemma of whether to benefit those with 
expensive tastes, like those recently acquired by Judas or not benefit those 
with cheap tastes, like Jesus, though knowing that it would seem unfair not to 
close the gap between the two. I will assess the welfarist option for 
interpersonal comparison and consider some of its general problems. 
3.2.1 Forms of welfarism 
The idea of welfare suggests a concern with what is of fundamental 
importance in a person's condition, rather than of merely instrumental 
importance. The concept of welfare "... was adopted, in fact, to provide a 
metric for assigning a proper value to resources: resources are valuable so 
far as they produce welfare. " The intuitive appeal of welfare lies in the 
recognition of differences that affect our judgement about a person's 
condition. (R. Dworkin, 1981, p. 191) 
Ronald Dworkin gives an example that can illustrate this relevance. A father 
has several children, one is blind, another a playboy with expensive tastes, 
and a third a poet with few needs. The question Dworkin makes is how the 
father shall write his will? If the father believes in welfare for interpersonal 
comparisons he will take into account these differences. He will also have to 
decide on some conception of welfare in order to balance the need of the 
blind son with the expensive tastes of the playboy and the cheap tastes of 
the poet. (Dworkin, 2000, p. 12) 
In Dworkin's example we can readily observe both the appeal and the 
problems of welfare as a metric for interpersonal comparison. It is intuitively 
correct to consider that the needs of the blind son require more resources to 
improve his welfare. However although we accept this, it is not clear enough 
whether it will be fair to provide fewer resources to the poet while accepting 
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the playboy's expensive tastes, something that equality of welfare would 
mandate. In order to illustrate these kind of problems let us consider a 
precise conception of welfare. 
Welfare has been understood in several ways to reflect this suggested 
fundamental importance in a person's condition: as utility, as happiness or 
preference satisfaction. Dworkin (2000: p. 17), arguing against welfare as the 
right metric for distributive justice, reviews several conceptions of welfare. Let 
us consider preference satisfaction. This conception would establish that "... 
a person's welfare is a matter [of] his success in fulfilling his preferences, 
goals, and ambitions... " Dworkin divides preferences into three types, 
political, impersonal and personal preferences. Political preferences are 
those preferences one would have for them to be followed by others. 
Impersonal preferences are those not necessarily directly affecting other 
people but requiring common resources, and personal preferences are those 
preferences about a person's own life and circumstances. He argues that 
even restricting the scope of welfare to personal preferences, welfare cannot 
be coherently considered by any theory of distributive justice. 
Dworkin argues that in order to avoid the subjective nature of personal 
evaluation of success in life, we would need an independent form to compare 
people's success. He proposes that for a person to consider her own life as a 
failure, she has to have reasonable causes of regret that she has not had 
whatever share of material resources she is entitled to have. The problem 
lies, Dworkin argues, in the existing circularity of reasonable regret. This idea 
would require "... an independent theory of fair shares of social resources... " 
Welfare in these terms cannot be the basis for a theory of fair shares, 
because the relevant welfare comparisons must presuppose such a theory. 
(Dworkin, 2000, p. 39) 
Before rehearsing the possibility of providing objective thresholds to welfare, 
let us consider a further argument against it. 
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3.2.2 The problem of expensive and cheap tastes 
Dworkin rehearses a further argument against welfare. His argument 
considers the problem arising from the seemingly counterintuitive obligation 
either to benefit those with expensive tastes or not to benefit those with 
cheap tastes. The dilemma can be better described considering malformed 
preferences, a form of cheap tastes. If we want to avoid pampering the rich 
by sourcing their voluntarily acquired expensive preferences, we cannot 
benefit those with malformed preferences as they have been chosen. As this 
seems to be an internal problem for the welfarist conception, the only form to 
solve it would be to appeal to an independent metric again, rendering the 
welfare metric inadequate to compare individuals. 
Recall the father's doubts about how to divide his resources between his 
children, one blind, the second a poet with humble needs and a third a 
playboy with expensive tastes. The father could very well reason that it would 
not seem right to leave more resources to the playboy than to the poet and to 
the blind son. However he would need some justification for not doing it 
considering that he is giving relevance to their children's own evaluation of 
success, and with this metric he should provide for each son's preferences. 
The force of the subjective evaluation of success lies in the assumption that 
each son has autonomously arrived to such preferences. If the father has any 
respect for their children's integrated personalities he would accept their 
choices or simply would assume different needs towards welfare 
achievement. A problem emerges though when we consider intuitively unfair 
the results coming from the assumption of autonomy for two similarly situated 
persons. The son who develops new expensive tastes would require more 
resources, but in this same vein, the son with cheap tastes would have to 
transfer resources to the other. The resulting distribution seems unfair. 
The father thinking about these possible distributions can justify his refusal to 
support the playboy and his aiding to the poet, by appealing to each man's 
defining choices. If when young each of them had equal resources, at some 
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point each would have faced two choices: the first to maintain their resources 
without entertaining expensive ambitions, and the second to settle for a life 
with less enjoyment than the one they have might envisaged. Dworkin is 
considering that if there were equal opportunities at a defining moment where 
choices for life options are open, it would be justified to refuse granting 
different bundles of resources to satisfy preferences. Thus the playboy 
should not have more than his fair share. (Dworkin, 2000, p. 56) 
Accepting the former description of defining moments of life choices, we 
would be focusing in access to resources to satisfy their preferences and not 
in their actual preference satisfaction. This might suggest that we can accept 
welfare as the measure of interpersonal comparison if we only avoid 
comparing preference satisfaction. However even considering only access to 
resources to satisfy preferences, it is not clear how can we decide which is a 
fair share of resources for each son. The father, focusing in access to 
resources for preference satisfaction, can decide that the child choosing to 
be a poet has tastes cheaper to satisfy, thus he is allowed to provide fewer 
resources to him than to the would-be playboy, even after refusing further 
resources to the would-be playboy. The case of providing more resources to 
the disabled child in order for him to have equal possible welfare would be 
easier to justify, as he is the only one among the children who did not choose 
to be like he is. However even this case can present problems. The blind 
child could consider his blindness not as a handicap but a god given 
characteristic, refusing any aid. In this case the father would have to respect 
the blind's child own evaluation of his situation. 
The fact that welfare either has to provide resources for expensive tastes or 
give less to the person with cheap tastes or can allow for fewer resources for 
the disabled child makes the welfare metric difficult to maintain. However the 
welfarist dilemma is debatable, for instance John Roemer (1998: pp. 242-245) 
offers an argument, contra Dworkin, where reasonable regret does not 
necessarily require an independent theory of fair distribution. His argument 
proposes different classes of individuals, each class formed by all of those 
individuals sharing the same circumstances over which they have no control 
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but they can influence their own preferences. If every person under each 
class receives the same amount of resources, one individual under such a 
class would not have reason to regret not having the life path of another 
person in her class, as the resulting achievement is entirely her responsibility. 
Roemer's argument would deal with voluntarily acquired expensive tastes, 
benefiting only those involuntarily acquired ones, but as Roemer points out, 
this argument would not be able to deal with cases of cheap tastes. A person 
in the class of persons with involuntarily acquired cheap tastes would be 
refused more resources. This result would be clearly counterintuitive as such 
a person could be developing adaptive preferences, in this case cheap ones 
that in fact are diminishing her opportunities even if she does not accept it. 
Roemer suggests that the main problem of a welfarist metric lies again in the 
subjective evaluation of welfare. 
As the problem of cheap tastes remains, we might be inclined to consider 
resources as an objective metric for interpersonal comparisons. Before doing 
this let us consider the welfare metric from the perspective of poor countries 
and graded welfare. 
3.2.3 Graded welfare and distributive criteria. 
It is important to consider the problem of expensive and cheap tastes in the 
context of poor countries. The problem of cheap tastes depends on the 
assumption that this type of personal preferences although involuntarily 
acquired do not deserve more resources because people are content with 
them, if people modify them, their new preferences would be considered as 
expensive tastes by some welfarists, and thus they would not be benefited. 
Recall that a type of welfarism intends to benefit only those involuntarily 
acquired preferences to avoid pampering expensive tastes. The problem 
arises when we reject this situation and intend to benefit the voluntarily 
acquired ones. 
In poor countries where social resources are scarce and most people live 
with few resources and are content or prepared to accept them, while just a 
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few live with a lot, the welfarist option would not seem to provide an adequate 
guide for increasing people's benefits. Consider for instance a poor country 
with large social and economic inequalities with a government focusing in 
access to equal welfare as a metric for interpersonal comparison. This 
government in order to assign resources in its anti poverty policies would 
need to know whether the poverty of some group is worse than another. 
Even though the welfare of both groups was originally terribly low, 
government officials, taking into account access to resources for welfare, 
have only to consider minimal increases in income or some categorical 
characteristic to decide that some people are worse off than others, and thus 
leave them out from the program. Government officials would have assumed 
that this increase in welfare is due to increments in resources, when in fact it 
could have been a change of preferences. 
The problem for this type of welfarist in this context, is that he would have to 
decide which preferences to take into account to assess the poor. In fact he 
would not be able to assess correctly which change of preferences account 
for a move out of poverty, as people can very well acquire an expensive 
preference sacrificing other areas which affect them most. This is not only 
counterintuitive; it also seems to be unfair. 
This example illustrates a problem. Under a certain threshold of poverty, the 
welfarist metric does not adequately capture the urgency of the situation. 
When some person changes her preferences, and this change is considered 
as an increase in preference satisfaction, the welfarist metric does not 
consider it fair to provide further benefits, even if such a person could have 
adjusted down his other preferences. 
However if we modify the general assumption that different personal 
preferences should be taken into account and consider all persons as having 
similar preferences, we could perhaps give content to objective thresholds of 
welfare and solve both problems. The first by setting a high enough threshold 
of achievement of certain basic goods that would deal with the urgency of 
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the overall situation, and second by assuming a progression of benefits up to 
a relevant higher threshold 
Ronald Dworkin rejects the possibility of a theory of objective welfare. For 
him one such theory would state that two persons welfare would be equal if 
both " are healthy, mentally sound, well educated and equally wealthy even 
though one is for some reason malcontent and even though one makes 
much less of these resources than the other. "(2000: pp. 46-47) As this theory 
would require only that people be equal in the selected resources, Dworkin 
states simply that this is a version of equality of resources. 
The price to pay for objectivity would seem for Dworkin the elimination of all 
subjective evaluation of people's own success. However this is not the most 
important part of the welfare metric. Welfare intuitively appeals to us by 
revealing the unfairness lying in providing the same resources to people with 
different needs and this need does not necessarily require an external 
criterion to be assessed. 
The welfare criteria for interpersonal comparison can be rendered more 
objective if we assume that welfare can be described in a graded form. That 
is, we accept first that there is a commonality of needs and preferences 
among humans, and second that these needs and preferences can be 
adequately divided in progressive stages of welfare. This way of looking at 
welfare is not necessarily another form of resourcism, as we would still 
recognize that people transform differently the same resources, and that they 
would not necessarily required the same benefits. For instance accepting that 
for all people is morally relevant to have an adequate healthy diet does not 
imply that people would not need to receive different bundles of food goods 
to achieve this state. However if we adopt an internalized conception of 
resources, graded welfare can be described as another form of resourcism. 
Like John Roemer (1996: 245), we could assume that people would have 
reached such a level if it was not for some factors beyond their control. 
However these reasons outside the individual's control have to be 
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constrained by other people's interests. The natural way to take into account 
other people's interests could be by accepting that after a certain low 
threshold is passed, welfare achievement should not be considered but only 
access to welfare, opening the way to different individual choices of life 
plans. 
However it is not yet very clear if graded welfare can address further 
problems of distribution where fairness depend partially in the criteria we 
have to compare between people. It could very well be that constraining 
welfare is not enough to express an adequate comparison between 
individuals. 
Let us consider the possibility of several objective welfare thresholds. Let us 
think about indirect taxation of food. A government requiring more resources 
wants to reform indirect taxes on food: its aim is to increase the welfare of all. 
In order to do this the government wants to eliminate existing progressive 
indirect taxation like subsidies to basic food items up to high taxation to 
luxury food goods. Policy designers argue in their bill that promoting a flat tax 
will be more efficient and crucially it will increase access to welfare. They 
argue that assuming different individual preferences, the best way to respect 
morally equally deserving individuals is to introduce a flat indirect tax of 5%. 
Congress committees have the last word. 
3.2.3.1 Welfare egalitarians 
The committee of welfare egalitarians argue that if government wants to 
respect equality it cannot pamper those with expensive tastes, it should keep 
on raising the taxes of luxury food goods in order to inhibit the involuntary 
development of these tastes. They accept, with the government however, 
that this creates a different problem, that of poor people with cheap tastes 
that would benefit more from higher subsidies to their tastes. But as they 
have chosen those cheap tastes they cannot be benefited more than the rest, 
thus in order to respect equal access to welfare, the committee suggests to 
extend subsidies for more products. 
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For welfare egalitarians the rich and others with expensive tastes should be 
encouraged to develop cheaper preferences, as egalitarians are convinced 
that the chosen development of expensive tastes should be discouraged. In 
taxing out luxury food goods from the market and expanding the range of 
products with subsidies, in effect egalitarians are reducing the price of an 
average food basket with the aim that everyone has access to it, to increase 
welfare. Assuming that people have different preferences, even with cheap 
tastes the basket could become very large, in effect reducing the generated 
income to the tax office. 
This option evades the expensive tastes problem with the rather expedient 
way of eliminating expensive products. However, even with a reduced and 
more accessible food basket, equality of welfare would not be reached, as 
differences in preference satisfaction would still make some people more 
satisfied with the chosen basket than others. It can also be argued that the 
elimination of tax receipts from luxury goods will reduce the budget for 
subsidies, forcing a general reduction of welfare with a constant reduction of 
the food options. In a poor country where direct taxation is hard to obtain, 
indirect taxes are a high source of governmental income, thus the egalitarian 
proposal in these terms is not very efficient and produces a possible perverse 
effect reducing welfare options. 
Let us consider the suggestion of progressive sufficiency of describing 
different morally relevant thresholds in relation to welfare, in order to evaluate 
welfare equality. Assuming graded welfare, we could accept that most people 
should be satisfied if they have reached a particular level of welfare. Such a 
level in a poor country could be set rather low. 
Assuming this strategy, the only interpersonal comparison we would be 
making is between those who have achieved that level of welfare and those 
who have not, we do not have to specify at any point whether some individual 
is worse off than another, only whether she is worse off by not reaching the 
accepted welfare level. By contrast, when considering a continuous welfare 
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while considering individual preferences, the food basket should have 
contained the widest possible range of options to satisfy the widest possible 
number of individuals, leaving indeterminate where should the basket stop. 
A seeming problem with the grade egalitarians welfare option in a poor 
country would be the rather large reduction of welfare suffered by a portion of 
the population, damaging their interests, as the tax rate for other products 
apart from the selected ones has to be very high. This is because equality of 
welfare discourages that some people have more welfare than others, thus 
after the set threshold, people are not allowed more benefits. On top of this 
we would have to set the welfare level as low as possible to guarantee equal 
welfare. 
However, the graded welfare egalitarian option of reducing the list of 
available goods to discouraged preferences seems to solve both the 
expensive and cheap tastes problems. In the latter, by committing welfare 
achievement to a certain threshold, thus providing certain objective 
characteristic to welfare; and in the first by inhibiting expensive tastes. 
However it is not very clear whether this revision of welfare is not better 
managed by focusing on resources rather than this restricted version of 
welfare where some preferences are discouraged to guarantee equality. 
To wit, recall Dworkin's example about the father and his children, under this 
later version of equality of welfare the father would have to be sure that all of 
his children reach certain threshold of preference satisfaction, some 
threshold perhaps defined in terms of average self-realization for each child's 
main characteristic. The father, for instance, can find what is the average 
achievement for a blind person, and so on, then distribute accordingly. Each 
child would still get different amounts of money, so they can still complain 
alluding to their special needs. Thus we would have two options, either to 
deny their claims as irrelevant and focus on a more objective metric like 
resources, or consider their claims partially relevant but not adequately 
focused, thus considering capabilities as a better metric for interpersonal 
comparisons. 
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3.2.3.2 Welfare prioritarians 
The committee of welfare prioritarians respond negatively to the government 
proposal of scraping progressive indirect taxation. They suggest that the 
government proposal would fail to give enough priority to access to welfare 
by the worse off. Instead they recommend that the government should 
consider maximising the income coming from taxes that can be extracted 
from expensive goods in order to increase the benefits for the least well off 
persons. Prioritarians then argue for imposing taxes on expensive products 
at as high a rate as possible in order to maximise their receipts and with this 
raise subsidise those products acquired by the least well off group. 
However, prioritarians suffer a deeper problem than egalitarians by using the 
welfare metric. Prioritarians, asking who is the least well off person, would 
have to answer: the person who is more reasonably dissatisfied with her life 
prospects. If we focus on access to desired goods, we could exclude 
voluntarily acquired expensive tastes, but not the involuntary ones. As 
prioritarians give priority to the worst off, they would have to benefit a rich 
person over a poor person if she is the worst off in terms of welfare on 
preference satisfaction, even as a result of involuntary expensive tastes. 
Prioritarians though would accept the existence of expensive tastes as a form 
of gaining resources to maximise the welfare of the least well off person; 
contrary to egalitarians they would not pretend to inhibit the formation of such 
preferences as long as those preferences increase the welfare of the least 
worse off person. However, accepting that those with involuntarily acquired 
expensive tastes should be benefited, prioritarians are forced to ask at every 
policy stage who is the least well off person or group. 
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Consider again accepting the suggestion that there are morally relevant 
welfare thresholds, rather than considering as relevant minimal increases in 
welfare. Welfare prioritarians could distinguish between those under and 
above different thresholds more easily than asking who is the least well off 
person when deciding every product's tax. As prioritarians do not strictly 
require full equality, they can benefit people under the first threshold, 
recognizing them as the worse off and then the next; the order would be 
given by considering each threshold better than the one before. 
In relation to the problem of cheap and expensive tastes, the objective nature 
of morally relevant welfare thresholds would mandate more resources even 
for people with cheap tastes, but not necessarily more resources after certain 
upper limit. To illustrate the idea let us consider the satisfaction of food 
preferences. Under normal welfare, each individual would have various food 
preferences; prioritarians in order to distinguish the worst off person, would 
consider in general how dissatisfied she is from not being able to have 
access, if you wish, to her usually average food basket. 
Under graded welfare, food preferences could be assumed as having morally 
relevant thresholds. The first threshold, although somewhat strained, could 
be described in terms of the satisfaction of the minimal diet required by every 
individual for survival. The second threshold could be described in terms of 
having access to those resources that would acquire the average food basket 
in a selected community. The third threshold could be described in terms of 
having access to those food products that are related to special occasions in 
the selected community. 
For welfare prioritarians the idea of thresholds present some problems. As 
welfare is understood as preference satisfaction achievement, every 
individual under the threshold would have to be benefited until it reaches the 
threshold, thus the gap between his actual welfare and the threshold 
becomes very important. As prioritarians give a high priority to benefit the 
worst off person first, the largest individual gap would be targeted. If 
resources were scarce, as they mostly are in a poor country, many under the 
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threshold would be left without resources. However this is a problem of 
priority. A problem for welfare, even graded welfare, would be that, for 
instance under the first threshold if someone prefers a more expensive food 
basket that would achieve her survival, this basket would have to be 
supplied. The problem of subjective individual preferences is inescapable in 
the first threshold as we are recognizing the value of welfare achievement. 
The same can be said with further thresholds described in welfare access 
terms. In these cases cheap tastes could be penalized, as people with these 
tastes would not profit from the opportunities open to them, remaining below 
a lower threshold. 
On top of these problems with welfare, prioritarians could face problems in 
the distribution of burdens and benefits in the form of taxes and subsidies 
when dealing with thresholds. Given the overall priority shown to the least 
well off by prioritarians, they could end dictating a tax regime where most 
food goods have a 100% tax in order to place people in the fir st threshold. 
This action would reduce the welfare of other people lowering them down 
from a higher threshold to a lower one. A similar problem exists if many 
cannot be raised to the second threshold before only one person with 
expensive tastes reaches the first. 
These later type of problems are related to the nature of the distributive 
criteria not to the nature of welfare. However, the reasons argued to impose 
constraints on welfare could perhaps better be handled by a resource or 
capabilities metric. In fact this objective way of describing welfare thresholds 
moves us naturally from preference satisfaction to resources. The 
Progressive sufficientarian view in fact moves us towards a capabilities and 
then a resource based view, as preference satisfaction seems not to have 
many advantages. 
Let us consider for now another distributive criteria. 
3.2.3.3 Welfare Progressive sufficientarians 
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A third Congress committee of progressive sufficientarians consider the idea 
of establishing morally relevant thresholds of welfare. They argue that 
individual preferences should not be considered as different, because this 
leads to a debate about different tastes, either expensive or cheap, instead 
welfare should be considered as graded, with lower and upper limits. 
Taxation then should consider different levels of welfare in this restricted 
version, but the adequate level of taxation would need an empirical research 
in relation to different levels and not simply a flat tax. 
Welfare progressive sufficientarians would avoid the problems of egalitarians 
and prioritarians of damaging the interests of many people above the first 
threshold because they do not place high priority in benefiting the worst off 
person first; rather they place priority in minimising the number of people 
below the first threshold. As progressive sufficiency places priority in people 
reaching successive thresholds, it should in general avoid lowering down 
people further down than their actual threshold. 
In avoiding benefiting the worst off person first, progressive sufficientarians 
would require a more precise definition of thresholds as people closer to the 
threshold should be benefited enough to reach it but no more to surpass it, 
before most under the first threshold reach it. The first threshold defined in 
absolute terms could impose a rather counterintuitive result to the ordering 
imposed by progressive sufficientarians. In fact progressive sufficientarians 
would recommend that people who are closer to survival should be helped 
first in order to save more people in overall terms. The counterintuitive idea is 
that those that are farther from survival, needing more help would have to 
wait. 
In other respects the problem of cheap tastes would still appear when 
considering graded welfare. Though we can even force individuals to be 
above the first threshold of survival, the graded welfarist progressive 
sufficientarian distributor would not be obliged to provide more resources to a 
person with cheap tastes above the equal average resources of the 
threshold. However, as her cheap tastes would not make her profit from the 
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opportunities open to her, she is bound to lag behind in the area of resources 
or capabilities, not in welfare terms. 
Although we could use welfare if we accept that increases on personal 
preference satisfaction are reflected in increases of resources, if we accept 
this without changing to a resourcist option, the problem of cheap tastes 
comes into full force as total satisfaction would come from small increases for 
some and from larger increases for others. A resourcist option could perhaps 
better express the idea of common general needs sourced in upper 
thresholds by equal average resources. Resources could provide a more 
objective non linear measure within upper thresholds that permit us to 
distinguish simply who is lagging behind for reasons not of his fault. 
3.2.4 Summary 
As we could see the welfare criterion for interpersonal comparison can be 
rendered more objective if we assume that welfare can be described in a 
graded form. That is, we accept first that there is a commonality of needs and 
preferences among humans, and second that these needs and preferences 
can be adequately divided in progressive stages of welfare. 
However, the main problem of welfare as criteria for interpersonal 
comparison, the dilemma of expensive and cheap tastes does not disappear, 
although it can be reduced by defining lower and upper thresholds of 
benefits. The problem of expensive tastes re-emerges although in different 
form in the lower threshold, when we consider the achievement of an 
absolute welfare characteristic. In order to reach the first threshold the 
individual welfare gap has to be closed, and as needed goods can be 
different for different persons and some of these goods can be expensive or 
cheaper than others, even if individuals do not desire these goods, a problem 
of unfairness can emerge, especially if those closer to the threshold require 
expensive goods. The problem of unfairness appears, if for reasons of those 
expensive tastes some other people with cheap tastes are left outside 
benefits. 
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The problem of cheap tastes, again reduced and taking a different form, 
appears in further thresholds: people in the middle threshold with cheap 
tastes could not demand more benefits because their involuntary cheap 
tastes leave them already at the middle welfare threshold. A resourcist could 
argue that is unfair not to provide the same resources to all, even if a person 
does not want them. For this reason we might look into a resourcist criteria 
where human differences in transforming resources after the first threshold, 
into well-being, though relevant, are not vital. 
The simple constraints imposed by progressive sufficiency mark a different 
approach towards thresholds. It would seem the first threshold requires a 
linear measure of interpersonal comparison. Insofar as high priority is placed 
in people reaching the threshold, graded welfare could be such a measure as 
it recognizes that individual differences require to be taken into account when 
benefiting. However, graded welfare is not the only existing consideration 
when taking into account these differences; the capability criterion of 
interpersonal comparison can also assess these differences. Further 
thresholds, it has been argued above, would need a non linear measure of 
interpersonal comparison to assess fairly whether a person has lagged 
behind for reasons beyond their control. 
Let us consider the capability option first taking into account the latter 
concerns. 
3.3 Capabilities as the focus of social justice. 
The case for welfare is partially defeated by the dilemma of having to benefit 
those with expensive tastes or penalize those with cheap tastes. I say 
'partially defeated' because despite their problems, either graded welfare or 
the capability metric is in principle needed to reflect individual differences in 
transforming resources into at least a very basic decent standard of life. 
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We can understand capabilities in a minimal sense as the idea of a person 
being able to do certain basic things, as A. Sen constantly points out in his 
writings. Thus what we would value in the capability approach are the 
functions a person is able to realise, his capacity to function in the 
community. We would not value strictly or for its own sake the amount of 
resources someone has, we value the opportunities that capabilities give to a 
person. We are, thus, considering not the means to be free in a society, nor 
the satisfaction these means produce in people, but the actual end of being 
able to freely function in society. 
This middle area, between resources and welfare, which has been called by 
Amartya Sen the 'capability' area, differs from resources and welfare in the 
emphasis placed on how resources affect the opportunity to do something 
with them. G. A Cohen summarises this idea, pointing out that capabilities 
are part of the neglected intermediate area between external resources and 
welfare. 
Sen was right that, in the enterprise of assessing a person's well- 
being, we must consider his condition or state in abstraction from its 
utility for him. We must look at something which is "posterior" to 
"having goods" and "prior" to "having utility. " we must look, for 
example, at his nutrition level, and not just, as Rawlsians do, at his 
food supply, or, as welfarist do, at the utility he derives from eating 
food. (G. A. Cohen, 1989, p. 943) 
Sen provides a description of well-being which appeals to something which 
individuals are entitled to in order to do certain basic things, to function in 
certain ways. 
The functionings relevant for well-being vary from such elementary 
ones as escaping morbidity and mortality, being adequately 
nourished, having mobility, etc., to complex ones such as being 
happy, achieving self-respect, taking part in the life of the 
community, appearing in public without shame [... ]. The claim is that 
the functionings make up a person's being, and the evaluation of a 
person's well-being has to take the form of an assessment of these 
constituent elements. (Sen, 1993, p. 36) 
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People would be entitled at least to the required assets to carry out 
elementary functionings and those complex ones that relate to their own 
community. However, we have to be very careful not to confuse elementary 
functionings with some specific level of functionings relative to the 
community. A person in a poor community could have very low expectations 
about his health along with other members of her community, but that is not a 
reason not to compensate her for her low expectations in the form of 
capabilities to have access to the complex functionings that other people in 
other communities could be enjoying. Capabilities in this sense will include as 
many opportunities as possible and the compensation for low capacities to 
transform those opportunities into the realisation of different functionings. 
Crucially for Sen, elementary functionings are part of the value of freedom, 
as they are the bases that lead to a chosen life. Freedom enjoyment is best 
realised in a person's capability of achieving differing functionings in his own 
community and according to his own characteristics. A person would require 
the resources and the opportunities to realise these functionings, but crucially 
what is at stake here is people's capacity to bring about these functionings. 
Thus the capability approach would consider compensating people for 
shortfalls in their internal and external assets when their opportunities and 
capacities are cut short, in order to enable them to function in their 
community. 
3.3.1 Some clarifications needed by the capability option. 
There are two main areas, however, where the idea of people's capacity to 
bring about differing functionings has to be clarified. The first area is human 
diversity and whether we are able to gather sufficient morally relevant 
information about these differences in order to fairly distribute resources to 
enhance their capability sets. The second is human choice and whether the 
selection of a specific expensive life plan or a cheap life plan implies different 
levels of resources. 
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3.3.1.1 Human diversity and requirements of morally relevant 
information. 
The first area can be better distinguished contrasting the ability to transform 
resources into well-being with the availability of resources. Say the 
functioning that concerns us is to be well nourished. Women's abilities to be 
well nourished do not necessarily relate to the availability of resources. A 
poor woman, for example, could very well have more resources in the form of 
food supply than another. However her capabilities to function or her 
opportunities to be well nourished, could not be realised because of her 
susceptibility to sickness, or higher load of physical work or simply because 
she could be expecting a baby. The diversity of human abilities to transform 
resources into well-being have to be taken into account when distributing. 
These abilities include internal assets. Thus a policy aiming to increase 
people's capabilities in this respect would have to consider the most 
important aspects in the community that limit them. Such a woman would 
require an adequate set of resources to realise her capability to be well 
nourished. 
However, a clear problem for the capability option to make interpersonal 
comparisons is that the information required in order to compensate 
someone for the reduction of her capability set would be immense. The same 
woman of our example once she has achieved the basic functioning of being 
well nourished would be entitled in principle to more resources if her 
capability set is restricted for her to participate in the feasts of her community. 
The problem with this is not only that this woman's capability set could 
demand more resources than other people, nor that we could think that her 
participation in her community's feast does not necessarily increase her 
freedom, but worse, we could not be sure if such a functioning could not have 
been replaced by her participation in the political life or in the cultural life or 
her community. We would need too much information about her capability set 
to adequately assess her needs. 
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Joshua Cohen (1995, p. 285) argues that this information problem restricts 
the area where we can apply the capability approach to one area where 
information is simplified. The problem, he argues could be solved if we 
abstract from the "fullness of human diversity, and make interpersonal 
comparisons in a "low-dimensional" space. " 
[... ] One way to make the required simplifications would be to 
specify certain especially severe and informationally transparent 
cases of limited capabilities, to focus in capability assessments in 
those cases, and to rely on primary goods for interpersonal 
comparisons elsewhere. Thus, we would rely on capabilities when 
we specify a minimally acceptable threshold of human functioning 
-basic needs in areas of nutrition and health for example -and 
when we are concerned to characterize and remedy disabilities. " 
(Cohen, J., p. 285) 
Cohen imposes several constraints to the capability approach due to its 
informational problems. The first and most important is to reduce the "fullness 
of human difference" to something more manageable. Accepting that this 
reduction not only is possible but necessary, -the threshold where human 
differences should be morally relevant becomes very important. For Cohen 
this threshold lies where "destitution" and "disability" end. Cohen remarks that 
the boundaries of such a threshold could be given by reference to "the notion 
of conditions that require remedy if a person is to have the capacities 
associated with the role of equal citizen. " (Cohen, p. 286) The justification of 
this boundary lies in the appeal to a community of equals cooperating in fair 
terms and sharing some general conception of the good. These Rawlsian 
conditions for a fair society would not be fulfilled if some members were not 
treated as equals; this would be the case of destitute and abandoned 
disabled persons. 
To link morally severe cases with a political aim, however, could become a 
problem as we are reducing the moral priority given to severe cases by 
accepting the possible political differences in different communities. In a way 
we would be appealing to a relative notion of conditions for citizenship to 
justify promoting the interests of objectively destitute and disabled persons. 
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However, we do not require any political justification to set the minimal 
threshold. If we accept that information problems can be solved, the only 
justification needed lies in the adequate description of the basic functioning. 
3.3.1.2 Description of basic functionings. 
The adequate description of a basic functioning though would set limits to 
further complex functionings. For instance, we need to know if someone has 
enough resources and opportunities to have access to achieve his basic 
functioning of being well nourished, this would imply fairly detailed and hard 
to obtained information about his assets. This practical exercise however is 
very difficult to realize at an individual level with basic functionings, and 
harder still with more complex functionings, like achieving self respect in the 
community. 
Sen argues for an idea that is closer to have access to the well-being that 
would come from achieving the functioning of being well nourished. He gives 
an example comparing two capability sets, one of someone starving from not 
having resources nor opportunities and the other of someone who is fasting. 
Neither person has achieved the functioning; but one has access to 
achieving it, while the other does not. However, by describing basic 
functionings in this way, we would be appealing to an independent criterion of 
the required adequate level of resources and opportunities to function. This 
criticism is just the one that Dworkin made against the welfare option. 
This criticism can be avoided if we simply accept that the person fasting 
cannot be let to die. The objective limit that life or death sets in this severe 
case does not have anything to do with an independent criterion of adequate 
resources: it is simply part of the description of being adequately well 
nourished. The achievement of the functioning, then, is what we would be 
looking for. We can assume a functioning has been achieved using proxies, 
such as the available income for food or expenditure on food, as well as self- 
production, crossing this information with basic medical information. 
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By arguing in this way we can avoid partially the claim that the capability 
option is another form of welfare. However, after basic functionings, the 
complex functionings require very sophisticated information. As Joshua 
Cohen argues, such a high demand of information simply limits the possibility 
of comparison between individuals' capability sets. 
At this stage we should recapitulate the argument. The capability option 
described in the above way would have to consider the achievement of basic 
functionings as its main objective. The achievement of these functionings 
would better incorporate the commonality of human experience than graded 
welfare, as it would constrain the scope of characteristics to take into account 
when considering the achievement of a functioning. The achievement of such 
a functioning though, would still require to be evaluated in a linear form, as 
we would consider similarly worse off people below the threshold. Comparing 
it with graded welfare, the capability option handles better the problem of 
expensive tastes below the threshold, as people's capability gap to the 
threshold is constrained to specific areas, signalled by capability proxies. 
To illustrate, we would differently consider the requirement of a malnourished 
person under graded welfare and the capability option. Under graded welfare 
we would accept the gap between the available income and the cost of a 
food basket as proxy for the welfare gap to be filled. The problem of this 
option lies in our reduction of options to avoid expensive preferences, 
however in doing this we are leaving out people's differences in transforming 
resources into well-being. Under the capability option the description of the 
achievement of a functioning incorporates more objective characteristics 
linked to available proxies. The use of proxies might insulate the basic 
functionings from individual preferences that could lead to a problem of 
expensive tastes, while allowing personal differences in transforming 
resources to surface. 
3.3.2 Individual choice of life plans. 
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The second area where the capability approach should be clarified is the 
area of individual choices. Human choices involve individual achievements or 
functionings. Two persons could have the same capabilities - similar 
opportunities, including similar resources -, but choose different ends. This 
freedom to choose different ends could lead to completely different complex 
functionings. But crucially, they can arrive to their own ends if society's 
emphasis is in providing similar capabilities. However, we face the problem of 
choosing those appropriate functionings that could broaden the area where 
different values could be realised. That is, a society should consider those 
basic general functionings that permit individuals to realize their different 
individual values. 
What we could agree on is that a society that wishes to respect individual 
freedom to lead a chosen life has to provide the means to do so by focusing 
on those basic functionings that could lead to more complex ones. We could 
speak of capabilities to function in a civil society, in the political life and 
crucially to be able to have part in the way the socio-economic life is led. But 
we have to limit the extent of some capabilities in order to be fair with the rest 
of the members in a society, as the capability set of a person can be 
extended widely by reducing the capability set of another person. For 
instance a person who is well nourished is fulfilling one of his elementary 
functionings. She is entitled to the set of commodities that allow her to attain 
this functioning and many others, but would be objectively constrained by the 
basic functionings of other people. 
Sen places this concern in terms of the person who fasts and the person who 
starves, the capability sets of the two are completely different: one has the 
capability to be well-nourished, while the other has his capability set 
restricted. The relevance of this difference between the two persons is to 
consider whether basic functionings, like being well fed, imposes restrictions 
on other people's capability sets, even if personal choice is involved and the 
choice is an integral part of the capability in question. 
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If we agree that a person's ability to choose between different forms of the 
good life has to be guaranteed, a person should be left to fast. However, the 
starving person could have chosen in a different moment to bet her fortune 
away, having her capability set reduced. We could ask if the capability set of 
the fasting person should be reduced in order to improve the capability set of 
the other person, not withstanding her past choices. If our answer were yes, 
basic individual well-being would actually depend not entirely on the nature of 
the choice of life plan, but in the nature of basic functionings. This would 
mean that basic functionings are prior to freedom to achieve well-being. 
To illustrate the idea consider again the case of the person who is fasting out 
of religious convictions. Her choice of life plan is very important to her. The 
other person is starving by her own past choices. By Sen's standards we 
would be inclined to provide resources to the starving person if we consider 
limited capability sets. However by the same Sen's standards we would have 
to let the starving person starve if we give adequate relevance to choices, 
respecting individual's life choices. The solution to this inconsistency is to 
consider that we should always secure basic functionings, that is we should 
always feed a starving person, but assume her choice to be left in the lower 
thresholds of benefits. 
3.3.3 Summary 
The capability option in principle works better than graded welfare to capture 
personal differences in transforming resources into well-being, solving the 
problem of expensive tastes when considering basic achievements. However 
due to information and individual choice problems the capability option would 
be very difficult to use when considering other cases than disability and 
destitution. 
The analysis of the capability option also provides a further and independent 
argument to maintain that human advantage can be considered in stages. 
The first stage would be better understood as the achievement of basic 
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functionings while further benefits can be better understood as access to 
resources and opportunities. 
3.4 Resources as the focus of social justice. 
I have argued that the case for an option of interpersonal comparison totally 
based in personal differences is partially defeated by the dilemma of having 
to benefit those with expensive tastes or penalize those with cheap tastes. 
We still need to reflect individual differences in transforming resources into at 
least a very basic decent standard of life. Once we agree that the capability 
option better reflects individual differences in transforming resources into a 
very basic decent standard of life, we should consider the case for further 
benefits in the form of resources. 
3.4.1 The resourcist option. 
As we consider giving priority to the least advantaged, in our case the poor, 
we could say that everyone should have at least enough resources as 
sufficientarians do, or equal amounts of resources as strict egalitarians do, or 
that we should give overriding priority to them, as prioritarians do. Leaving 
aside for the moment the idea of a distributive criterion imposing certain 
constraints on the resourcist option, let us consider whether the idea of 
resources, as the relevant aspect to compare individuals' advantage, could 
deal adequately with the problem of compensating individuals for lower levels 
of advantage, that are no fault of their own. 
John Rawls in A Theory of Justice famously argues in favour of distributing 
primary social goods, a list of goods that every individual would require not- 
withstanding her preferences. Given the nature of these primary goods, an 
index in theory could be made and used to compare between individuals' 
levels of advantage. Rawls' theory promotes fair equality of opportunity, to 
allow a fair competition for positions of advantage, assuming the result of the 
competition as a fair result. Institutions then should maximise the level of 
primary goods held by the worse off group in order to give priority to them. 
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In Rawls' theory, the main assumption is that there are some factors that we 
consider morally arbitrary that make people different. A distributor then would 
have reasons to compensate those individuals that face disadvantages at the 
start of the competition for being born, for example in a poor family, or face 
handicaps, or not having the talents and natural abilities required by the job 
market. In order to compensate them, a Rawlsian distributor would use the 
resources coming from those whose talents have a higher earning potential 
in the job market. 
However one problem for Rawls' theory is that the level of advantage an 
individual holds, measured in an index of primary goods, is the only way we 
have to compare between individuals. But in fact the position an individual 
holds has been used by the theory in two different ways that could become 
contradictory, the first revealing the individual's talents and the second 
revealing his effort. 2 If we use the level of advantage a person holds as a 
measure of her talents, and such a level is low, in theory we should benefit 
her not withstanding other people's efforts in the same level of advantage. 
This problem is similar to the welfarist dilemma where those with cheap 
tastes are not entitled to more benefits. As the theory is not concerned with 
the final outcome, but with the opportunities for the competition, a Rawlsian 
distributor will always benefit the person who is worse off in the sense of 
having a lower level of primary goods, without taking into account personal 
effort or change of preferences. 
Consider how two similarly situated persons should be benefited, where one 
chooses to have more leisure time and the other chooses to invest his time in 
re-training. If benefits coming from training were slim for no reason in 
particular, both persons would still receive the same benefits from the 
distributor on the Rawlsian view. Intuitively this would not seem fair for the 
person who re-trains, thus a welfarist and even a graded welfarist would 
choose the man who is making an effort to give him more benefits or place 
him closer to a threshold. Instead a resourcist would defend his benefiting the 
2A similar problem for the theory is discussed by John Roemer (1996: pp. 165-167). 
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other man with the idea that in objective terms his level of resources is 
similarly low. 
This problem can be divided into two parts. The first is related to the way in 
which the distributive criterion of maximining the level of primary goods 
affects the fairness of the competition in successive rounds of competition, 
once, it is supposed, real opportunity has already been achieved. The 
second is the way in which the idea of an open list of primary goods could not 
permit us to distinguish precisely between those who are choosing a simple 
life or choose to free ride and those who simply have bad luck in their 
endeavours. 
The second part of the problem is the one that concerns us, as we are 
searching for a way in which different levels of resources can express morally 
relevant differences between individuals, that allow us to allocate to people 
without penalizing them for the way in which they lead their life. 
Rawls in a Theory of Justice speaks of primary goods as rights and liberties, 
opportunities and powers, and income and wealth (Rawls, 1971, p. 92). Later 
Rawls adds to his list the social bases of self-respect and those capabilities 
essential to be a "normally cooperating member of society. " (Rawls, 1996, 
Ch. V). In fact these primary goods reflect so diverse and differing goods 
that is very difficult to use them as a criterion to compare individuals' 
advantages. 
John Roemer points out (1996: pp. 165-167) that creating an index of these 
primary goods becomes a problem since we do not know from the list the 
person's labour contribution, which should be an essential part of such an 
index. After all, the Rawlsian intuitive idea is that individuals' disadvantages 
should be maximined as far as possible to increase the value of return of 
effort. The problem of not being able to define such an index risks the 
objectivity of the criterion, as it does not deals adequately, according to 
Roemer (1996: 182), with the relationship between the choice of life plans 
and effort. 
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3.4.2 Ronald Dworkin's resourcist idea. 
The intuitive problem for Rawls is how to compensate those with morally 
relevant disadvantages but taking into account effort. This problem requires a 
coherent index of primary goods to make adequate interpersonal 
comparisons; such an index can be difficult to produce. Rawls main intuition 
is maintained under another resourcist proposal. Ronald Dworkin's resourcist 
idea considers that a fair distribution should be sensitive to individual 
preferences but not sensitive to the bundle of resources an individual initially 
holds. The bundle of resources can be divided into two types: internal and 
external assets3. 
When we speak of resources, we are concerned, in the first place, with 
external assets, understanding them as both natural resources and economic 
benefits coming from social cooperation. Natural resources can include the 
value of land, the benefits coming from underground supplies of valuable 
materials, and in general those resources that are understood as wealth. In 
relation to internal assets, Dworkin holds the idea that differing social and 
genetic circumstances produce differing abilities and handicaps that affect 
the way in which people transform external resources into success in their life 
plans. Circumstances also affect preferences. (Dworkin, 2000, pp. 86-89) 
Dworkin's idea of equality of resources calls for a distribution that is sensitive 
to ambition or preferences and not sensitive to personal endowments or 
internal and external resources, understanding these resources as coming 
from morally arbitrary circumstances. For Dworkin, if we are ready to 
compensate people for their disadvantages in external and internal assets, 
we should also take into account people's responsibility for their own 
situation. The problem then seems to be to find a way to separate the 
influence of resources from the influence of choices for which people are 
responsible. 
Dworkin distinguishes between external resources and "physical and mental powers" later includin, 
them into circumstances (2000: pp. 79-80). 
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Dworkin uses the construction of a hypothetical insurance market to account 
for problems of compensation coming from disadvantages in internal 
resources. One has to note that for instance those handicapped are 
considered as having fewer resources, so every individual, knowing that he 
shares a common ex ante risk of being handicapped, would rationally want to 
buy insurance. The insurance market in question would take into account 
individual preferences about risk, in fact making individuals responsible for 
their choices and compensating for handicaps in the resulting distribution of 
total resources. 
However, there is no clear guidance as to how we would discern who is 
worse off than another. Furthermore this system does not solve our initial 
problem. To recall, we were looking for a resourcist option that promotes the 
interests of those lagging behind and permits us to make objective 
interpersonal comparisons. The problem of cheap tastes or adaptive 
preferences is emblematic. If someone accepts her situation as good and 
has no ambition to raise her level, in Dworkin system this person will not 
receive a transfer of resources, just as it happens when we considered the 
welfarist option. 
The case of cheap tastes is important in the context of a society with extreme 
scarcity of resources, as many people would hold little resources and will be 
naturally satisfied, if only for psychological reasons as in the case of adaptive 
preferences, with the low level of resources they have. However the intuition 
still holds that justice would demand more resources for these persons even 
if they did not expect them; it seems obvious that more external resources 
would make their life better, either in welfare terms or in providing the means 
to realize their life plans. Even after the resource and choice distinction has 
been drawn there are further adaptive preference problems for Dworkin's 
view, in a poor country. 
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3.4.3 Responsibility 
Dworkin's main point is that people should be compensated with external 
resources for those inequalities arising from their circumstances and not 
compensated for those inequalities that are due to their preferences or 
choices. However as I have argued, this system falls back on the welfarist 
problem of giving to individual preferences an inordinate place of importance 
in the distribution, without much clarity as to how to distinguish between a 
situation caused by unlucky circumstances or by own choice. 
The balance between responsibility and resources has been made more 
specific, though not necessarily clearer. John Roemer summarises the 
general view of the debate of what he calls a "restricted egalitarianism" 
"Persons should be rendered equal in condition insofar as their 
condition results from circumstances over which they cannot be held 
responsible, but differences in condition are admissible when those 
differences are due to actions/beliefs for which they are 
responsible. " (Roemer, 1996, p. 263) 0 
Roemer considers that Dworkin stipulates this area as the existing difference 
between preferences and resources. As a contrast G. A. Cohen describes it 
as the existing difference between "bad luck and the actions one could have 
chosen not to have done". Cohen's proposal to articulate his view is to 
promote "equality of access to advantage", where access functions as 
opportunities and advantage as a hybrid of welfare and resources. 
Roemer takes on the work of implementing Cohen's view, calling it equality of 
opportunity for advantage. 
"I say that equality of opportunity has been achieved among a 
group of people if society indemnifies persons in the group against 
bad consequences due to circumstances beyond its control and 
brute luck, but does not indemnify them against the consequences 
of their autonomous choices. " (Roemer, 1995) 
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In order to operate the above principle Roemer uses the standard idea of a 
statistical distribution to group people into similar types sharing similar 
characteristics. As the distribution of individuals between types is given by 
those characteristics a person did not freely choose to have, the place in the 
distribution a person holds within her type is a product of her choice. 
Roemer (1995) argues that a distributor wanting to allocate resources to 
combat lung cancer should take into account individual responsibility within 
specific groups. Suppose the first group is formed for 60 years old white 
female professors, the second group for 60 years old black male 
steelworkers. Roemer argues that assuming the median time for smoking of 
the first group is 8 years and for the second 30 years, both medians would be 
equal in probability terms, that is an individual in each group would have the 
same probability of having smoked the number of years specified, thus 
Roemer argues, they deserve equal resources. Below that level a person in 
either type has exercised responsibility; above that level she has been more 
irresponsible. A distributor should take this into account by charging 
correspondingly different amounts for similar treatments to people in 
correspondingly positions in the two distributions. The procedure considers 
two steps: a) factoring out aspects beyond person's control and b) examining 
the empirical distribution of those aspects. 
As responsibility is crucial in Roemer's view, Susan Hurley (Boston Review of 
Books, 1995) considers that the patterns of choices open to a person are 
multidimensional. Thus, in any choice, it can be reasonable in given 
circumstances, to reduce the appeal to responsibility entirely as we would not 
be able to determine whether people's choices were better or worse in given 
circumstances. Furthermore, Hurley argues that in this way Roemer intends 
to reward meritorious choices and this should not be the goal of distributive 
justice. Roemer replies to Hurley's idea arguing that his proposal only works 
in unidimensional choices, like smoking, or choosing more education. 
Hurley (2001) argues that "luck egalitarianism" uses the distinction between 
luck and responsibility as a filter to select those goods to be distributed. That 
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is we would be able to distribute those goods that are matter of luck and not 
goods that individuals are responsible for. She argues however, against the 
idea that selecting which goods to distribute could influence our idea of how 
to distribute them. Furthermore she rejects the idea that the 
responsibility/luck distinction could provide and adequate account of the 
position of an individual in the distribution, and worse it could not provide an 
adequate guide to the difference between positions of different individuals in 
a just distribution. Her argument considers simply that even if a person is 
responsible for her own position she could not necessarily be responsible for 
the position of others, thus invalidating the appeal to redress unlucky 
situations through an egalitarian aim. 
Now, Roemer's argument intends to implement a practical "political" solution 
to the distinction between luck and responsibility. If Hurley's argument holds 
true there is actually no possible solution, simply because there is not a 
practical way to discern where lies the distinction between personal choice 
and luck, in our own situation and in our relative position. 
I will consider an argument by Scanlon (1975) to argue that responsibility 
should not be important at certain stage of advantage but should be partly 
considered after some stages. If we coupled this idea with Roemer's reply to 
Hurley whereas statistical inferences should be accepted and that we should 
look into unidimensional choices, perhaps we could give some support to 
Rawls' resourcist simple intuition where people should be compensated for 
situations not under their control. 
3.4.3.1 Limited Responsibility 
T. Scanlon (1975) argues that we should give priority to the moral urgency of 
a situation. Scanlon argues that presented with situations of great absolute 
moral urgency we should give immediate priority to this situation. The appeal 
to this action is based in a humanitarian moral obligation that trumps other 
considerations. Now one of these moral considerations to be trumped is 
responsibility. We are under the obligation to assist people in situations, say 
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of misery, even if they are in that position by their own choice. Accepting this 
basic moral idea, the luck/egalitarian view presents not only practical 
problems of implementation but also theoretical problems as to what justice 
requires at certain stage of advantage. 
If we agree that morally urgent situations command a prioritarian action we 
have to consider that justice should have a place in these considerations. For 
instance in situations of a humanitarian emergency, we should be ready to 
consider how to render our obligation to act fairly, both in the currency and 
the way we distribute. The constraints imposed on what we should distribute 
and how we should distribute under this emergency have a natural threshold 
where the moral urgency ceases. It is beyond this boundary where 
responsibility can start having relevance, assuming that objections can be 
met, even if it is disregarded below this threshold. 
The point to consider here is that accepting Scanlon's simple prioritarian 
argument but not including the distribution and the currency of the distribution 
within the morally urgent idea to assist those in need, we will find a tendency 
to see after the emergency boundary, all higher advantage as problematic. 
Instead, if we include the distribution and the currency of the distribution 
within the idea of an emergency action, we can see past the strict boundary 
and assume in general that higher thresholds should also be morally 
relevant. 
In the above sense, a limited way to implement responsibility could be to 
provide opportunities to advantage in the type of resources that can 
incorporate unidimensional type of decisions and increasing grades of 
advantage. If after a certain threshold of achievement, we focus on 
opportunities/access to resources rather than resources, in fact we are 
assuming that after reaching a certain minimum people are responsible in the 
most part for the level of advantage they hold. Consider education as a type 
of advantage with a unidimensional type of decisions linked to pay in different 
jobs. After reaching a certain equal minimum, opportunities and information 
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should be offered, thus, guaranteeing equal access to jobs, the unequal 
payment received is partially the responsibility of the individual. 
To illustrate let us consider Rawls's proposal again. He simply assumes that 
the worse off are in that place for reasons that are not their own fault. Rawls 
argues that the social minimum is to be obtained from maximining an index of 
primary goods that permits every person to fulfil her idea of the good. As 
people differ in their idea of the good, people would be responsible for how 
they use their primary goods. As this idea has the double problem of being 
unable to create an adequate index of goods to make interpersonal 
comparisons, or to use the position in the level of benefits held by the person 
to measure her effort, her choice of life plan and her unfortunate 
circumstances, it simply is not clear enough how to compare people's 
positions. 
Another option to capture Rawls' simple resourcist intuition of providing 
resources for differing ends, without entering into the difficult area of 
clarifying how far a person is responsible for her own position relative to 
others', would be to limit the list of resources and to assign minimums and 
maximums of resources relative to the society in question, in order to partially 
capture the area of responsibility. This area could be captured by accepting 
that people lagging behind, given similar opportunities for benefits and a 
minimum level of guaranteed benefits, are in that position in part by their own 
choices. However they would receive increasing benefits over time as these 
would be described relative to the increasing benefits of the rest of the 
members of the society. 
The few types of resources chosen with an appropriate measure would allow 
us to compare the level of goods and services held by the person in question. 
A very simple option is the common idea that money or income can be an 
adequate measure of advantage, as it can be the means to acquire 
differently preferred goods and services. Consider a society where nutrition is 
a problem. Officials assume that 2 500 calories per day is sufficient to be 
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nourished for the average type of activity in the region and they give priority 
to the least advantaged. 
Three different resource distributions ensure different distributions of calories: 
a) 2 500,3 200; b) 2 700,2 700; c) 2 800,3 000. 
Sufficiency is satisfied by each distribution, equality by (b), priority by (c). 
We have to note that resources in this case would equate with people's 
supply of food or the income to acquire it and that we measure the worse off 
as having less resources. 
The specificity of a lower limit for a good nutrition or simply the acceptance of 
minimums sets the problem of those with cheap tastes or adaptive 
preferences in a different perspective. When considering welfare we would 
intuitively reject the idea that no more resources should be given to this 
person because she is content with her preferences, and furthermore we 
agree that she has enough in this lower level. To argue that she would be 
better off with more resources seems not to make sense in a welfarist view. 
In a resourcist view, however, the intuition for accepting that justice demands 
more resources for this person is based in the idea that, if there are enough 
resources in the society, then she should not be left way behind, even if she 
does not prefer them or simply has enough to reach the lower level or she is 
responsible for her level of resources. Perhaps she would only be picked last 
in the distribution but she must be selected. 
To assume there are scarce resources to be distributed does not necessarily 
complicate this person's claims for more resources. We could argue that in 
fact there are enough resources for a minimal level of resources for all, 
though not enough resources for a higher level for all. The idea of minimums 
in specific resources takes into consideration a singular idea of what is 
enough, as it would allow in a Rawlsian argument that differently talented 
people would have resources minimally to follow their own idea of the good. 
However, and in contrast to Rawls, there is no need to specify that the 
minimum is the equilibrium point where the worse off maximise their 
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expectations, and where transfers cease. (Rawls, 1971, p. 285) In the sense 
of "enough" we are using here, and without entering into distributive criteria 
discussions (though the point would naturally lead to this discussion), enough 
is simply the absolute lower standard of to the morally relevant resources and 
it would be only a required start. 
To illustrate the point consider again the food example. To have resources 
for acquiring food equivalent to 2500 calories is enough to survive but not 
necessarily enough to enjoy a varied and typical meal. It would seem that if 
we agree that we can select morally relevant type of resources, there would 
be an absolute lower level and either socially agreed further levels or levels 
defined by benefits held by other members in the society. When the minimum 
is set in absolute terms and we agree that there are not sufficient reasons to 
refuse resources to those people lagging behind, we can argue that further 
increases in benefits depend on the average selected level in the society. 
It would seem that we are left with the option that individuals should have 
increasing resources and choose how to use them, with the important 
caveats that resources are scarce and those lagging behind would only 
receive more resources depending on the general average increase of 
resources for different levels of benefits. This idea is closer to a pure 
resourcist view, where the area of responsibility for one's preferences is 
limited. 
3.4 5 Summary. 
I have argued that considering a more objective resourcist criterion, with 
some minimums on certain specific types of resources, individual 
responsibility is not morally relevant at the lower level. Thus, it would not 
matter that someone looses her fortune by betting it all: the moral priority to 
feed her would be maintained. When considering further benefits we could 
think with Rawls that fiscal incentives should reward, for instance, labour, but 
up to a certain high threshold level guarantee that those behind are not left 
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without resources. Thresholds could all increase with the general wealth of 
the society. 
For instance, a progressive sufficientarian distribution would require simply 
minimising the number of people under the lower limit and guaranteeing that 
people have enough, described in average terms, to reach further thresholds. 
Both egalitarians and prioritarians would aim to raise the level of resources of 
everyone; in the case of the prioritarians giving priority to the worse off, 
among which our person with cheap tastes would be found; in the case of the 
egalitarians simply equalising resources. 
3.5 Conclusion 
Progressive sufficiency presents the problem of where to draw the line of 
differently relevant moral thresholds. It also sets constraints as to how to 
characterize these thresholds, due to its graded progressive nature. The 
problem of what should we consider morally relevant in human experience 
for distributive purposes concerns all forms of distribution, and is directly 
related to how we specify that a person is worse off than another. This 
general problem is one of interpersonal comparison, famously addressed by 
Amartya Sen in his essay "Equality of What? " Depending on our answer to 
this question, egalitarians would establish whether inequality exists, and 
prioritarians would use the description to "... identify those individuals whose 
claims are morally most urgent. " (Clayton & Williams, p. 8). Progressive 
sufficientarians, would use the answer as the prioritarians do, to identify 
those individuals whose claims are morally most urgent and to minimise their 
number below some low sufficiency threshold. After this level progressive 
sufficiency would maximize the number of people reaching the following 
thresholds. After the last threshold, by contrast with prioritarians, further 
benefits are not considered by progressive sufficientarians, even if people 
above the final threshold are worse off in some sense than other people 
further above. 
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On identifying what aspects of human life should we consider in order to 
decide which person is better off than another when distributing burdens and 
benefits, one important subject is the relevance of personal responsibility in 
the person's condition. We could ask whether we should focus only in access 
to goods or in people's achievements. Suppose that everyone accepts that 
we should help the poor, and two poor persons have access to the same 
help in the form of a job offer, but one of them does not reduce his poverty for 
reasons that can be attributed entirely to him: says he rejects the job. If we 
focus only on access, egalitarians would accept the resulting inequality. 
However, focusing only on access to benefits, would not allow us, for 
example, to pay a medical bill for an accident for the willing jobless, as he 
has not contributed to common resources by taking the offered job. I would 
argue that justice at least would demand of us that certain minimum 
thresholds of achievement have to be reached by all, regardless of 
responsibility. 
After the first threshold, individual choice of life paths, where individual 
responsibility is involved could modify the required distribution, taking into 
account whether someone is worse off than another only by her choice of life. 
The important point to underline here is that given the indeterminate nature of 
responsibility we should shift the emphasis on individual choices back to the 
distributive criterion, and far from the area of what to distribute. 
Considering the analysis in this chapter of welfare, the capability option and 
resources, we can suggest that there are reasons to argue for a graded 
advantage in human experience and that anti poverty policies should 
consider first the achievement of basic functionings described as the relief of 
severe deprivation and disabilities. Secondly, policies should consider 
resources and opportunities. Progressive sufficiency then would recommend 
thresholds in advantage with the first one described in absolute terms and 
the second and third described in relative terms. 
believe it is important to notice that when considering distributive questions 
from the perspective of a poor country, we have to take into consideration 
that possible answers have to provide an adequate political guide to a 
process, from almost an absolute unfair distribution of benefits and burdens 
towards a fairer distribution. The process towards justice in a poor country 
and a discussion on specific theoretical considerations in such respect has 
been neglected in the literature. I have maintained that just distributive 
answers should vary depending on the severity of resource scarcity. I have 
argued that when considering a fair distribution under severe scarcity of 
resources we should aim to minimise the number of people below a threshold 
defined in absolute terms. I have also argued that further thresholds should 
be taken into account and that such a mix distributive process can solve 
some problems of other distributive rules. 
A further conclusion from both the analysis of the distributive criterion and the 
currency of the distribution suggests that both criteria naturally fit together in 
a general prioritarian argument with graded sufficientarian steps of benefits 
and egalitarian considerations within thresholds. The structure of the 
distributive rule imposes some constrains to the answer of what to distribute. 
It is clear that in considering the first threshold in absolute terms with severe 
resource scarcity as a background condition, the only fair answer to what to 
distribute is to consider the area of capabilities. If we assume a decreasing 
moral relevance towards the better off and higher resource availability we 
can argue that the next threshold should be described in a resourcist view. 
The general idea of thresholds coupled with resource availability and 
decreasing moral relevance, inclines us to consider that when resource 
availability is high and higher thresholds are described in relative terms, the 
highest of the thresholds should consider welfare as the currency of the 
distribution. 
In order to consider how far my answer to the distributive question and to 
what to distribute affects social policy, I will discuss poverty conceptions, 
poverty measures and design assumptions in poverty alleviations policies. In 
discussing poverty we can better observe whether the first threshold of a fair 
distribution can be adequately described. 
I 
112 
Chapter 4: Distributive considerations when designing anti-poverty 
policies. 
4.1 Introduction 
Let us suppose that we agree that under conditions of severe scarcity of 
social resources one possible answer to the question of how to distribute 
resources is that a just social distribution should maximise the number of 
people who have enough to lead a decent life -a life where limited different 
aims can be reasonably pursued at different graded, morally relevant 
thresholds. Furthermore, let us assume that to the question of what to 
distribute we have agreed that one possible answer is that a just social 
distribution should consider different answers depending on the different 
morally relevant thresholds set by a distributive aim, from the lowest one in 
absolute terms better described by functionings, to the highest one in relative 
terms better described in terms of income and opportunities. 
In order to enquire how unfair a society is in the above terms, and what type 
of policies should be applied to redress possible unfairness, we should look 
first into how the worse off, or in our case the poor, are selected. We need to 
know, at least whether our normative distributive criterion affects poverty 
definitions, poverty measures and poverty alleviation program designs. This 
chapter addresses some of these questions. 
The literature on poverty is vast and generally concerned with the question of 
how we can more fairly measure whether someone is poor or not. According 
to the literature there are at least two general types of poverty measures, one 
measuring whether people are poor or not, the other estimating how poor are 
they. One type considers empirical and conceptual problems inherent in 
classifying a percentage of the population as poor. The other operates with a 
mathematical manipulation of poverty indices aiming to be more sensitive to 
the income distribution among the poor by providing some sort of measure of 
poverty intensity. 
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Governments and international agencies have usually used the first type of 
aggregate measures due to its attractive and self-explanatory results -a ratio 
of the total population that is poor. However some researchers have rejected 
this type of measures because they do not measure poverty intensity, thus, 
providing ambiguous results and probably leading to unfair policies. The 
second method, which is distribution sensitive, has been accepted by welfare 
researchers as one of the only methods that may lead to equitable anti- 
poverty policies. (Zheng, 1997, p. 125). This latter assumption and their 
possible problems related to the justice of the distribution amongst the poor, 
as well as the constant discussion in relation to the success or failure of anti- 
poverty policies provides room for a discussion. 
In the light of the discussion in Chapter 2 and 3, where we considered a 
specific just distributive rule, saying how to distribute, and a mixed criterion 
for the currency of distribution, saying what to distribute, this chapter will 
describe both types of poverty measurements. It will mainly examine and 
question the impact that both types of measurement have when considering 
the recommended distributive rule and other rules, and the currency of 
distribution. Finally I will suggest some ways of applying this methodological 
discussion to empirical data on poverty. 
This chapter is divided into three parts. The first section will address 
theoretical aspects of both types of poverty measures. The second will 
discuss the relevance of the findings of Chapter 2 and 3 on poverty 
measures. The third will draw conclusions and offer suggestion on how we 
might evaluate poverty. 
4.1.2. Theoretical aspects of poverty measures 
A general conception of poverty considers the worse off portion of the 
population with unsatisfied basic needs requiring urgent help to satisfy them. 
This conception appears clear as long as the urgency of the situation appeals 
to our humanitarian moral sense and to our sense of justice. However, this 
conception of poverty becomes less clear-cut when some improvement is 
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noted in the living standards of the worst off; the moral urgency of helping 
diminishes when there is a qualitative improvement in their quality of life. 
Therefore, this conception of poverty should be carefully examined to avoid 
ambiguities about whether some people are poor or not. 
The ambiguity of a situation where we cannot clearly consider someone as 
poor or not depends not only on the conception of poverty, but also on how 
we measure it. Definitions of poverty also seem dependent on the tendency 
of researchers to assume that an increase of one unit will always benefit a 
person ceteris paribus. If we assume that welfare does not have a continuous 
form, but a graded form, in which only certain levels of welfare are important, 
then we can evaluate poverty from a different perspective. 
Let us first consider the question of how a society should fairly distribute 
severely scarce resources amongst similarly situated individuals assuming 
we face a morally urgent problem. Consider the answer that says that social 
justice, as a morally binding agreement between societies' members, would 
demand that we give priority to the group of worst off individuals. If we agree 
on the definition of the worse off we still need to decide how to distribute 
among them. 
4.2 AGGREGATE MEASURES OF INCOME POVERTY 
4.2.1 Head Count 
The most common aggregate poverty measure is the headcount ratio -the 
fraction of people with income below a poverty line. This measure has been 
criticized by for not providing an indication of the severity of poverty. 
(Atkinson, A., 1998, p. 48) Critics have argued that the results given by this 
measure could mislead policy design or policy evaluation, as we would be 
designing or evaluating only poverty eradication policies, rather than poverty 
alleviation or redistribution policies. The problem of this measure is easily 
noted if we consider two groups of people of equal number, one well below 
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the poverty line, and the other very close to the line. Both groups show the 
same poverty head count, but the first group has a greater problem. 
Anthony Atkinson (1998, p. 49), although accepting that the head count 
measure does not provide adequate information about poverty intensity, 
defends the measure as a good way to show, for instance, how many 
members of society are deprived of the right to a minimum level of 
subsistence. In his view, all individuals under certain threshold would be 
among the worst off, notwithstanding their ranking among this cohort. In a 
way this view resembles the idea of not considering individual welfare as 
continuous, but graded. For Atkinson, it would not matter whether person (A) 
is only one unit close to the line and person (B) 300 units farther behind. It 
could be said that neither's right to be over the lines is respected. 
Atkinson's view, however, does not address the problem of how to distribute 
when considering severe scarce resources. Using his perspective, we would 
have no of deciding whether person (A) or person (B) should receive first the 
help. It is because we recognize that there is a severity ranking of the 
condition of the poor, and furthermore, that a specific distributor would have 
limited resources, that problems of justice arise. A distributor would have to 
decide who would receive resources first, and justify why some have been 
left out or not benefited from the distribution. If a right to reach a threshold 
existed, there would be no reasonable and just rationale for leaving some out 
of the distribution when resources are scarce. 
Assuming that welfare is graded, and considering that being above the first 
threshold is not a right but a weaker moral requirement depending on the 
available resources in a society, we can only maximise the number of 
individuals reaching the first threshold. Additionally, a distributor aiming to 
reduce the portion of the population who is worse off should start distributing 
resources to those closer to the threshold until resources run out. In this way 
the Head Count could provide ex ante and post facto measurements of the 
success of a particular policy. However, the head count is not enough to 
correctly assess the fairness of a policy. In the area of measurement and 
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guidance for policy design, the head count cannot answer who is farther or 
closer to the line, because it does not provide information on the severity of 
an individual's situation and the specifics of income distribution under that 
threshold. We would need to incorporate other type of measures to clarify 
these empirical questions and provide some insight into other moral 
questions, such as whether we are helping the most needy individuals, and 
when this is not morally justified, why not. 
4.2.2 Distribution sensitive measures 
Distribution sensitive poverty measures have been designed to consider the 
income distribution amongst the poor, ordering them from the worst off 
upwards. Assuming for now that income is taken as a good measure of well 
being, the worst off person is the one with zero income, the second worse off 
person is the one with one unit and so on. Thus, a distribution sensitive 
poverty measure would provide an idea of the intensity of the inequality 
amongst the poor with reference to the poverty line. 
0 
There are several distribution sensitive poverty measures, most of them 
created after Amartya Sen noted different problems emanating from some 
simple aggregate measures such as the Head Count (Sen, 1996). Sen 
proposed some minimal requirements that an aggregate measure should 
include, which were subsequently translated into the mathematical axioms 
forming the basis for most measurements of this type. ' A measure for 
instance has to satisfy at least the following axioms. 
Monotonic: given other things, a reduction in the income of a poor 
household must increase the poverty index. 
Transfer: given other things, a pure transfer of income from a poor 
household to any other household that is richer, must increase the 
poverty index. 
SCC /hcng. E3: (1997) for an extensive survcv on poverty measures. 
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Transfer sensitivity axiom: this axiom gives more weight to transfers 
at the lower end of the distribution than the higher end. (S. Levy, 
1991, p. 16) 
The most common distribution sensitive poverty measure, fulfilling Sen's 
axioms, is the one proposed by Foster, Greer and Thorbecke (FGT) (1984). 
This measure is commonly used because it is decomposable, allowing not 
only measurement of poverty levels, but also the contribution to the total of 
each different surveyed subgroup. For this last reason governments use the 
measure to plan decentralized anti-poverty policies. The FGT measure works 
by comparing each individual's income with its distance to the poverty line 
(poverty gap). The measure can be made to assign different weights to each 
individual's poverty gap, values of the variable a. The value of a gives less or 
more. weight to larger poverty gaps, providing an index of poverty intensity. 
Its functional representation is the following equation: 
Figure 4.1 Foster, Green, Thorbecke, poverty measure. 
a 
Pa =-I. ' for all y, <z N; 
=, z 
Where N is the size of the population, n is the number of poor, z is the 
poverty line, 
. 1. y, 
represents the income level of individual i for all y, < z, and a 
is a parameter showing the relative importance attached to the income of the 
poorest of the poor in the measurement of poverty. 
By this formula one can also obtain other commonly used poverty measures. 
As the measure takes a power of the poverty gap, when a= 0, Pa is equal to 
the Head Count. When a= 1, Pa is equal to the combination of the Head 
Count and the average income gap of the poor, a measure usually called 
Income Gap. As the parameter a rises, increasing priority is given to transfers 
to the very poorest. Read in this way, the measure with the same data 
provides information on the proportion of the poor (a=0), the intensity of 
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poverty in the whole population ((-L=1,2 or 3), and the distribution of income 
among the poor. 
4.2.3 Contrasts with different distributive criteria 
The comparison between different distributive criteria can be observed in 
Figure 4.2 where the plotted FGT equation represents an increasing marginal 
valuation of an additional one Euro for the worse off. (Atkinson, A., 1988, 
p. 51). The Figure represents different concerns for the worse off. 
Figure 4.2 Foster, Green, Thorbecke, poverty measure, with different 
parameter values. 
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The value a =1 implies that the same value is attached to a marginal 1 Euro 
at all income levels below the poverty line. This in fact means that is 
indeterminate who should get the Euro, once in this case the number of 
people would matter. The value a=2 gives a linearly increasing marginal 
valuation; higher values, such as that of a=3 shown, give a non-linear 
increase in the marginal valuation, with more weight attached to additional 
income given to the poorest. (Atkinson, 1998, p. 51) 
As we can observe in Figure 4.2, the increasing marginal valuation of one 
Euro provided by higher numbers of the parameter IL, could be in fact liken to 
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the increasing moral valuation given by prioritarians to the worst off. For 
instance, a value of u=3 would recommend that a specific distributor with 
limited resources assign aid to the worst off person until this levels reaches 
the level of the second worst off person, then he would help the two equally 
until both reach the thirdly ranked, and so on until all aid is distributed. 
(Zheng, 1997, p. 125) In fact this distribution would give a similar solution 
than the Rawlsian prioritarian maximin. A very important difference with 
maximin is that a=3 would in principle allow trade offs between number of 
people helped, while maximin will refuse trade off regardless of numbers. 
Another very important difference is that maximin cannot in principle be 
represented in a continuous line. 
Once again, consider the question how should we distribute severily scarce 
resources amongst similarly situated individuals? As mentioned in Chapter 2 
there are at least three distinct responses to this question, which can be 
briefly stated as follows. 
Equality: Nobody should have more than anyone else, through no fault 
of his own. 
Priority: We should benefit individuals, and more weight should be 
given to benefiting less advantaged than more advantaged individuals. 
Sufficiency: Each person should have enough. 
The plotted FGT measure can be a good way to show differences among 
distributions and assess my progressive sufficientarian argument. We have 
to note that progressive sufficiency (PS) would give, as does moderate 
prioritarianism a decreasing marginal valuation (DMV) between thresholds. 
Giving DMV between thresholds would mean that the group within the first 
threshold has priority over the group within the second. PS has a significant 
difference with moderate prioritarianism, whereby within thresholds the 
distribution will start from those closer to the threshold down, giving 
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increasing marginal valuation within thresholds in order to minimise the 
portion of individuals below the line. 
4.2.3.1 Priority 
Observing Atkinson's graphic we could argue that a= 3 (see Fig. 4.2) can be 
described as a strong prioritarian distributive valuation. In Figure 4.2 we can 
easily observe why one of the most common critiques to strong 
prioritarianism is the overriding value given to the worst off person. This 
situation not only presents a problem under extreme scarcity, as resources 
would be expended very rapidly on the worse off, leaving many with little, but 
also a distributor under moderate scarcity would require too much information 
to discriminate between the less badly off and the slightly better off. 
For example, if we assume that the poverty line is situated at 300 units and 
that we have 100 units to distribute, consider three persons, A) with zero 
income, B) with 250 units and C) with 250 units. The three of them are 
similarly situated in other characteristics. A distributor following a strong 
prioritarian rule of distribution would require all aid to be given to A) since he 
is worst off. This policy would settle the distributive question because nothing 
would be left to distribute between the other two. Although the final income 
distribution would be more egalitarian, B) and C) could reasonable claim that 
their interests have not been adequately assessed as none of them received 
benefits which could help them reach the threshold. 
A weaker prioritarian version, one that could be described as close to Parfit's 
version of prioritarianism, (See Chapter 2, Section 3) would be a=2 (see Fig. 
4.2). This distributive criterion would not confer extreme priority to the worst 
off person. Instead, it would allow a distribution of resources between all the 
worse off. However, one of the problems with this distributive criterion is its 
indeterminacy. As there is no clear moral obligation to the worst off person, 
we would require further criteria to assign resources. 
121 
With regard to my example of three persons with different levels of 
resources, the weaker version of prioritarianism would have the same 
problems as maximin in ranking B) and C). However, as there is no extreme 
priority to provide benefits for the worst off, the number of individuals 
benefiting matters much more than in a=3. Thus, resources could be divided 
amongst the three of them in different proportions, giving more to A) and 
perhaps the same to B) and C), according to the linearly increasing marginal 
value one more Euro has for the worse off person. 
4.2.3.2 Equal Treatment 
A kind of equal treatment for those below the threshold would require us to 
assign a=1 (see Fig. 4.2), where we would assume that 1 unit would have the 
same marginal value to every person under the threshold, because what 
matters is to treat them all equally. Therefore it would not matter who gets the 
allocation, it would be of the same value regardless position. Note that this 
would not equalise their positions and should not be confused with equality in 
the sense discussed up to now. 
In my example, persons (A=0), (B=250) and (C=250) with a threshold of 300 
and 100 to distribute, assuming a=1 we would end up with (A= 33.33), 
(B=283.33) and (C=283.33). The result of this distribution would reduce the 
aggregate intensity of poverty, though it would seem to be unfair to the three 
of them, in the sense that they would end up with less than needed. A 
distributor would be presented with the dilemma of lowering down some for 
the benefit of a third, leaving all, at the end farther away of the relevant 
threshold. 
4.2.3.3 Progressive Sufficiency 
Progressive Sufficiency is not considered in the graph plotted by Atkinson 
(Fig. 4.2). The reason for this is that distributive sensitive poverty measures 
assume either a linear value to transfers to all the worse off or increasing 
higher values to transfers to those who are in worse conditions. A 
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progressive sufficientarian distribution, aiming to provide enough for 
everyone, would in fact assign an increasing marginal value or maximax 
within thresholds and a decreasing marginal value priority or weigthed 
prioritarianism between thresholds. Opposite to weigthed prioritarianism, PS 
would be discontinuous in its increments in welfare. If we assume that 
welfare is formed by discrete characteristics with different levels of 
accomplishment, we would have to measure the distance to the threshold of 
each person, or of a group of persons and provide the required resources to 
reach the threshold. 
Assuming extreme scarcity of resources, and because we accept that it is 
better to benefit more people than less, we should aim to minimise the 
number of people who have less than enough, starting with the ones closer 
to the threshold. In fact we would have a linearly increasing marginal 
valuation of the income gap of each person or group. That is, we will give 
more marginal value to one Euro given to the person closer to the threshold, 
as we would be able to place more people in the threshold. 
Returning to my example, persons B) and C) both at 250 units, would receive 
everything and A) would receive nothing. A) Being the worst off would remain 
the worst off but B) and C) would no longer be poor. The advantage of this 
distribution can be better appreciated if we consider the threshold in absolute 
terms. If we think in nutrition terms, only when reaching the threshold will a 
person have enough to eat. 
With this end goal in mind, and thinking in my example with extreme scarcity 
of resources, progressive sufficiency would succeed in providing enough to 
two out of three persons; the other distributions would fail to save anyone in 
this sense. As far fetched this example can seem, this is more or less what 
happens in situations of extreme scarcity, ether in humanitarian emergencies 
or in most parts of the developing world. 
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4.2.3.4 Contrasts among distributions 
Cross comparisons between distributions are illustrated in Table 4.1 
Table 4.1 Contrasts among different distributive criteria 
Original 
Distribution 
Maximin Weak 
Priority 
Equal 
Treatment 
Progressive 
Sufficiency 
Pre Post Post Post Post 
A= 0 100 50 33 0 
B= 250 250 275 283 300 
C= 250 250 275 283 300 
Note: Arrows show the direction it would take the distribution. 
Assume that we have 100 units to distribute and less than 300 units means 
indigence. From a graded welfare perspective and assuming severe scarcity 
of resources, we would have to accept that the best distribution is the one 
that places more individuals at the threshold. Only progressive sufficiency 
fulfils this requirement. In order to do this it would have to start with those 
closer to the line. In contrast, a prioritarian would start from the bottom of the 
distribution, and a strict egalitarian would divide equally total resources 
among all or if it cannot do this it would try to close the gap, giving it all to the 
worst off. 
Now, let us evaluate each distribution from the perspective of distributive 
sensitive poverty measures, assuming A), B) and C) are the only poor out of 
thirty others (see Table 4.2). In this case we are distributing 100 units and the 
poverty line in absolute terms is set at 300 units. 
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Table 4.2 FGT measure results- 
Original Dist. High Priority Weak 
Priority 
Equal 
Treatment 
Progressive 
Sufficiency 
A=O A=100 A=50 A=33 A=O 
B=250 B=250 B=275 B=283 B=300 
C=250 C=250 C=275 C=283 C=300 
a=(0)=10 a=(0)=10 a=(0)=10 a=(0)=10 P(0)= 3.33 
((1)=4.4 a=(1)=3.33 a=(l)=3.33 a=(1)=3.34 a=(1)=3.33 
u=(2)= 3.52 u=(2)= 1.67 a=(2)= 2.36 a=(2)= 2.66 a=(2)= 3.33 
a=(3)=3.36 u=(3)=1.02 a=(3)=1.93 u=(3)=2.35 u=(3)=3.33 
Note: All indices were multiplied by 100. When a=0, P is equal to the head count, when 
a=1, P is equal to the income gap, when a=2, P gives more value to lower incomes, when u 3, 
I' increases the value given to lower incomes. 
In Table 4.2 a lower percentage in the results of the FGT measure reflects a 
better situation. We can observe that a sufficientarian distribution as 
measured by setting a=0, reduces the proportion of people under poverty 
comparing it with the original distribution. It also reduces the aggregate 
intensity of poverty as measure by setting a=1,; and improves, albeit slightly, 
the original distribution when we use a=2 and a=3. In contrast, all the other 
distributions do not reduce the proportion of the poor for a=0 and present the 
same results as sufficiency in the aggregate intensity of poverty for «=1, 
though have better results than sufficiency when we give more value to lower 
incomes. In this later respect the best arrangement is high and weak priority. 
Let us now consider the case of A), or a group of persons left without 
anything in the case of sufficiency. In the case of a graded welfare approach, 
and considering indigence, it is obvious that to distribute only some benefits 
would not be enough, they would remain malnourished, and thus it is better 
to save 7 percent and loose 3 percent, rather that loosing 10 percent 
altogether. In the rest of the distributions we are administering hunger, not 
solving it. 
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If we consider that one more unit means an increase in benefit, as in normal 
continuous welfare, in Table 4.2 we can observe that improvements to A) 
provide overall better results in a=2 and a=3. However, the priority given to 
the worst off could lead to a problem of ambiguity for the FGT measure. For 
instance, it seems counterintuitive that under sufficiency, while reducing the 
number of the poor, the measure gives a similar percentage of U=2 and (X=3 
poverty to that in the original distribution. This would mean in reality that the 
moral command over resources of one poor individual would be similar to the 
moral command over resources of several poor individuals, though only in 
relation to reaching the threshold. This cannot be accepted if we want to 
respect the equal interests of individuals. 
Seeing from this perspective, an apparent problem for the FGT measure 
seems to lie in the Transfer sensitivity axiom, where more priority is given to 
the worst off under the threshold. As I have argued, between thresholds 
priority should be given to the general group of the worst off, while within that 
group priority should be given to those immediately below the threshold. The 
overall rule is multiply discontinuous. 
The results in Table 4.2 also show the importance of the poverty line in the 
case of graded welfare or to be more general the moral relevance of 
thresholds. In a continuous welfare scheme each unit provided to individuals 
is considered as benefit. But in a graded limited idea of welfare each unit is 
only important if it pushes a person to a given threshold. An increase in 
benefits after reaching this threshold is accepted by prioritarians as long as 
we keep our rule of decreasing marginal moral valuation of one Euro for the 
better off. In the case of equal treatment, as long as everyone reaches similar 
levels of resources, more units after the threshold are considered an increase 
in benefits. In the case of simple sufficiency the problem becomes the 
threshold, a little bit more resources after the threshold becomes irrelevant, 
there would not be further benefit relevant to justice. This might be solved if 
we accept different thresholds with a declining moral urgency. This means 
that it always will be more important to guarantee that a person has enough, 
for instance, to be well fed, than others having enough opportunities for 
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gourmet food. But once the first moral threshold is reached by all, 
opportunities for mild exotic consumption should be open. 
Taking into account the results of the above section, let us consider some of 
the problems related to poverty definitions and the setting of a poverty line. 
4.3 POVERTY DEFINITIONS AND MIXED CRITERIA IN THE CURRENCY 
OF THE DISTRIBUTION 
The fact that poverty is multidimensional, reflecting the composition of a 
complicated function that allows people to reach certain levels of 
achievement in order to lead a decent life, and the fact that some societies 
suffer from a severe lack of social and financial resources, makes a clear 
definition of the cut off point between the poor and the non-poor a difficult 
task. This becomes especially difficult if we disagree in the type of benefits to 
distribute to people in order for them to leave poverty. 
There are three main perspectives in which poverty has been defined over 
the years. 2 
1) Income perspective: Through this perspective a person or a household 
is poor if their income is below the defined poverty line. Such a poverty 
line varies depending on the country. However, it is usually defined in 
terms of having enough income to acquire a defined amount of food. 
2) Basic needs perspective: Through this perspective poverty is defined 
as deprivation of material requirements for the minimally acceptable 
fulfilment of human needs, including food. This concept of deprivation 
includes not only income, but also basic services such as health, basic 
education, work and public services. 
The following is based in the Human Development Report, 1997. pp. 15-16 
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3) Capability perspective: Through this perspective poverty represents 
the absence of some basic capabilities to function. Functionings can 
vary from such physical ones, as being well nourished, being 
adequately clothed and sheltered and avoiding preventable morbidity, 
to more complex social achievements such as partaking in the life of 
the community. 
Option 2 and 3 could be regarded as very similar in practical terms. Option 3, 
however, expresses a more inclusive description of poverty, which can be 
difficult to express in policy terms since it has to deal with many more 
variables than does option 2. As we have seen in previous chapters, both the 
distributive rule and the currency of distribution set constraints on how to 
distribute scarce resources. One of these constraints (something that the 
poverty literature does not consider) concerns what happens when we mix 
different currencies of distribution to better assess the moral problems of 
distribution. I have argued that we should consider capabilities for the first 
threshold and resources and opportunities for the second and third 
thresholds. 
4.3.1 Poverty definitions and distributive criteria 
Each of the poverty definitions provided above, reflects a more general 
debate about what should be the currency of a just distribution (see Chapter 
3) and the distributive rule to be followed. The currency debate considers the 
problems derived from selecting some area of human experience as the 
adequate one to be equalised, prioritised or limited. As I discussed in 
Chapter 3, welfare, income and capabilities present particular problems that 
can make a distribution unfair. A natural problem of these three types of 
criteria is the narrowness in which they consider human experience. 
The most inclusive description is the capability version, describing a middle 
area between resources and welfare. It recognizes that different persons will 
transform resources into welfare in different ways. Thus it would seem unfair 
to describe someone as non-poor even if she is above an income threshold, 
while knowing that she requires more resources because she has for 
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example, a handicap. Observing this area of human life we could better 
describe the group of people who is worse off. However, the capabilities 
currency would not solve all problems of justice in the distribution of 
resources. 
We cannot adequately rank all persons by their capabilities, either throughout 
their lives or even simply at a particular moment in time. This is not only due 
to the large amount of private information needed, but also because apart 
from certain basic functionings much is open to individual effort. It would 
seem we have to limit our concerns with capabilities to a very clear level of 
achievement in order to be certain we are being fair in our comparisons with 
other peoples' efforts. After this basic level we should still be morally 
concerned with people who are worse off, but our concerns cannot remain 
focused on this middle area. We would better shift focus to consider 
resources, described in terms of enough resources and opportunities to 
reach different levels of specific discrete goods. 
Let us assume that the first standard of a decent life is formed by basic 
capabilities, and that we should minimise the number of people below this 
level of achievement. The first standard, thus, requires a way to measure 
people's functionings. As this cannot be done directly, an indirect way has to 
be found. An index of deprivation would show through social indicators the 
indirect lack of some functionings. The United Nations in their Human 
Development Report (1997) offers an alternative with the Human Poverty 
Index. 
HPI=[1 /3(P13+ P23 + P33 +)]ßi3 
The HPI concentrates on deprivation in three essential aspects of human life, 
namely a) longevity (people not expected to survive to age 40 (P1), b) 
knowledge (percentage of adults who are illiterate (P2) and c) a decent living 
standard of living (P3) (this element is composed by three variables: the 
percentage of people without access to safe water (P31), the percentage of 
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people without access to health services (P32), and the percentage of 
moderately and severely underweight children under five (P33). 
The HPI is represented as a percentage of decomposable multidimensional 
poverty measure with equilibrium between its formula factors. It can be 
disaggregated up to a small regional level. Moreover, the HPI introduces a 
new perspective into the measurement of poverty in underdeveloped 
countries because it does not take income into account. The rationale behind 
the UN-Human Development idea is to take into account much more than the 
Gross National Product. This idea could be exemplified by assuming, that 
even if an individual could have more income than the average she can still 
have a reduced capability set, measure by a low P32. This is clear in case of 
the disabled, but it is also relevant in other groups of able-bodied individuals. 
For example, pregnant women who are raising children, collecting fire wood, 
water, grinding and attending other house chores. Some members of this 
group might possess more than the income threshold to be described as 
poor. However, they have a reduced capability compared with other groups 
with less income. In this context, income becomes important once these 
proxies for basic functionings have been satisfied. 
4.3.2 Poverty lines and graded welfare 
The HPI however, does not solve the problem of ranking people or 
households from a capability perspective. The three areas of human 
experience selected in the HPI, longevity, knowledge and living standards, 
are necessarily restrictive due to information access problems in each 
country. (HDR, 1997, p. 18) For example the HPI doe not include the 
functioning of partaking in community life, as it would be very difficult or close 
to impossible to measure. Other basic functionings, such as the exercise of 
civil and political rights, as well as being handicapped are also difficult to 
measure. 
We must recognize that the HPI was created to evaluate and rank 
underdeveloped countries where lack of safe water, illiteracy and malnutrition 
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are more common. In this context, the thresholds set by the index are the 
lowest standards in the world. The HPI in this context can only provide a 
guide in order to assess deprivation in certain countries, as the lowest 
standard can be too low for other countries. 
When we explore the possibility of ranking individuals or households in one 
country, taking into account the variables set by the HPI, we are confronted 
with disparate sources of information, making impossible the use of one 
single data set. For example the incorporation of longevity makes it very 
difficult to rank households, as it is by definition an aggregate measure. 
Malnutrition for children under five years of age in a household is information 
usually linked to medical databases that do not give other type of socio- 
economic information. In contrast knowledge is clearly described by the 
proxy of school attainment; the same can be said of access to safe water, 
and access to health services. 
The common sources of general socio-economic information for households 
and individuals are the census and socio-economic surveys. Censuses are 
more reliable as they are able to show a wide picture of socio-economic 
characteristics of the whole population at a determinate moment. However, 
their long-term periodicity prevents a close scrutiny of short-term social 
changes. Furthermore they do not provide information on malnutrition or 
morbidity. In contrast, household surveys tend to be performed every one or 
two years, allowing statistical comparisons over shorter time periods. These 
surveys incorporate information related to expenses, income, work, 
education, and living conditions. However they usually lack health data. 
The HPI applied to households or individuals can be considered when 
referring to a very basic quality of life, not withstanding income level. In 
cases where health information is not available, we would need to select 
those proxies related to health. Using micro data information about 
households related to social and living conditions it could be possible to 
select multiple indicators related to deprivation. The extent of the indicators 
and the availability of information depend on each country. The point to 
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stress here is that we are measuring a very basic level of attainment, a base 
line where a decent life starts to be possible, regardless of the income each 
individual has. This base line is described in such absolute terms that to be 
close to the threshold would not help, the person has to reach it or be above 
it. In order to start exercising her liberties an adult person has to be able to 
read, to be informed, to be healthy and live in a good shelter with safe water. 
4.3.2.1 Problems of interpersonal comparison between those 
individuals under the lowest threshold. 
Financial poverty lines are either framed in absolute or relative terms. When 
financial poverty is considered in absolute terms, the poverty line is set to 
take into account the price of a minimal basket of goods recommended by 
experts. When poverty is considered as a relative condition the poverty line is 
set to take into account the average income in society. Each method of 
determining the poverty line has specific drawbacks. For instance, it is very 
difficult to agree on the components of the minimal basket of goods. A 
common problem to both absolute and relative poverty lines is how to link the 
cost of the basket or the average income to real earnings, or even simply to 
inflation. Once problems of definition are resolved, financial poverty has the 
advantage of providing an interpersonal ranking easily grasped for policy 
purposes. If information were available for type of households and regions, a 
distributor would be able to rank individuals by their income. 3 
In the case of the Human Poverty Index, however, the suggested deprivation 
line, although well defined in absolute terms, does not allow us to rank the 
worse off. In fact, although the Human Poverty Index is providing a complex 
very low base poverty line in non-financial terms for underdeveloped 
countries, those under this threshold can still be numerous. Use of the HPI 
would require policies directed to all of those under the threshold, diminishing 
our ability to maximise the number of people reaching the threshold. 
For a discussion of po crty lines sec Boltvinik, J., (1999), Desai, \1., (1995) and I Icrnandcz Laos, 
F., (2001) 
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However, even if we accept the platitude that we must help all under the 
threshold provided by the HPI index, we must keep in mind that we are 
talking about countries with severe scarce resources to distribute, where the 
sheer number of people under the threshold make policies very difficult to 
implement if there are no further criteria to distinguish among very badly off 
individuals. For instance, according to the HPI calculated in 1997, Mexico, 
one of the best-situated countries in this index, had 11% of its population 
under the threshold, almost 10 million people. The worst situated country in 
the HPI of 1997, Niger, had 78% of its population under the threshold, around 
7 million people. (HDR, 1997, p. 21) 
If our aim, as recommended by Progressive Sufficiency is to minimise the 
number of people below the deprivation poverty threshold., and if we poses 
information related to the groups represented under the threshold, one way 
to solve the lack of ranking in graded welfare would be to attribute benefits to 
the larger group, or to the region with a larger deprived population. 
I 
In strict terms we could say that, in order fairly to distribute social resources, 
we would have to maximise the number of people reaching the first 
threshold, crucially maintaining a balance for the long term, with incentive 
constraints and other social aims that can promote further benefits for 
everyone. In general we are assuming that our moral concern is with the 
worst off, defined as the group of people under successive thresholds. 
Although diminishing in priority, our moral concern is sufficiently strong to 
benefit individuals in each successive threshold, even though they would not 
be considered poor. 
The problem to distribute benefits between groups now, seems to be one of 
targeting and efficiency in the distribution. A general objective for a distributor 
considering all social transfers would be to give priority to those under the 
first threshold and maintain benefits for the rest of the population to avoid 
people falling down a threshold for faults not of their own. In what follows, let 
us manly consider the first threshold. 
133 
4.4 TARGETING AND EFFICIENCY IN A DISTRIBUTION4 
We should remember that poverty alleviation is not the only objective of 
social policy. A clear objective would be the establishment of a financially 
sustainable social security system, linked to the finance of a pension system. 
(Dreze, J., & Sen, A., 1991, pp. 8-15) In developing countries governments 
usually possess few resources to invest in social security, and only some 
groups of workers receive these benefits. Targeting resources to the worse 
off and the overall efficiency of transfers becomes relevant insofar as 
priorities are clear. However, targeting resources for the worse off can only 
work as long as other objectives of social policy are not abandoned. 
The general problem of measuring target efficiency to alleviate income 
poverty is illustrated in Figure 4.4 given by Atkinson (1998, p. 121). 
I 
4T 11e follýýýý inýý section is based in Atkinson, A., 1998, pp. 120-125 
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Figure 4.3 Measuring target efficiency of programmes 
Income 
y Effect of transfer 
o.. ' Poverty Line z 
---------------- 
D 
Ä 
y min 
Source: Atkinson, 1998, p. 121 
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In the figure all families are ranked in increasing order of income along the 
horizontal axis, z is the poverty line and H the percentile of families. The 
poverty reduction efficiency of social transfers would lie in the extent to 
which they reduce the poverty gap (D+A). In Figure 4.3 the solid line 
represents the situation before transfers and the dashed line the situation 
after transfers. 
"The reduction in the poverty gap is the indicated by the area A, and 
the poverty reduction efficiency of the transfers is measured by the 
ratio of the area A to the total transfer (A+B+C). The efficiency is less 
than 100 per cent to the extent that there are payments to the non- 
poor (C) and that there are "excess" payments to the poor (B). " 
(Atkinson, 1998, p. 122) 
In considering this type of efficiency we are centring our attention on the 
accuracy of the program in assisting only the target group. This type of 
efficiency, called vertical efficiency can achieve 100% efficiency by moving 
the dashed line downwards, eliminating areas B and C, leaving, however, a 
high poverty gap. 
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We could also consider how far the needs of the target group in question 
have been met. This issue is represented in Figure 4.3 as the ratio between 
the area (A) and (A+D). Looking close at Figure 4.3 we can appreciate that 
horizontal efficiency better covers the needs of the target group. 
These two different ways of observing efficiency, vertical and horizontal, are 
based on the poverty gap. If we consider the headcount measure of poverty, 
horizontal efficiency would be "the ratio of the number of beneficiaries in the 
target group to the total number of persons in the target group. " (Atkinson, 
1998, p123) In this case transfers in the figure would achieve 100% 
efficiency. However, as Atkinson remarks this efficiency would also be 
achieved if we move the dashed line vertically downward until the break-even 
point coincided with the poverty line. 
The point made by Atkinson is that notions of "efficiency" are not independent 
of the methods used in measuring poverty. It is clear that we can achieve 
high levels of "efficiency", at the same time as leaving high levels of poverty. 
"Vertical and horizontal efficiency are therefore valuable indicators, but they 
are not on their own sufficient to guide policy formation. [... ] The indicators 
need to be related to the overall policy problem, with an explicit formulation of 
the objective and constraints. " (Atkinson, 1998, p. 123) Consequently, the 
methods used to set the poverty line and identify the poor are of singular 
importance in the general objective of making poverty alleviation policies 
efficient in reaching the targeted group. 
One such problem is how we ought to measure the effect of transfers on the 
group of deprived people, taking into account not income but only an index of 
achievements, but where these may have beneficial effects in the long term, 
as in the case of educational achievement. There is, first, the problem of 
mixing the HPI with the FGT index. The first is a non-linear measure of 
poverty and the second a linear measure 
136 
4.4.1 Poverty alleviation problem 
According to our previous discussion, let us suppose that a government's aim 
is to maximise the number of people reaching the first threshold, and in 
considering the long term, reasons of efficiency and incentives, prevent 
people from falling below thresholds for reasons not of their own fault. The 
government will tax people over higher threshold but not so hard as to level 
all them down. In this sense Progressive Sufficiency will be more like 
weighted prioritarians than like maximiners between thresholds. 
The government will measure the degree of aggregate poverty by the head 
count and the poverty gap, which is given algebraically by FGT formula. The 
policy aim would be to minimise Pa=O (head count) and Pa=1 (poverty gap) 
subject to a government budget constraint. Consider the following class of 
transfers. 
Figure 4.4 Class of transfers. 
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Source: Modified from Atkinson, 1998, p. 124, incorporating Income Guarantee. 
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Consider pre transfer net income (solid line). The family with the lowest pre- 
transfer income intercepts the vertical axis in y min. Four transfer cases are 
contemplated. The first is a Uniform Benefit that can be express as pre 
transfer income plus an equal transfer for all. The second is an Income 
Supplement that is targeted to those below the poverty line and is less than 
the individual poverty gap but gives relative priority to those with lower 
income giving them higher sums. The third provides a Minimum Income 
Guarantee that concentrates the transfer on the half poorest group giving 
them half their income gap to the poverty line. The fourth provides an Income 
Guarantee equal to the poverty gap, concentrating the transfer in those with 
a lower income gap. 
We might ask how these transfers fare according to our explicit poverty 
reduction aims of minimising Pa=O and Pa=1. Let us consider a simple 
example where the poverty line is set in absolute terms and is 1 /2 average 
family income. In the original distribution with this poverty line we would have 
a head count of 20%. The poverty gap in the original distribution is 8% of 
total income. Let us assume a transfer of 2% of total income. 5 
Taking into account these conditions we can transfer 4% of the poverty line 
to a Uniform Benefit. 20.2% of the poverty line to an Income Supplement. 
40.4% to a Minimum Income Guarantee for the poorest half. And the income 
gap for a Income Guarantee equal to the poverty line until resources run out, 
starting from those closer to the poverty line. Consider Table 4.1 to contrast 
between results. 
Table 4.3 Comparison of class of transfers. 
Head 
Count 
Poverty 
Gap 
Improvement 
PG (%) 
FGT 2 Improvement 
FGT 2 (%) 
Original Distribution 20% 8.0% 4.70% 
Uniform Benefit 20% 7.20% 13% 4.00% 15% 
Income Supplement 15% 4.00% 50% 2.28% 51% 
Minimum Income Guarantee 20% 4.40% 45% 1.40% 70% 
Income Guarantee Equal to PG 5% 3.95% 51% 3.18% 32% 
Source: My own calculations based on Atkinson, 1998, p. 124 
Note: Flus example is similar to Atkinson, 1998, p. 121.1 have only changed the numbers and added 
a lurther option. 
1 3< 
Considering our explicit aim of minimising Pa=O (Head count) and Pa=1 
(Poverty Gap), and taking into account the results provided by using the FGT 
formula, the best option would be to provide an income guarantee equal to 
the income gap of families closest to the line. The improvement in this option 
with respect to the original poverty gap is 51 %. 
One disadvantage of this option is that 5% of the very poor would be left 
without transfers. This is clearly observed after measuring poverty and 
assigning high priority to those in the bottom of the income distribution, Pa=2. 
According to Pa=2, the best option would be to benefit the worse off first, 
through a minimum income guarantee. As we have discussed, this option 
cannot be considered when we describe the poverty line in absolute terms, 
as the line consists of a graded benefit that cannot be separated. This option 
also provides ambiguous results; for instance, if we are looking for the 
highest reduction of a=2, we could still obtain the same result of 1.40% by 
benefiting only 5% of the worse off. 
The above exercise shows, among other things, that in designing a poverty 
alleviation policy governments should be clear in their aims when referring to 
the targeted efficiency of the policy in question. It can also be observed that it 
is possible to apply different priorities to different groups of the population. 
For instance, in my example the minimum income guarantee has been 
applied to half of the poor and the income guarantee has been applied to 
75% of the poor. Although it is clear that the best options for reducing poverty 
are the targeted ones, we might face two problems derived from targeting. 
The first problem is one of lack of precise information to be able to target 
benefits, and the second problem is one of incentives to work and leisure. 
4.4.2 Targeting and information 
Efficiency in the targeting of governmental programs is a general problem in 
developing countries. Institutions are weak and resources are scarce, which 
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makes it very difficult to gather detailed income and categorical information 
from individuals and households. The main problem of this lack of precise 
information is that benefits can be given to those who do not need them as 
much, leaving the needy without anything. 
To avoid problems of this type governments usually design some poverty 
alleviation policies by self-selection, making the self selected group, the 
targeted group. Self-selection stems from the assumption that only those who 
really need the benefits will bother to claim them. However, self-selection can 
raise the same problem of not reaching the targeted group. This can be due 
to people feeling that they should not claim it, or simply because they are not 
well informed of the policies. Other cases of imperfect targeting can come 
from a failure to express clearly the objective of the policy, such as when the 
objective is to reduce poverty, and due to a wrong interpretation of aims, only 
the rural poor are benefited, excluding the urban poor. 
A further problem could arise from the difficulty in gathering precise 
information related to income poverty. This is especially so if targeted 
programs assume different benefits for those under different thresholds, for 
instance, if the extremely poor are to be benefited with direct benefits and the 
moderately poor are only be given indirect benefits. A program has to 
consider in its design a way to certify adequately and with detail when direct 
resources should be withdrawn, especially when we assume that direct 
benefits might be more attractive to an individual that indirect benefits. The 
aspect of individual behaviour in relation to work or leisure brings us to the 
issue of incentives in the design of a poverty alleviation policy. 
4.4.3 Problem of incentives in the design of anti-poverty policies 
The standard theory of utility maximisation assumes that when faced with a 
marginal tax of 100%, the individual rational decision is to avoid that tax. By 
this same basic premise the tax structure has been designed assuming that 
tax increases for those above certain earnings would reduce their incentives 
to work. Goverments take into account this rationality and in general design 
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their incentive structures according to it. In poverty alleviation policies this 
rationality would mean for instance that income benefits couldn't be given in 
relation to earnings. For incentive reasons, assuming this conception of 
rationality, transfers equal to the poverty gap will only reduce effort, as 
people will cease to work. If benefits were given in this way, the argument 
goes, people would face a 100% marginal tax, thus they would reduce 
earnings to receive more transfers, increasing the general cost of the 
program and not benefiting those who work harder. 
However, the utility maximisation assumption in relation to incentives to work 
has to be proved empirically and there has not been much empirical support 
for this theoretical proposition. (Atkinson, 1998, p. 136) One reason for the 
absence of this "rational" behaviour in the real world could be the wrong 
assumption that leisure is ceteris paribus always preferred to work. Work 
could be a source of self-respect for the individual, making someone to prefer 
badly paid work over a legitimate claim for benefits, or prefer to pay high 
taxes given the status acquired with the job. It could also be that the poor 
behave as if they have nothing to lose, that is rationally. They could very well 
accept whatever transfer is provided, until it has reached a sufficient 
threshold that makes a difference in their lives. (Banerjee, A., & Newman, A., 
1994) 
In the case of poverty alleviation programmes, a distributor facing scarcity of 
resources would have to regard as a necessary part of the program that the 
poor increase their earnings in the short term, in order to reduce the general 
cost of the program. The utility maximisation assumption would suggest to 
poverty alleviation programmes designers that, for example, cash transfers 
should be distributed without taking into account earnings, only augmenting 
the monetary income for all the poor. However, we could start from different 
assumptions when considering incentives to work. We could assume, for 
instance, that some of the poor will continue working for reasons of self 
respect even if they receive relatively large transfers. We could also assume 
that if the poor have the chance they will choose between working in back 
breaking jobs in order to survive or to survive only with the transfer. However 
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these assumptions require a close supervision of poverty alleviation 
programs. 
One way to solve the supervision problem is to assign probabilities to specific 
groups within the poor as to which group would benefit more due to 
exogenous and endogenous development variables. This is an empirical 
question that can be answered with household income and expenditure 
surveys including socio demographic micro data. An example of this idea can 
be given by labour surveys showing that an increase in one year of education 
after third grade increases earnings between four and nine percent in the 
informal sector and twelve percent in the formal economy. 6 
4.5 Conclusion 
In order to enquire how unfair a society is and what type of policies should be 
applied to redress possible unfairness, we should look first into how the worst 
off, or in our case the poor, are selected. We needed to know how our 
normative distributive rule and currency choices are related to poverty 
definitions, poverty measures and poverty alleviation program designs. 
In relation to poverty definitions, I have suggested in section 4.3.1, that if we 
accept progressive sufficiency we should consider poverty in a graded form. 
The first threshold should be defined in absolute terms related to functionings 
and the second in terms of resources and opportunities. If we accept this 
division we should consider lack of capabilities as a greater moral problem 
than income poverty. 
The results in Table 4.2 show the importance of the poverty line in the case 
of graded welfare. In a continuous welfare scheme each unit provided to 
individuals is considered as benefit. But in a graded limited idea of welfare 
each unit is only important if it pushes a person to a given threshold. An 
increase in benefits after reaching this threshold is valued by prioritarians, as 
long as we keep our rule of decreasing marginal moral valuation for 
('Scc Orlando, Maria. 2001 and Taylor E.: 1999. 
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everyone. In the case of strict equality, as long as everyone reaches similar 
levels of resources, more units after the threshold are considered an increase 
in benefits. In the case of single threshold sufficiency the problem becomes 
the threshold: a little bit more resources after the threshold is achieved 
become irrelevant; no further benefit would be recognized. This is 
counterintuitive. This might be solved if we accept different thresholds with a 
diminishing moral value, just as in general weighted prioritarianism would do. 
That would mean that one Euro for the group under the first threshold has 
more value than for following thresholds. Within thresholds we would accept 
that one Euro for those closer to the threshold has increasing moral value. 
I suggest that in relation to poverty measures, accepting progressive 
sufficiency would present an axiomatization problem, as we would need to 
solve the problem of measuring both linear poverty with the HPI and non- 
linear poverty with the FGT index. As the HPI index does not include income 
and FGT index measures income differences, a problem could emerge 
where both indexes meet. For instance a person not considered to be poor in 
income terms could be suffering a handicap which limits his functionings. 
Furthermore in section 4.2.3 we considered how different distributions 
produced similar results in the FGT index when taking into account higher a, 
even if the proportion of the poor has been reduced to a third. I suggest that 
the distributors should have a clear alleviation poverty reduction aim when 
designing programs. Furthermore if we accept the progressive sufficientarian 
notion that when benefiting the worse off, reaching a threshold for most has a 
higher moral relevance than benefiting all worse off with little, we should 
consider an inverse priority in order to maximise the portion of those 
benefited, maximax up to a threshold. This assumption would suggest that 
the FGT measure should be refined to capture differing priorities between 
and within thresholds. 
In relation to poverty alleviation programs, if we consider our explicit aim 
minimising Pa=O (Head count) and Pa=l (Poverty Gap), the best option 
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would be to provide an income guarantee equal to the gap of families closest 
to the line. 
In considering poverty alleviation policies, I suggest, that governments should 
be clear in their aims when referring to the targeted efficiency of the policy in 
question. It is possible to apply different priorities to different groups of the 
population. Also, when considering incentives in the design of poverty 
alleviation programs, the utility maximisation assumption in relation to 
incentives to work has not much empirical support. (Atkinson, 1998, p. 136) 
One possible reason for the absence of this "rational" behaviour in the real 
world, I suggest, could be the wrong assumption that leisure is ceteris 
paribus always preferred to work. Work could be a source of self-respect for 
the individual, making someone prefer badly paid work over a legitimate 
claim for benefits, or be willing to pay high taxes in order to get the status 
acquired with the job. 
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Chapter 5: Poverty alleviation programs during liberalisation in Mexico 
(1988-2000). 
5.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the poverty alleviation programs 
operative in Mexico from 1988 to 2000. Most developing countries during the 
eighties and nineties facing political, financial and economic crisis, opted for 
liberal structural reforms as a new model of development (Pipitone, 1994). In 
Mexico, one of the most important reforms involved a reform of the State. 
The new liberal State changed its conception of social justice, from one 
aiming for equality of condition to one accepting inequalities as the price to 
pay for more economic growth and more opportunities. One of the 
consequences of the reforms was the increase in inequalities and the 
increase of the portion of the population in absolute poverty. The government 
of the time considered that social justice should be understood as co 
responsibility in the individual's own well-being, the government providing a 
safety net in the form of poverty alleviation programs as well as the benefits 
of more opportunities, while the individual should assume his responsibility in 
the labour market. 
I suggested in the introduction to this thesis that the Mexican liberal state's 
conception of social justice has not really been adequately described, 
especially if one of its historical liberal egalitarian aims is to provide sufficient 
social and material means to citizens to exercise their freedom, something 
that has not successfully been done. I suggested that this problem is in part 
due to a theoretical problem in the liberal political debate in relation to the 
justice of a distribution in cases of extreme scarcity of resources. 
In previous chapters I have described an incomplete moral distributive option 
that attempts to solve some of the problems of other distributions under 
extreme scarcity and suggested that this option could be an adequate 
normative political guide to follow in the design, for instance, of poverty 
alleviation programs. 
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Suppose we agree that a just social distribution should progressively 
maximise the number of people who have enough to lead a decent life, 
where a decent life is defined as that in which diverse aims can be 
reasonably pursued. Furthermore, assume that we can describe such a life 
on a graded scale, where we can distinguish at least three increasing levels 
in a decent life. If this were the case, social institutions would be fair if they 
initially maximise the number of people reaching the first level of a decent 
life, then the second and so on. 
Suppose also that we agree that the first level of a decent life consists of 
basic functionings. After reaching the first level, capabilities and functionings 
tend to require too much information correctly to assess individual differences 
in transforming resources into well-being, risking unfairness in the 
distribution. Therefore we should move towards the second and third levels 
by minimising the number of people who have less than enough resources 
and opportunities to reach such levels. 
i 
In Chapter 3I suggested that my normative distributive option has 
consequences for the way we should measure poverty as well as in the way 
we should design poverty alleviation programs. Specifically I suggested that 
we should use mixed measurement criteria to respond to different criteria in 
the first threshold and further ones. The mixture of measurements could 
present problems for a poverty alleviation program, as it would have to be 
designed to respond to different aims. The first aim would be the 
achievement of basic functionings and the second access to resources and 
opportunities, measured in relative terms. These normative ideas suggest 
some assumptions that have to be taken into consideration when designing 
poverty alleviation programs. 
The chapter will be divided into three sections. The first section will provide a 
background of the Mexican economic liberalisation process during the 1980s 
and 1990s, and a brief assessment of the matter of social and civil rights 
during this period. The second section points to the historical context of Mexico's 
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poverty alleviation programs, and foregrounds a review of the main program 
implemented from 1988 to 1994, Pronasol. Section three considers the 
relevance of the normative findings in the analysis of the design of poverty 
alleviation programs, especially the latest program named Progresa which 
started in 1997. 
5.2 Liberalisation process: 1983-2000 
The 1980s debt crisis resulted in a lack of external financial resources and 
high reduction of public investment to balance the external deficit, these 
macroeconomic measures lead to an economic crisis in public utilities and 
public services, creating internal deficits and high inflation (Aspe, P., 1993). 
The Mexican authorities of the moment concluded that the existing model of 
development was inadequate, and that a new model, supported by the 
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, might better address the 
country's economic challenges. The Mexican authorities also assumed that in 
the long term the development model designed by the IMF and the World 
Bank would partially solve a problem of perennial structural poverty. 
According to the World Bank, the measures taken by most governments in 
Latin America had to, 
"... re-establish macroeconomic stability by introducing fiscal 
adjustments and appropriate credit controls. This implied the need to 
raise taxes, improve tax collection and administration, reduce or 
eliminate subsidies to utilities and goods and services, and reduce 
the number of workers in the public sector. These actions had to be 
taken alongside programs which would reduce the role and the 
dimension of the state, through the privatisation of public utilities and 
public financial institutions. "(Banco Mundial, 1985, p. 1)1 
The purpose of these liberal economic reforms, promoted by the World Bank, 
was to restart economic growth as well as raise income and employment 
levels, by improving a market economy. The past model of development had 
relied excessively in a large external and internal deficit in order to sustain an 
My translation. 
147 
unrealistic internal market with high subsidies and crucially inefficient states 
productive enterprises. 
The Mexican debt crisis can be traced to government officials' belief, that oil 
prices would stay high in the near future and that capital costs in the 
international economy would be lower in the long term. These assumptions 
led to a tripling of the external debt, between 1977 and 1982. From 1981 
international interest rates rose and international oil prices stopped growing. 
The seeds for the financial and economic crisis were sown: namely 
"excessive external indebtedness, higher commercial deficit, drastic 
worsening of public deficit, capital flight, overvaluation of the 
currency. "(Pipitone, H., 1994, p. 418). 
In August 1982 the Mexican government declared a moratorium of payments 
of its external debt, and the nationalization of the commercial bank system. In 
December 1982 a new government belonging to the same party in power 
since 1929, took office. The new government started a process of structural 
adjustment. A junior minister of finance in 1997, Santiago Levy, described the 
reforms in 1980's, in the following terms. 
Far from simple retrenchment caused by a temporary scarcity of 
funds, the Mexican government is embarked on a radical redefinition 
of its role in the economy, its responsibilities, and the nature of its 
interventions. Its role as producer is diminished (with a few 
exceptions like oil and electricity). Its role as regulator is changing: at 
the macroeconomic level to set credible and sustainable policies; at 
the micro level to promote the efficient operation of markets. At the 
same time, the government maintains its commitment to improve the 
welfare of the poor. (S. Levy, 1991, p. 4) 
Notwithstanding the purported priority given to the poor in this economic 
reform, a terrible impact was to be felt by those already of limited means 
when it came to living standards. Special measures had to be taken as the 
State could no longer harness the whole economic development in favour of 
those who were severely impoverished. The Organisation of Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) remarks in the conclusion of its 1995 
economic survey of Mexico: 
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In many respects, Mexico's record in implementing structural reforms 
is remarkable. Deep-rooted government interference in economic 
activities was substantially reduced in less than a decade through the 
massive sale of State assets, bold reforms in agriculture, the 
liberalization of financial markets and a spectacular opening of the 
economy to international trade, leading to the signing of NAFTA and 
other trade agreements. [... ] Although there have been social costs in 
such reforms, further delays in implementing long-due changes 
would have only made the situation of the poor worse through higher 
prices, regressive use of public subsidies and overall allocative 
distortions. (OECD, 1995, p. 121) 
The OECD last remark points to a common belief during liberalisation. The 
common idea was that reforms were urgently needed if future benefits were 
to be expected, as past interference in the market had caused perverse 
incentives, destabilizing the economy. However, after almost 13 years of 
liberal structural reforms, the Mexican economy, approved by the WB and 
IMF, plunged into the worst financial and economic crisis of its history. The 
1995 survey conducted by the OECD, adequately sums up the events after 
the financial international agencies and the executive powers of the USA and 
Canada announced a US $50 billion financial rescue package to the Mexican 
government in 1995. 
"In return to this financial assistance, the Mexican government 
agrees to a series of conditions, including tight targets for monetary 
and fiscal policies and for privatisation revenues, further structural 
reforms, publicity for key fiscal and financial data and the channelling 
of proceeds from oil exports to a special account at the Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York. "(OECD, 1995, p. 160) 
In short it would seem that the new economic reforms and the 1995 crisis 
changed the nature of the state's relationship towards economic activity. It 
changed from a State that was actively involved in protecting local productive 
activities and producing those products considered strategic, to one that is 
only supposed to enforce regulation to control the excesses of the free 
market and minimally to protect the poor. According to this new liberal model, 
fairness in the distribution of benefits would come from the rule of law, formal 
equality of opportunities and from an adequate economic. environment to 
promote economic opportunities and a safety net to protect the worse off. 
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The new liberal mode places high hopes in the Rule of Law. Thus, before 
entering into the analysis of poverty alleviation programs, we should partially 
assess the strength of the state's institutions through the alleged 
enforcement of civil and social rights. 
5.2.1 Civil and social rights during liberalisation (1985-2000) 
The Mexican Constitution defines a number of civil and social rights that 
should be granted to every resident in the country. One way to assess 
whether individuals enjoy these rights is to consider to what extent state 
institutions have guaranteed these rights. 
The Mexican Constitution of 1917 privileged individual liberties. Its first 
section on Civil Rights lists those individual liberties that should be protected 
by the Mexican State, (such as the abolition of slavery (Art. 2), equality of 
sexes before the law (Art. 4), freedom of speech (Art. 6), freedom of press 
(Art. 7), freedom of public manifestation (Art. 9), freedom of transit (Art. 11), 
freedom of creed (Art. 24)), and guaranteed rights of private and communal 
property (Art. 27). In order to assess whether the government in fact 
guarantees the above civil and social rights to its population, I will consider 
the concepts of rule of law and citizenship. 
The Rule of Law is susceptible to different conceptions. One approach 
focuses on governmental power. Governmental power, especially as it 
concerns citizens, "... must be accompanied by observance of the correct 
legal rules and have the authority of the law... discretionary power however 
broadly based must not be abused or used in an unrestrictive way. " (J. 
McEldowney, 1994, p. 105) In the case of Mexico, the institutional abuse of 
power has been the norm. The arbitrary form in which decisions were taken 
made impossible a system of checks and balances between the three 
powers of the Republic. Until the year 2000, the political system granted 
almost absolute decision making power to the Executive Power. In short 
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there was no accountability, civil rights violations were common, and impunity 
is the norm. 2 
Foweraker makes the point more explicitly, referring to the Mexican political 
system 
"In a system lacking effective checks and balances, and in the 
specific absence of an independent judiciary, the Mexican 
executive both makes the law - by initiating most legislation - and 
controls the courts. The executive is also able (routinely) to 
designate and remove state governors, mayors and legislators at 
both federal and regional levels. In sum, there is no rule of law 
because government in Mexico is not accountable. "(J. Foweraker, 
1996, p. 98) 
Foweraker makes an analysis of the formal changes to the law introduced by 
the liberal structural reforms during most of the years of the liberalisation 
period (1982-1996). He argues that most of the changes are more formal 
than real with the exception of the electoral laws and electoral institutions. He 
concludes that since the beginning of 1982, liberal governments, while 
promoting changes to the electoral system, were involved in an incremental 
of violations to civil rights. (J. Foweraker, 1996, p. 98) A window of hope was 
opened in the presidential elections of 2000, after a single party rule of 71 
years. During this elections the PRI lost the executive and its congressional 
majority. Although a basic form of democracy had been secured with the real 
possibility of party alternation in the presidency, a paternalistic political 
system still persisted. The Rule of Law, understood as respect for every 
individual's civil rights, was mostly absent. 
In terms of social and economic rights, it is important to take into account 
how the law defines them and whether successive governments have 
succeeded in guaranteeing them. The formal objective of the State towards 
social and economic development is stated in an amendment to Article 25 of 
the Constitution. This amendment was passed in 1985. 
Sec Amnesty International 1997 report for a summary of civil rights violations in Mexico. 
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"The State is responsible for the promotion of economic 
growth, employment and a just distribution of income and 
wealth. This development will allow the full exercise of the 
liberty and dignity of individuals, groups and social classes, 
whose security is protected by this Constitution. 3 
The question one must pose here is what the modern Mexican State 
understands by the constitutional mandate of "the promotion of economic 
growth, employment and a just distribution of income and wealth", when it 
does not have a very good record in respecting civil and political rights? We 
can partially assess its commitment to economic development through social 
rights and the extent to which the population enjoys these rights. Economic 
advantages, we must remember should be such that citizens can take full 
part in the political community. (Desai, M., 1995, p. 104) 
Some of the social rights described in the Constitution include the right to 
education (Art. 3) to health services and to decent housing (Art. 4) and to 
social security (Art. 123). These rights could also be interpreted as an 
entitlement to a share of the economic product of the social cooperation of 
every citizen, whether in the form of public services or real equal 
opportunities to an income that could pay for these services. 
Education 
In terms of education rights, Article 3 of the Constitution states: 
Every individual has the right to receive education. The 
State -Federation, States and Municipalities- will provide 
pre-primary, primary and secondary education. Primary and 
secondary educations are compulsory. 
And yet, according to the National Institute of Statistics (INEGI) Census of 
2000,28.5% of the population over fifteen years of age have not had any 
instruction or have not completed primary school and 9.5% are illiterate. In 
1970,70% of the population over fifteen years of age lacked instruction or 
had not completed primary school. Comparing percentages between 1970 
and 2000, we observe 1% improvement every year for the past thirty years. 
Although there has been a large improvement in primary education, 
` Mexican Constitution. This and all following quotes from the Constitution are my translation. 
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according to the Census 2000, only 47% of the population over 15 years old 
finished primary and secondary instruction. 
These data suggest that state institutions have not done enough in their 
efforts to guarantee the right to education, since they have failed in relation to 
more than half of the population. Considering that educational achievement is 
usually related to earnings, we might conclude that the majority of the 
population with low educational attainment has also been denied economic 
opportunities. (Orlando, M., 2001) Consequently, if the Mexican liberal 
historical aim has been to provide sufficient means to citizens in order for 
them to exercise their rights, it seems very unlikely that 53% of the population 
of fifteen years or older, who have not completed primary or secondary 
education, could fully exercise these liberties. 
It has been observed in Mexico that the lack of education is related to poverty 
(Szekely, M., 1998). In order to observe whether educational attainment is 
linked to other social rights, I have compared levels of infant and adult 
mortality with literacy and income. Unfortunatoly this information cannot be 
statistically correlated as data does not come from the same source, however 
Table 5.1 shows a clear picture of what happens in these areas. 
Table 5.1 Literacy and income and infant and adult mortality rates by 
region. Mexico 2000. 
Num. 
of 
states 
Total Population 
(Millions) 
% of 15 years or older 
who know how to read 
and write. 
% of working population 
earning 3 Minimum 
Salaries or more. ** 
Regions* 
A 9 13.1 93.0% 31% 
B 8 28.9 92.6% 30% 
C 5 10.7 90.0% 26% 
D 10 44.8 86.8% 25% 
Total in Mexico 32 97.5 90.5% 28% 
Source: Secretaria de Salud, 1999, and INEGI, 2001. 
* Mortality rate data is from 1998. I ranked states from low infant and low adult 
mortality rate (A) to high (D) in descending order. See Appendix II for method and 
regions. 
**A minimum salary a month accounts more or less to 100 US dollars. 
As we might have expected, in Table 5.1 we can observe that if we rank 
regions of the country by their level of mortality rates, this is mirrored in 
literacy level and income. Where mortality rates are lower (A), the percentage 
of people earning more is higher and the percentage of illiterate people is 
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lower. As mortality rates increase, earnings decrease and illiterate population 
increases. This rather common picture of a relation between social problems, 
is punctuated by the number of people involved in these shortcomings. 
These descriptive results suggest that the worse off are concentrated in 
specific regions and that the State has failed to grant them most basic rights. 
Health and housing 
Taking into account that, in aggregate terms, when people have better health 
they also have more earnings, we might further consider similar descriptive 
relations. The rights to decent housing and to health services are described 
in Article 4 of the Constitution. 
- Every person has a right to health protection. 
- Every family has a right to enjoy a dignified and decent 
house. 
According to the literature, there are various methods to assess health 
protection (Secretaria de Salud, 1999). Following the idea of functionings, we 
could assume that to die lacking medical attention, even by natural causes, is 
an indication of not having access to adequate health services. In fact, data 
provided by the Mexican Health Office in 1998, shows that 15% of deaths 
occurred without medical attention. Also, the presence of drainage or septic 
tanks provides a good measure of housing standards. Interestingly, the 
census of 2000 of INEGI shows that 78.5% Mexicans live in adequate 
housing conditions according to this measure. 
To evaluate possible descriptive relations between access to health services 
and to other public services, we need only to look at the data provided in 
Table 5.2. 
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Table 5.2. Health Indicators and percentage of dwellings without services, 
Mexico 2000. 
Num. 
of 
states 
Total Population 
(Millions) 
Average percentage of 
dwellings without 
drainage. 
Average percentage of 
people dying without 
medical attention. 
Total 32 97 21.5% 15% 
Regions* 
A 9 13.1 19.8% 12.2% 
B 8 28.4 17% 12.4% 
C 5 10.7 25% 15.7% 
D 10 42.5 30.5% 20.5% 
Source: Secretaria de Salud, 1999, and INEGI, 2001. 
* Mortality rate data and people dying without medical attention is from 1998. I ranked states from 
low infant and low adult mortality rate (A) to high (D) in descending order. See Appendix II for 
method and regions. 
Table 5.2 shows data of infant and adult mortality rates, total mortality without 
medical attention, and the percentage of housing without drainage. Although 
this type of result cannot be conclusive, as the association of percentages 
cannot show causation, they show at least the clustering of significant 
aspects of deprivation in the country. Table 5.2 also demonstrates, 
unsurprisingly, that higher mortality rates and a lack of health services are 
mirrored. The same can be said of lack of decent housing. This data and the 
found in Table 5.1 suggest that people in region D might also lack most other 
social rights. 
Social security 
Article 123, fraction XXIX of the Constitution deals with labour and social 
security matters. 
The Social Security Law has public relevance. It will consider 
insurance for disabilities related to work, old age, death, 
involuntary dismissal, sickness and accidents, day nursery 
services, and whatever other insurance destined to the 
protection and well-being of workers, peasants not receiving 
a salary and other social groups and their families. 
The Institute of Social Security (IMSS) provides social security, pensions and 
disability insurance, as well as health services to non-government workers 
earning a salary. It also provides basic medical attention in poor 
communities. According to the 2000 Census, the IMSS provided all these 
services to 32.3% of the population. For government workers the Institute of 
Social Security for Workers of the State (ISSSTE) provided these social 
security services to 5.9% of the population, while other public systems (social 
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institutes in each state of the Republic for public workers), covered another 
2.2% of the population. This leaves almost 60% of the population without 
social security. 
A reform to Article 123 in 1996 modified the structure of the national security 
system to allow private pensions for non-governmental workers. The law 
changed the system from one financed by all actual workers to one financed 
by individual savings. The new law allowed the self-employed and other 
types of workers to subscribe to private pension providers regulated by the 
State. The State guarantees that after 30 years of contributions or for 
disability reasons, a basic pension would be paid to the contributor. 
Through this new private scheme, self employed workers are also able to 
receive health services for an extra price. This makes the new social security 
system open to all who have the discipline and the money to save for 
pensions and health, whereas before, the only option for retirement was the 
public social security system, then only available to those workers earning a 
salary. Moreover, under the actual conditions of severe unemployment this 
system provides a certain degree of security to the self-employed who can 
afford it. 
The amendments made to Article 123 are also aimed to reduce the 
proportion paid by the employer and the employee into social security, 
thereby increasing the portion paid by the government, which provides 
funding for more than a third of the quota with open taxation. This law also 
permits workers to save in their private pensions in order to increase their 
pension. 
However opening social security pension schemes to private providers 
necessitates coming face to face with market risks. For instance, as the 
government has made the private pension providers invest mostly in 
government bonds in order to guarantee stability, low real interest rates could 
diminish returns for savers. 
1 56 
The possible drawbacks in the amount of the final pension will not affect 
those whose contributions amounted to a minimum salary. This is in fact the 
only redistributive characteristic of the system. It has replaced solidarity 
between generations and within workers with a minimum for those making 
the saving effort. This characteristic of the pension system, in fact suggests 
that liberal reforms are effectively abandoning the egalitarian aim of reducing 
the gap between people for a different aim which accepts inequalities but 
provides a safety net. 
Summary 
To sum up, the data on civil and political rights, as well as social rights shows 
that, although there have been small improvements throughout the years, the 
rule of law is weak and deprivation in many social areas is widespread. This 
overall picture provides us with a view during the 1980s and 1990s of an 
underdeveloped country trying to solve its economic problems through a 
more open market economy and liberal state reform. 
In this context, the liberal governments of the Republic between 1988 and 
2000 proposed specific social policies to pursue the alleviation of poverty. 
These social policies included programs that targeted those who were 
considered the least advantaged of all the citizens, the poorest of the poor. 
5.3 POVERTY ALLEVIATION PROGRAMS 
Before assessing the design of specific poverty alleviation programs, I will 
evaluate the historical background of these types of programs operating in 
underdeveloped countries since the 1980s. I will describe the different factors 
taken into account by governments to create social policies aiming to 
eliminate poverty. I will also review some specific formulas used by the 
Mexican government to measure poverty and distribute resources among the 
least advantaged. 
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5.3.1 Historical background of poverty alleviation programmes under 
liberalisation. 
Since the beginning of the liberalisation process in 1983, the Mexican 
government seems to have been aware that the new economic model would 
be hard to implement due to the traditional paternalistic system of price 
controls, subsidies, and a relatively high minimum salary. While reforms 
liberalised these three areas, the poor and the middle classes were expected 
to suffer from them. In 1988, a program named Pronasol was designed not 
only to palliate the resultant poverty problems, but also to target scarce 
resources on the poorest, leaving out those not considered to be in greater 
need. The idea of Pronasol is similar to the Social Investment Funds 
implemented across Latin America and the Caribbean in the 1980s, 
supported by the World Bank and the IMF. The general idea of Latin 
American governmental officials undergoing structural reforms was to 
guarantee economic growth through free market conditions and to minimise 
the investment in universal welfare and productive activities in order to 
balance any budget deficits, despite the great political cost. The idea was to 
target poverty problems through specific programs and funds in order to 
direct scarce resources to the least advantaged, creating a safety net and a 
claim to political credibility. The rationale was that resources were scarce 
because public deficits had to be constrained to guarantee a good 
macroeconomic environment in order to establish the bases for long-term 
growth. A secondary assumption was that most resources spent in universal 
benefits were not reaching those who were really in need of them. 
A general statement from a World Bank report describes the idea behind the 
Social Investment Funds. 
The social investment funds were created in Latin America and the 
Caribbean to alleviate the impact, on the poor, of the reduction of 
income and employment, caused by the debt crisis and by those 
structural adjustment measures taken to set the bases for a renewed 
growth. The traditional ministries of the social sector were not 
sufficiently prepared to administer this task. The social investment 
funds were conceived as a way to re-establish the government's 
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credibility and to secure political support for the reforms. (Banco 
Mundial, 1985, p. ix) 
The majority of the funds were used to create temporary institutions that later 
became permanent ones. These institutions were created to provide funding 
for infrastructure and social services for the poor. These funds had the 
following characteristics: 4 
" Autonomous from the public service and highly paid officials. 
" Contracts were given to the private sector. 
" Freedom of expenditure and allocation of resources without 
direct government supervision. 
" Funds dependent on the demand of financial assistance from 
poor communities. High degree of participation within 
communities. 
" Clear accounting systems and open information. 
" Strategic use of funds, justified by maps and poverty indexes. 
" Promotion of high priority projects in communities of 
extremely low income. 
" Co-finance of projects from international agencies, such as 
the World Bank and the Inter American Bank of Development 
PRONASOL (National Program of Solidarity) (1988-1994) was very similar in 
its methods and objectives to the Social Funds, but was financially controlled 
by the federal government. Its main goal was the reduction of poverty 
through the participation of its beneficiaries in poor communities. 
5.3.1.1 Pronasol (National Program of Solidarity 1988-1994) 
Pronasol targeted direct resources to the least advantaged in order to 
provide staple food, basic infrastructure, and basic services (i. e. primary 
schools, primary health services, electricity and water supplies and labour 
schemes to supplement incomes). In fact Pronasol became almost the only 
provider of funds to social projects in the majority of poor communities, 
ignoring democratically elected local authorities. 
The general aims of PRONASOL included: 
4 The following is based in Banco Mundial: Alivio de la Pobreza N, Tondos de Inversion 
Social, (Introduction )p. ix Nly translation 
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" Allocating enlarged budget shares to increase the welfare of the 
poor. 
" Expanding programs of global development to all Indian zones. 
" Increasing social investment returns by seeking the participation 
of benefited groups in the planning and execution of projects as 
well as promoting utilization of local materials in infrastructure 
projects. 
" To demand participation of the state and municipal authorities 
by requesting joint investments in projects along with the federal 
expenditure. 
" To involve Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), 
academics and other groups of the society in poverty 
eradication. 
" To promote the active involvement of women in the program. 
(A. Guevara, 1996, p. 158) 
The main difference between Social Funds and PRONASOL was the lack of 
strict financial control exercised by the international agencies. The lack of 
financial clarity, the relatively large resources directed to this federal 
program, and its blatantly vertical structure led to much criticism of the 
program and its use of resources (Esquivel, G., 1996). The main argument of 
those against the program was that targeting did not have a clear criterion of 
distribution and that the total political control of resources could be easily 
used in order to win political battles, granting or retiring funds for public 
services and infrastructure that were deserved by legal right. Indeed, there is 
indirect evidence that the government in Mexico during 1988-1994 used 
poverty alleviation resources for partisan political purposes. 5 
To better appreciate such a large program, consider Pronasol spending as a 
share of Gross Direct Product in Table 5.3 
5See Gerardo Esquivel: 1996. In top of this evidencc, PRONASOL has being criticised in the press as 
being partisan. Chalco, an area near Mexico City is an example. In the 1988 elections, this area was 
won by the left opposition party. After being signalled as a pet project of then President Salinas, 
PRONASOL invested heavily in the area. In the elections of 1994, Chalco was won by the PRI. In a 
normal democracy this would seem a logical result. In Mexico it was seen by political commentators 
and the opposition parties as buying votes. 
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Table 5.3 Pronasol and social spending 
Billions of current pesos and percentages 
Total Pronasol spending 
of which: 
1989 
3.09 
90 
6.50 
91 
10.23 
92 
13.95 
93 
16.46 
94 
18.41 
Social Dev. Agreements 1.64 3.28 5.19 6.99 8.26 9.23 
Pronasol for Social Welfare 0.97 1.87 3.16 4.21 5.22 6.31 
Pronasol for Production 0.17 0.88 0.99 1.56 1.87 1.65 
Basic Infrastructure 0.31 0.47 0.89 1.19 1.11 1.22 
Pronasol spending (as a 
share of GDP) (0.61) (0.95) (1.18) (1.37) (1.48) (1.48) 
Public spending on social 
Dev. (as a share of GDP) (6.18) (6.49) (7.70) (8.64) (9.59) - 
Pronasol spending (as a 
share of public spending on 
social development) (9.86) (14.6) (15.3) (15.8) (15.3) - 
Source: OECD, 1995, p. 109 
As we can see, Pronasol, if only for the sheer size of the program, had a 
profound impact in poor communities. Since the projects it conducted were 
demand-generated, the program can be recognized as particularly effective 
in generating support. However we cannot be' certain that those community 
projects would not have been pursued if resources had been given to local 
authorities through normal channels. Furthermore, some empirical studies 
show that Pronasol did not really helped the very worst off as very poor 
people did not have access to local political channels to demand resources. 6 
Despite the new economic measures, the economy did not recover enough 
to include the least advantaged. Poverty problems in 1994 were reflected, not 
so much in those who enjoyed the benefits of Pronasol, but in those who 
could not demand funding and generate the political pressure needed to 
obtain assistance. 
The idea that the very poor would be provided with better opportunities by 
demand-driven programs could be considered as partial targeting. However, 
the worst off did not have the information or the resources needed to seek 
'See OECD, 1995, h. 1 1I for a general assessment of PRONASOL and A. Guevara, 1996, p. 171 for an 
empirical assessment over one region. 
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help. The failure to reach the worst off population, as well as the lack of 
accountability of the program, led the next government of the PRI under 
President Zedillo (1994-2000) to consider the implementation of a new 
program. Two new targeting ideas were considered in the design of the 
government's new programs. The first idea was to create clear criteria for 
resource assignment to infrastructure projects, thereby identifying people in 
extreme need. Second, people in extreme need were to be directly benefited. 
5.3.2 Poverty alleviation programs during 1994-2000 
Since 1929, it has become a tradition in post revolutionary Mexico, especially 
during the long time the PRI governed, that each new administration would 
produce a new social policy. The vast problems of poverty and inequality, 
together with the social justice rhetoric of governments, makes the unveiling 
of new policies and their possible achievements - in terms of gaining social 
stability, electoral success and political power - one of the most important 
events of each new government. 
Social policy in a liberalized market economy with little intervention by the 
state in controlling prices and salaries depends largely on a good fiscal 
system with fair taxation and special programs, in this case conceived as 
safety nets. In general the state is charged with providing a economic 
environment which allows individuals to interact in the market place, either 
through producing and selling goods or selling labour. The rationale is that, 
given equal formal opportunities and a stable growing economy, 
achievements would depend on the individual. The government would 
directly help only the poor who could not benefit from the increasing 
opportunities. 
Let us further consider what sort of assumptions the 1994-2000 Mexican 
government followed in the design of their poverty alleviation programs. 
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5.3.2.1 Assumptions in poverty alleviation design during 1994-2000. 
Santiago Levy, junior minister of finance between 1994 and 2000 is credited 
with the design of the main poverty alleviation program during the period in 
question. In Poverty Alleviation in Mexico, Levy considers poverty to be a 
different problem from income inequality (1991). The swift treatment he gives 
to this distinction is based on the general assumption that some of the 
policies that promote equality will not necessarily reduce poverty, as they 
might reduce the average wealth of the society. "Policies that reduce income 
inequality may, but need not, reduce poverty. " (Levy, S., 1991, p. 7). 
The objection to egalitarian policies makes Levy favour a prioritarian view, 
where the worst off should be the only ones who benefit from a government's 
direct intervention. Benefits for the worst off should only reach a certain level. 
The level is set in terms of having enough income to acquire a minimal food 
basket. In this respect Levy would favour a very basic sufficientarian view. 
The worst off for Levy would be the extremely poor, those whose poverty is 
an absolute condition in nutritional terms. 
"The extremely-poor are those who cannot secure enough nutrition 
to function adequately.. . 
[The extremely poor] in general, are less 
able to lead a healthy life with sufficient energy to satisfactorily 
perform tasks in the labour market and/or participate in educational 
activities. "(Levy, 1991, p. 7) 
Levy is using the language of functionings and capabilities but at an 
extremely low level when referring to the extremely poor. Even though he is 
considering functionings he measures these short-comings in income terms. 
By contrast Levy considers the moderately poor to be those who "cannot 
avail themselves of what, at the given stage of the country's development, 
are considered basic needs. "(1991: 7) For Levy, well-being requires at least 
meeting very basic needs, so that an able person can assume risks and 
pursue her interests. Individuals will decide for themselves what is worthwhile 
to pursue and what is not. Levy's working assumption is that a person knows 
more about his preferences than the state: thus the state can only provide 
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him with the basics and with the right environment for him to pursue his 
interests. Levy argues that the State should provide indirect benefits to those 
who are able to work but have welfare levels below those deemed 
acceptable. 
With the right set of policies most of these [moderately poor] 
individuals can increase their productive potential and, therefore, 
Mexico's national income. (Levy, 1991, p. 9) 
In Levy's view, the direction of government investments should be geared 
towards the supply side of the labour market. The government should focus 
only on those distributive measures that increase the marketable assets of 
the poor (i. e. technical education, land prices, etc). The division line between 
the extremely poor and moderately poor in Levy's work becomes rather 
important, as benefits would be different for the two groups. 
5.3.2.1.1 Poverty lines 
In terms of efficient economical resource allocation a distributor requires a 
clear cut off point to distribute scarce resources to the targeted group. As we 
have seen in Chapter 3, the efficiency of a distribution can be influenced not 
only by the way in which we measure poverty, but also by the selected 
poverty line. In general, a clear poverty line, either in terms of achievement of 
functionings or in income terms is necessary to select those within the 
population to be benefited. 
According to Levy (1991) the poverty line for the extremely poor is set by 
considering those characteristics of poverty that produce definite damage. 
"People that are undernourished are more vulnerable to disease, are at risk 
of developing anthropometric deficiencies, [and] are at times lethargic... " 
(Levy, 1991, p. 7) Therefore, in order to be able to produce efficient policies 
we should identify those characteristics that put people at risk. Levy 
considers that although most social indicators like life expectancy, literacy 
rates, child mortality rates, access to drinking water, number of hospital bed 
per region, etc., show some form of poverty, as long as they are statistically 
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correlated any of them would suffice to show poverty. Levy claims that these 
indices are not good criteria to use in efficient poverty alleviation policies. 
This is because many of the indicators confuse inputs with outputs for 
example he argues that we should not really care first about the number of 
hospital beds per region, but rather about the health status of individuals. For 
example, longer life expectancy is a result of good nutrition and healthy life 
(Levy, 1991, p. 10). Therefore, according to Levy, an adequate policy must 
emphasize and focus on improving nutrition, hygiene and education. Levy 
considers functionings as the main measure to assess policy intervention for 
the extremely poor. His proposal is to provide some resources to help people 
achieve very basic capabilities. If those basic capabilities are achieved, poor 
people might be able to grasp other opportunities available to them. For Levy 
the extreme poverty line should be measured with respect to a diet based on 
the preferences of individuals as well as the prices ruling in the area. (Levy, 
1991, p. 12) 
Although he considers capabilities, Levy is in effect returning to the idea that 
food supply can be a good measure of extreme poverty. He then proceeds to 
use expenditure as a measure of welfare advantage by arguing that 
capabilities should be targeted. He is disregarding the possibility of setting a 
poverty line in functionings terms, when his argument would have naturally 
led to this measure. 
Levy sets the extreme poverty line based on the recommendations made by 
FAO, in terms of the consumption of sufficient calories to function 
adequately. He provides an estimation of costs of basic foods to feed a family 
of 4.9 members. The line of extreme poverty, according to Levy (1991) "... is 
given by the cost of the nutritional basket, and the extremely poor are those 
whose food expenditure are below this cost: these are the individuals who 
lack access to adequate sources of nutrition. " (Levy, 1991, p. 23) 
Taking into account the price of a food basket set by Coplamar (1983) for a 
family of 4.9 persons, Levy uses the Foster, Green, Thorbecke (FGT) poverty 
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measure to find out the characteristics of the extremely poor, in the Mexican 
Income and Expenditure Survey of 1984. 
To sum up, based on the 1984 Income Expenditure Survey: (i) at 
most 19% of the population was below the line of extreme poverty, 
(ii) the extremely-poor are mostly located in rural areas, (iii) the 
poorest of the extremely-poor are also found mostly in rural areas, 
(iv) the extremely-poor have very large families, have the largest 
share of children, the highest dependency ratio and the lowest 
educational levels, (v) not even the extremely-poor allocate more 
than 60% of total monetary expenditures to food, (vi) most of the 
extremely-poor are in agricultural activities, (vii) the urban extremely- 
poor are relatively better off than the rural, but have similar 
demographic, expenditure and educational characteristics. 
(Levy, 1991, p. 30) 
From the above description a general policy is derived. Levy argues that the 
information available in relation to the characteristics of the poor shows that 
primary poverty in Mexico is the result of institutional measures that have 
undervalued the resources owned by the poor, such as land and labour. 
Alleviation of extreme poverty in the medium term, Levy suggests, will come 
from institutional reforms able to skew market outcomes to benefit the poor. 
He also argues that targeting of direct benefits need to be adjusted if the 
government aims to target the people who are most in need. 
Policies for the extremely poor need to exploit the complementarities 
among nutrition, health and education. [... ] benefits to the extremely 
poor must all be under a single program that: (i) centre attention in 
regions with the highest FGT indices, (ii) delivers food through 
coupons rather than price subsidies. (Levy, 1991, p. 85) 
Levy considers that the best way to promote preference satisfaction is by 
having enough resources to enable people to buy their preferred foods. This 
description mixes preference satisfaction, resources and capabilities in a 
rather confusing way. For instance in Levy's view of preference satisfaction, 
there would not be a form to satisfy food preferences if there are not enough 
resources or coupons. However he is claiming that resources should be 
given up to a certain level and only for reasons of labour efficiency. In the 
other hand if capabilities want to be targeted for help, they would have to be 
sourced adequately or simply there would be no sense in the exercise as 
people will not reach the determine functionings. 
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Let us consider Levy's poverty alleviation proposal only from his perspective 
of preference satisfaction. His proposal is based upon the assumption that 
the extremely poor are able to maximize their own welfare. Understanding 
welfare in this approach as preference satisfaction, we could argue that the 
poor require resources and not in kind benefits. This assumption produces, at 
least two implications in the context of designing poverty alleviation 
programmes: 
a) Enough resources should be available for people to choose between 
the objects of their preferences; and 
b) Transfers of resources should be a supplement to earnings. 
In Levy's policy proposal, food coupons or money allow people to satisfy their 
food preferences, as there is no constraint in the type of food they are able to 
purchase. However as mentioned before, 7 this form of preference satisfaction 
discriminates against people's differing abilities to transform resources into 
well being, as some could have more needs than others. It could be also 
criticized in terms of people's expensive tastes, for example if the poor want 
to exchange their food coupons to satisfy cultural preferences in relation to 
festivities of some kind, clearly it would still be unfair to let them be 
undernourished. 
In Levy's proposal (b) is solved by incentives to work. Levy states that 
"policies that help the poor need to avoid the creation of a class of 'welfare 
dependents'; the incentive structure must be such that, at the margin, it 
always benefits the poor to work and earn additional income. "(Levy, 1991, 
p. 52) The incentive structure proposed by Levy provides low benefits in the 
form of food coupons. The required equilibrium between the offer of 
resources and preference satisfaction comes from providing half of the 
average food requirements to families in food coupons, forcing the poor to 
work to get the other half of their needed food supply. 
'Sec scctioil about ww, clfare in Chapter 2, above. 
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Levy assumes that under this type of incentive structure individuals will prefer 
to work. As we have seen in Chapter 4, this argument is rather weak in that it 
is very unlikely that at very low levels of advantage people will stop working, 
not even when their whole average food requirements are covered by food 
coupons. It is also possible that people prefer to work for reasons of self- 
respect. If, however, they cease to work this can be due to other types of 
problems, like having cheap preferences, as a result being used to having so 
little that the have no incentive to improve their absolute worse off condition. 
Levy's proposal, which evolved into the program PROGRESA, represents a 
rather weak starting point for a sufficiency distributive criterion. First, it 
promotes a sufficiency threshold based on the average food requirement of a 
family, considering this area as well as health and education as forming very 
basic functionings. Second, it promotes an incentive structure that forces 
people to work as benefits given are not enough to reach the low level 
threshold. 
Levy's (1991) theoretical framework for the design of poverty alleviation 
policies was considered and enacted by the government of Mexico between 
1994 and 2000. The following section will review the policies generated 
based on Levy's suggestions. 
5.4 SOCIAL POLICY 1994-2000 
The government of President Zedillo in 1994 changed the emphasis of social 
policies directed to alleviate poverty from an umbrella program like Pronasol, 
which was in charge of all areas of human welfare in poor communities, to a 
federal program concentrating on nutrition, education and, basic medical 
attention for extremely poor individuals. By doing so it was believed that an 
individual's productive capabilities could be improved, enabling greater 
achievements in social and economic aspects. 8 
8Sl1CP, Social Policy, 1997. 
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Following the financial crisis of December 1994, the subsequent reduction for 
fiscal year 1995 reveals much about government priorities. The fact that the 
new program of nutrition is the only part of the budget that increased its real 
budget in 23% while the rest of the programs reduced their real budget 
suggests that the Mexican government took Levy's views seriously. However, 
although increasing its budget the social nutrition program showed a very 
small budget compared to other programs. (SHOP, 1997) 
Pronasol assumed that groups of poor people would generate a demand for 
services, and the state would help them to help themselves build or rebuild 
infrastructure. The condition attached to such programs was that the 
community should solve its own conflicts of interest and decide which project 
to implement. The emphasis was on infrastructure in order to provide the 
right environment for people to leave poverty. 
The new government divided the possible help between direct individual help 
and indirect intervention, focusing in infrastructure programs. The new social 
policy maintained the emphasis on infrastructure, allocating increasing 
resources, according to a clear criterion to those regions in the worst 
situation. But in order to help the extremely poor to leave a vicious circle of 
poverty, where illness and lack of abilities stopped them from enjoying the 
new opportunities, the government changed its policy to one of direct 
intervention into these people's lives. 
The first paragraph of the budget project of 1997, presents a general social 
policy to the lower house of Congress. This paragraph reveals this division of 
priorities in detail, 
In concrete terms this government's objective translates itself in 
providing a generalized access to education services, health care, 
social security, and housing, among other services. 
But it has to be recognized that the benefits of economic growth and 
broad social programs do not homogeneously reach, or do so with 
the required speed, all of the regions, or all social groups. This is why 
the government has established a second half within its social policy, 
with the objective of eliminating those circumstances that impede the 
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incorporation of those regions and social groups in the benefits of 
development. (SHOP, 1997, Social Policy)9 
From this quotation we can see that the government considered the poor as 
being held back by their condition. The government characterization of the 
poor takes into account the supply side of the market, where people need 
only be healthy and educated in order to take full advantage of the available 
economic opportunities. If they were healthy and educated, failure would be 
their responsibility. In contrast, the capabilities characterization of poverty 
would consider the demand side of the market, promoting people's well-being 
in order to increase their abilities to enjoy their liberties. This approach 
relates a lack of resources to a lack of freedom. It would seem then that 
despite Levy's conception of extreme poverty in terms of functionings, the 
influence of the capability conception on social policy is rather limited. 
Social policies are divided then into those actions aimed at those without the 
ability to enter the labour market, living below a certain absolute threshold, 
and those actions directed to the rest of the population. The two types of 
approach are shown schematically in Figure 5.1. 
f\ly translation. 
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Figure 5.1 PERSPECTIVES OF SOCIAL POLICY, 1997. 
Social security 
Health 
Wide Actions 
Education 
(General Population) 
Labour training 
Housing 
Social 
Policy 
Human capital development 
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Source: Secretaria de Hacienda y Credito Publico, 1997. 
The objective of the first half of the social policy shown in Figure 5.1 
concerns the general population: it is to strengthen those institutions that aim 
to promote social rights for all. As we have seen in the beginning of this 
chapter, the results are far from satisfactory in terms of the large proportion 
of the population not enjoying these social rights. As for the second half, 
targeted actions, to which I will devote more attention, the emphasis is on 
focused programs to alleviate extreme poverty. 
I will focus on the area specified as "Targeted Actions" which involve human 
capital development, income opportunities, and physical capital development. 
Since 1994, the federal government considered the FGT index plus an index 
of unsatisfied basic needs, as the main criteria for generating targeted social 
policies to alleviate poverty. Those regions and communities with a higher 
FGT index (a=2) would be selected, within communities an income survey 
and the index of unsatisfied basic needs would be used to select those 
families to be targeted. 
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The respective programs to be targeted were PROGRESA, income 
opportunities and special funds for physical development. 
5.4.1 Foster, Green Thorbecke poverty measure to select the targeted 
groups. 
The FGTI, as mentioned in Chapter 3, is used to measure poverty intensity, 
and to evaluate the effect transfers of income have within different groups of 
the poor. As the FGT index is sensitive to poverty intensity, the way income 
is measured becomes very important. The government takes into account 
total household monetary income earned by members over fifteen years old 
and compares this total with the price of an average food basket, per capita, 
multiplied by a factor of 1.34 to account for cooking costs. 
As the index gives increasing priority to those furthest below the selected 
threshold, it solves the problem of attributing the same poverty characteristics 
to all of those who were below a poverty line. The index leaves wide open 
the normative question about where to draw the poverty line. To assess 
income as a way of distinguishing who is poor and who is not, we would have 
to consider not only what income can provide in the form of commodities but 
also the level of opportunities denied to the least advantaged. For instance a 
better income without a better health service and good schools will not 
necessarily improve conditions nor generate opportunities. Someone who 
receives less income but has fair (rather than formal) educational 
opportunities would be better off. 
5.4.1.2 Unsatisfied basic needs index as a way to select the poor 
The second index taken into consideration by the government is one based 
on unsatisfied basic needs. The government's correct assumption is that by 
considering income and unsatisfied basic needs variables the complex 
picture of poverty would be easier to assess and the available resources 
would be distributed more efficiently to the worst off. The Unsatisfied Basic 
Needs index takes into consideration four variables: 
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Percentage of illiterate people older than fifteen years old. 
Percentage of inhabitants in houses without sewage. 
Percentage of inhabitants in houses without electricity. 
Percentage of population in towns with less than 5 000 
inhabitants. 
These variables are normalized by a statistical process to produce a re- 
scaled index of deprivation of basic needs (Sedesol, 1996). Combining 
indices to measure income poverty and accumulative deficiencies seems to 
serve two objectives. The first is to reduce the targeted group, as only those 
areas with severe lack of services would be taken into account when 
distributing direct resources. The second is to rank publicly different regions 
of the country by their poverty levels. 
The first objective proves problematic, as it discriminates against the poor 
living in areas with services, such as people , living in shantytowns in big 
cities, who are not included in the program. The second objective might 
function as a control against the common usage of national programs in 
favour of the party in government. For the first time in Mexico there is a clear 
criterion for distributing resources to those regions that lag behind others. 
Let us consider those programs that use a combination of the indices. 
5.4.2 Targeted programs 
President Zedillo's government (1994-2000) used the UBN and the FGT 
index and publicly available data to target regions and families with three 
main programs: the Program of Temporal Employment to offer direct income 
opportunities to men; PROGRESA offering a package of help to the family, 
concentrating on women and children; and Branch 26 which provides a 
special fund for local infrastructure in the targeted regions. I will provide a 
brief description of PET and Branch 26, but will concentrate on PROGRESA 
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The Program for Temporal Employment (PET) provided seasonal work to 
people living in targeted regions who do not possess other income sources. 
The PET program managed by the Communications and Transport Ministry, 
used temporary workers to refurbish and provide maintenance to rural roads, 
which otherwise would have remained in disrepair. Wages provided through 
PET were very low, and only those in dire need would accept this type of low- 
waged job. Salaries are purposely set very low to act as a disincentive 
topeople with other possible income generating activities from taking them. 
This is clearly based in the Levy's ideas for incentive to work. 
In terms of Branch 26, this program provided special funds for basic 
infrastructure in the targeted areas. The funds that under PRONASOL were 
centrally administered, were in this program instead administered by local 
councils, with the only caveat that these were tagged funds that could only be 
used for specific works. The infrastructure deficit in those regions should 
have made the program a large well resourced one. But this did not happen 
during the six year period of the government as we can observe in Table 5.6 
below. 
The other poverty alleviation program implemented by the government was 
PROGRESA, which was inspired by Santiago Levy's poverty analysis and 
policy proposal (Levy, S., 1991). This program is similar to other conventional 
poverty alleviation programs implemented in Latin America, and is directed at 
helping extremely poor mothers and their children10. Before entering into the 
program's details, it is important to recall that the program distributes an 
income supplement set at the cost of half average food basket for a family of 
4.9 persons as well as providing children's school grants and free primary 
medical care. PROGRESA is singular in its broad spectrum and high 
expectations. It aims to provide a national safety net for extremely poor 
families. PROGRESA is also emblematic of the way the Mexican liberal 
101n Chile, specifically the PNAC (National Program of Complemetary Nutrition) targets infants in 
pre-primary scholing and requires their mothers to attend the health center in order to receive benefits. 
See 1. Vial et al, 1991. In Venezuela the Maternal Nutritional Program (PAMI), also eliminates 
subsidies to food and targets extremely poor people, e specially infants and pregnant womcn. Sec 11. 
Garcia et al, 1991. 
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government has redesigned social policy. By the end of 2000 PROGRESA 
reached 2.5 million families living under extreme poverty. If we consider an 
average of 4.8 members in each of these families, then the program has 
reached approximately 12 million people. As a matter of contrast with the 
estimated total number of poor people in the country, consider Table 5.4. 
Table 5.4 Extreme and Moderate poverty according to 
different income poverty lines. Mexico, 2000. 
Poverty Line Extreme 
Poverty 
Moderate 
Poverty 
Percentage of 
poor 
population 
(Million) (Million) (%) 
World Bank 6.5 14.8 21.8 
CEPAL-INEGI 24.2 27.2 52.6 
Coplamar3 48.9 33.8 84.7 
Source: My own calculations from the Income and Expenditure Household Survey of 2000 
ýINEGI, 2001). I used micro data to calculate total household per capita gross income. 
The World Bank poverty lines are 1 US Dollar per capita per day for extreme poverty and the 
double for moderate poverty. 
2. The CEPAL_INEGI extreme poverty line is based in the cost of a per capita food basket (339 
monthly pesos of 1996 inflated to pesos of April of 2001); moderate poverty is the double. 
Approximately these lines are 2.2 US Dollars per capita and 4.4 US Dollars respectively. 
'. The COPLAMAR extreme poverty line reflects a sub minimal per capita basket of goods (641 
monthly pesos of 1996 inflated to pesos of April of 2001). Mpderate poverty reflects a minimal 
basket of goods (1664 monthly pesos of 1996). Approximately these lines are 4 US Dollars per 
day per capita and 10.8 US Dollars, respectively. 
Note: CEPAL-INEGI and Coplamar poverty lines were taken from Hernandez Laos, 2001. 
Set aside for a moment the wide disparity in the poverty estimates caused by 
different poverty lines. " If we only consider the government's poverty line 
(CEPAL-INEGI) which amounts approximately to two minimum salaries, we 
have an estimate of 24.2 million people in extreme poverty, exactly double of 
the number PROGRESA was helping in 2000. If we take into account that 
PROGRESA has been increasing the number of families in the program by 
up to 800 000 families a year, two characteristics of the program become 
relevant. First, the distributive criteria used by the program, and second its 
financial stability. 
Governmental officials have used the FGT index to select those areas that 
are to be benefited first. Once an area is selected, individual families are 
chosen through a further selection process, which includes periodic 
See Chapter 6 for a discussion of different poverty lines. 
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questionnaires about income and basic needs. The program began by 
targeting the worst off areas and has continued to expand in the less worse 
off areas. That is, it has chosen those areas with a higher Pa to start 
distributing and gone on to distribute in those areas with a lower Pa. This 
strategy presents some problems of justice from the perspective of 
progressive sufficiency as I pointed out in Chapter 3. The most evident 
problem is that those closest to the threshold, who need less to leave 
extreme poverty (remember that it is described in terms of not having enough 
to eat) will be the last to receive help. It is also clear that giving the same 
income supplements to all of the extremely poor, will not solve the problems 
of those at the bottom and will give those closer to the threshold more than 
what they in theory would require. This last point brings us to the financial 
part of the program. 
The general governmental strategy for financing PROGRESA was to re-focus 
existing direct programs and reroute resources from food subsidies to this 
program. Although new funding sources originating in other programs and 
subsidies are added to the main sum, the management of funding sources is 
in keeping with the general institutional liberal economic policy of maintaining 
a low fiscal deficit and opening the economy. This targeting strategy, along 
with the fiscal equilibrium objective, required an increase in resources 
through overall taxation and receipts in order to increase the budget for 
priority programs and at least maintain other types of wide actions for the rest 
of the population. To partially assess whether there was a constant increase 
in funds for extreme poverty alleviation, consider Table 5.5 illustrating the 
expenditure on social development between 1995 and 2000. 
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Table 5.5 Expenditure in Social Development and Poverty alleviation 
programmes by Percentage of National Gross Product, Mexico 1995- 
2000. 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 I95-2000 
% Change 
Total in Social 
Development as % of 
GNP 
-Education 
-Health 
-Social Security 
-Labour 
-Regional Dev. 
-Social Assistance 
From total in Social 
Development 
Expenditure in 
Poverty Alleviation as 
% of GNP 
8.44 8.29 8.57 9.04 9.37 9.60 1 13.7 
3.60 3.67 3.70 3.86 3.80 3.93 9.16 
2.22 2.07 2.24 2.29 2.38 2.18 -1.8 
1.35 1.33 1.48 1.65 2.06 2.19 62.2 
0.07 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05 -28.5 
0.74 0.75 0.81 0.94 0.87 1.01 36.5 
0.35 0.41 0.28 0.25 0.22 0.23 -34.3 
0.98 0.95 0.88 0.90 0.93 1.03 1 5.1 
1. Human capital 0.48 0.49 0.43 0.44 0.44 
-Progresa - - 0.01 0.09 0.15 
2. Income 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.16 
Opportunities 
-PET 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.07 
3. Branch 26 0.37 0.33 0.30 0.31 0.33 
Note: My own calculations from the Sexto Informe Presidencial, 2000. 
0.50 4.1 
0.18 
0.17 30.7 
0.08 
0.35 -5.4 
Table 5.5 shows that expenditure on social policy increased by 13.7% from 
1995 to 2000, while the increase in resources for the extremely poor was 
only 4%. During these six years the GNP grew on average 12%. As we can 
see, the expenditure on poverty alleviation only refocused existing funds in 
new programs or maintained the same budget. This data provides some 
grounds for doubting the priority given to the extremely poor by governmental 
programs. As PROGRESA is the only program that considerably increased 
its budget, and will continue to do so12, it is wise to examine it in detail. 
5.4.2.1 PROGRESA 
PROGRESA'S three main related components are: 
1. An income transfer giving the person in charge of preparing meals for 
the family funds to support the food supply. This income supplement is 
12 The government of 2000-2006 announced in 2002 that PROGRESA will 
be extended. 
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equivalent to half the monthly average price of a standardised food basket 
for a family of 4.9 members. 
2. Basic health attention - routine preventive check ups tailored to the 
health requirements in the area. 
3. School grants to improve school attendance -The amount of the grant 
rises each year, rising from the fourth grade up to sixteen years old in 
order to encourage families to send their children to school. Grants given 
to girls are higher than those given to boys. 
The interrelated components of PROGRESA take into consideration the 
individual life cycle from conception to old age, giving greater emphasis to 
those actions that have a major impact in the development of a person 
according to his age. The action plan of PROGRESA is schematically 
represented in Figure 5.2. 
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Figure 5.2 Progresa's actions during life cycle. 
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Source: SHCP, 1997. 
The program has been designed with the apparent objective of providing a 
long-term safety net, especially for women and children, who suffer most in 
conditions of severe deprivation. In the case of children, the idea is to provide 
protection from the womb, through infancy, to schooling and training for 
labour. In the case of women, the objective is to disseminate information on 
health matters and conduct health checks during pregnancy and through the 
life cycle. Men also receive health checks. The person in charge of preparing 
the meals, usually a woman, will receive an income supplement, which 
requires the provision of proof that their children attend school and that all 
members of the family have kept their medical appointments. 
17 1) 
The conditions for income and grant benefits are described in Table 5.6, 
which illustrates the number and periodicity of visits to health centres. The 
emphasis of the routine visits is paediatric preventive medicine, which aims 
to avoid the vicious circle between poverty and illness and malnourishment. 
Table 5.6 Visits to health centres. 
AGE GROUP FREQUENCY 
Children and adolescents 
From birth to one year old 
From one to two years old 
From three to five years old 
From six to eleven years old 
Women 
Fertile age 
Pregnant 
Recovering from giving birth and 
breast feeding 
Seven visits at 7,28 days, 2,4,6,9 
and 12 months. 
Four visits per year. Once every 
three months. 
3 visits per year. 
months. 
2 visits per year 
months. 
Once every four 
Once every six 
4 visits Oer year. Once every three 
months. 
Five prenatal checks. 
Two visits. Immediately after birth 
and at the end of breast-feeding. 
Adults 
Young adults Once every year. 
Old age people Once every year. 
Source: SHOP, 1997. 
Under PROGRESA these visits to the health centre are the responsibility of 
the woman receiving the transfer. Moreover, as women are the ones who will 
receive the monetary help for food, the assumption is that they should be the 
most interested in complying with this requirement. The idea is to generate a 
positive discrimination towards women because they will be the ones to 
receive additional income and medical attention. In addition they will receive 
special food formulas when pregnant, breast-feeding and child rearing. 
Additional responsibilities will be placed on them to prevent nutritional 
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problems in children. As mentioned before, women are the main targets of 
PROGRESA and the men will only receive additional income through PET. 
Although there are no studies available to evaluate sex-biased malnutrition in 
children, 50% more boys die than girls (Secretaria de Salud, 1999). 13 
Another inequality to be addressed is the marked difference in the education 
of men and women. Girls generally stop attending school earlier than boys. 
(2000 Census) PROGRESA takes into consideration these differences, 
providing an extra grant/incentives for female education. These 
grant/incentives are provided to parents as an income transfer for leaving 
their children in school. This transfer has been calculated to replace the 
earning ability of children at work. Consequently, another means of 
conditionality consists in women providing proof that their children are 
attending school. By conditioning the provision of benefits in this way, 
PROGRESA supplies the income generated by child work. 
The grants and incentives provided by PROGRESA are supposed to cover 
two types of costs. One is the potential income of children when they are not 
working and the other covers the cost of school materials. During the first two 
years in school, the government will also provide a school breakfast (which 
will help learning performance). The government will also provide grants to all 
targeted children who attend primary and secondary school (6-16 years of 
age). The school grants will be limited to a maximum of three children. 
One of the indirect objectives of the program is stated in the following quote. 
Reaching higher levels of schooling will allow women a more 
responsible exercise of their reproductive capacity. In consequence, 
the grants will have greater social impact than the ones assigned to 
men. " (Sedesol, 1996) 
The effect would be to reduce family sizes and increase the well-being of 
family members. 
` For every 150 boys dying in preeschool age, 100 girls 
die. 
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The incentive structure proposed by the program does not confront the 
problems of information that most poverty alleviation programs do, because 
in the case of PROGRESA information is available for each selected family. 
This availability of private information could present some problems for 
women, especially because benefits are conditioned in a way that may 
conflict with personal preferences. For example, some women accept that 
they need the money, but are still not willing to let their daughters go to a 
nearby town to secondary schooling, as it is simply very dangerous. 14 
5.4.2.2 PROGRESA'S conditionality. 
The government rationale for conditioning benefits for the extremely poor is 
also in line with the liberal idea of making people partially responsible of their 
situation. 
An important characteristic of this Program is that benefits granted in 
each of these three components require in various aspects the 
compromise and the co-responsibility of those who will be benefited, 
giving to families, in this way, an active role in the solution of their 
own poverty condition. (SHOP, 1997) 
This "co-responsibility" to be created between the government and the 
beneficiaries means that those selected for PROGRESA would have to 
invest some effort in order to receive direct benefits. The aim pursued by the 
government is related to the change in health habits of the worst off. This 
makes sense as long as people consider the benefits provided by the 
program worthwhile. However, if some consider the program too intrusive in 
relation to their customs, they would not be able to reject the conditions 
imposed without loosing their benefits. 
The design of this incentive structure is similar to the one used with PET and 
suggested by Santiago Levy (1991) in his poverty analysis. The idea behind 
this incentive structure is simple; as long as people consider the offered 
benefits as worthwhile they will accept the proposed conditions. We have to 
14 Personal communication with a researcher in rural towns. 
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note, that while this type of incentive will improve targeting as it is in a way 
self selective, it might fail to reach people who do not consider to need the 
benefit or who simply are not adequately informed. We must also note that 
benefits which are conditional in nature are subject to a change of conditions 
at any time. 
This could create a possible civil rights problem because the government 
might be tempted to manage the confidential information provided to 
PROGRESA and use it for other purposes. One of the potential problem 
areas is birth control. Reproductive education has been one of the most 
important issues addressed by the health services in Mexico since the 
1970's, manly due to the high birth rate during that decade (Total fecundity 
rate= 6.3 children/woman) (Figueroa, 1990, p. 107). Here, it is important to 
mention, that according to Art. 4 of the Constitution, women have a right to 
"decide freely and responsibly" about the number and timing of pregnancies. 
However, serious questions have' been asked about the high rate of female 
sterilization in the country. 
Figueroa (1990) points out that ... a 
doubt or concern exists about how far 
[sterilization] is an informed preference of the population or an 
institutionalised policy which influences the preferences of the health 
workers. " According to Figueroa's estimates, 1 out of 4 women in Mexico 
using birth-control methods have opted for this type of surgery. Moreover, 
there is a tendency for younger women to be sterilized. One indication of this 
is that 1 out of 5 women sterilized is younger than 25 years of age (J. 
Figueroa, 1994, p. 107-9). Women have to give a written consent for this 
surgery to be undertaken. However, the requirement of legal authorization 
does not eliminate the pressure on health workers to reduce birth rates. 
Figueroa, quoting reproductive surveys, points out that women with low 
education levels have very high birth rates and are usually very poor. At the 
same time, a large percentage of these women decide to be sterilized, and 
later demonstrate profound discontent with the resulting infertility (J. 
Figueroa, 1990). 
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As PROGRESA requires poor fertile women to attend health clinics, this 
aspect has to be clearly defined in order to raise awareness in health workers 
about the ethical problems involved in recommending sterilization. 
5.5 CONCLUSION 
It is clear that in Mexico social institutions have not been able to provide 
basic social rights and economic opportunities for a large group of the 
population. Since 1988, successive governments have changed the past 
emphasis from closing the gap between the achievement levels of individuals 
to one of giving priority only to the worst off or the poor. To this end the 
government created special poverty alleviation programs, following the 
example of Social Funds advanced by the World Bank and the IMF. The aim 
of these programs was to create a safety net for the extremely poor, who are 
conceived of as people unable to profit from the economic growth that would 
ensue from the economic liberal reforms. 
The creation of poverty alleviation programs reflects a prioritarian approach 
with an extremely low level of benefits justified by resource scarcity and, 
crucially, by incentive considerations. The liberal government 1994-2000 
considered that, apart from increasing the level of well being of the targeted 
population, a "better efficiency, efficacy and social benefits of the public 
expenditure"15 would be attained with PROGRESA. 
PROGRESA represents an improvement on PRONASOL, the preceding 
poverty alleviation program, not only because it eliminates the partisan 
political link in a federal programs, but also because it makes public the 
criteria for the selection of benefited areas and families. This has allowed a 
better analysis of the problem of justice in the distribution of resources, 
among the poor as well as among the entire population. 
15 SEDFSOL, Aspectos... l996. 
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In relation to the distributive rule used by the government to apply its social 
policy, we could ask whether it is fair to use a very basic sufficientarian 
approach towards direct benefits. The government is assuming in the design 
of its main programs that responsibility can be attached to people with 
malformed preferences. This assumption is particularly important to set the 
amount of transfers to the very poor, as the help is described in terms of help 
for nutrition, meaning that full help will not be available. In terms of a 
sufficientarian approach the help is not enough for people to reach a 
threshold, thus the policy serves only the function of an income transfer, 
eluding the explicit aim of improving social justice. In terms of a progressive 
sufficientarian approach the social policy described does not attribute enough 
priority to the worse off to be considered just. In order to be fair the policy 
should target resources to solve the problem. 
In relation to the currency of the distribution we can argue that Progresa 
mixes, in a confusing way, the capability and welfare approach with a 
resourcist option with a strong factor of individual responsibility. In one hand 
the program intends to source people's capabilities by providing income for 
education and free health services and in the other considers that income is 
the best vehicle to satisfy food preferences. The program is in fact not 
reaching the capability area as it does not attempt to provide people with 
enough resources to function adequately in their community, it is only 
attempting to source two very basic needs. 
Furthermore, in the program malformed preferences are not considered and 
these are usually present in groups of people with long term problems of 
poverty. The working assumption that benefits are only supplements to 
earnings could in fact reduce people's well-being as they could reduce their 
food expenditure up to the level of their transfers. People in fact can lower 
their expectations up to a survival level. 
Perhaps the most important critique to the social policy is the factor that the 
level of benefits is set not by resource scarcity, but by incentive 
considerations. I suggested in Chapter 3 that people under a very low level of 
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advantage cannot be made entirely responsible for their actual situation. 
Something that Progresa is doing. Furthermore, as Progresa holds complete 
information of the economic situation of each family, it is unfair not to attempt 
to fully contribute to solve the poverty problem. 
0 
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Chapter 6: Empirical analysis of deprivation and poverty during 
liberalisation. Results of poverty alleviation programs. 
6.1 Introduction 
A broad group of political philosophers believe that justice requires equality to 
be the main distributive rule. In Chapter 1 of this thesis I claimed that 
egalitarianism could better be served by using a mixed distributive rule. 
Progressive sufficiency, as I call it, aims to maximise the number of persons 
above different morally relevant thresholds. In particular, I have advanced 
some ideas as to how this criterion can better express our intuitions about 
justice under situations of severe scarcity -when resources are not enough to 
source minimally basic needs for those who need it. 
When discussing competing egalitarian conceptions of distributive justice we 
can distinguish two questions. First, how should resources be distributed 
between individuals who have equal claims on those resources? Second, 
which standard of interpersonal comparison should be employed to 
determine when one individual is better off than another? I this chapter I will 
comment on some empirical results as to how these questions might be 
answered. 
In this chapter I will analyse some changes in the pattern of distribution of 
benefits and burdens in Mexico in the 1990s. The 1990s are particularly 
important in this respect as changes in those years continue to transform the 
country in economic and political terms. For instance, the economic liberal 
structural reform of the eighties were consolidated by the signature of a free 
trade agreement with the USA and Canada in 1994 (NAFTA), de facto 
making the, until then closed Mexican economy into one of the most open of 
the world. Asking about shifts in the distribution of benefits and burdens 
amongst social groups in Mexican society is relevant because one of my 
objectives is to evaluate whether during the liberalisation of the 1990s the 
shifts in benefit and burdens in Mexico were fair or unfair according to 
different distributive criteria. 
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Most social and economic policies in the 1990's were designed following 
even more liberal principles than those of the eighties. Mexican liberals 
considered that these reforms would extend economic opportunities and 
benefits to the great majority of Mexican citizens. Liberals in the 1990s, as in 
the 1980s, considered that although some of the economic reforms would 
potentially harm the worse off, this group could be protected by the creation 
of a specific national poverty alleviation programme. If the reforms have 
failed to protect them, one of the questions we would have to answer is 
whether the liberal design of the structural reforms and poverty alleviation 
programmes need to be changed in order to make them fairer. 
In order to assess the latter, this chapter will be divided into three sections. 
The first section will provide information about the long term shifts in the 
aggregate results of deprivation, income poverty, and inequality for the whole 
of the population. The second section will evaluate different measures of 
poverty and analyse the robustness of the preliminary results. Also in the 
second section I will evaluate in detail the data related to the extremely poor. 
And finally in the third section I will draw all the information together and 
speculate about the fairness of different distributive criteria when distributing 
severity scarce resources, by modelling different scenarios. 
6.2 DEPRIVATION, INCOME POVERTY AND INCOME INEQUALITY 
Most empirical research done on welfare and human development in Mexico 
draws upon the good record of household surveys on income and 
expenditure (ENIGH) supplied by the national statistical office (INEGI). 
Although the databases generated by INEGI have been designed to provide 
data for monetary purposes (price changes and inflation), they are the only 
available and reliable datasets that provide detailed information on these 
issues. The micro-data in the databases of INEGI includes socio-economic 
information on household members as well as categorical data on dwellings. 
Since 1950 twelve surveys have been made at regular intervals, and those 
made since 1984 are strictly comparable between each other. In this chapter 
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I will concentrate on the 1992,1994,1996,1998, and 2000 surveys. ' Before 
providing detailed statistical information about the 1990s, I will look at long- 
term changes and possible patterns in the distribution of social resources in 
different social groups since 1950. 
6.2.1 Long-term trends in deprivation, poverty and inequality in Mexico 
1950-2000 
Long-term estimates and data related to deprivation, poverty and inequality in 
Mexico have to be made with care. This is because there are no strictly 
comparable historic series of data in a similar format. Nonetheless, the 
available results of these surveys can be used to evaluate general long-term 
trends. The evaluation of these trends are relevant for this thesis, because 
my main objective is to explore how the economic policies, with particular 
emphasis on social policies of the 1990s, helped change established patterns 
of social benefit distribution among social groups. 
Poverty estimates, like other economic and statistics measurements, do not 
have a unique methodology; different measures and assumptions affect the 
results, sometimes significantly. This is important, as poverty estimates can 
affect our judgement about the failure or success of different social and 
economic policies, and can also affect our judgement of the adequacy of 
budget allocations for poverty alleviation by governments. 2 Likewise, we have 
to be clear as to what sort of methodology we are using and what are its 
strengths and limits. Inequality measures do not suffer from the same 
methodological vagaries as afflict poverty measures, although they are only 
as good as the data selected. Deprivation measures, by contrast present a 
general problem of information, as most social indicators used are national 
aggregates, lacking micro data on households. This disparity of information 
sources makes it difficult to interrelate some of the aggregate social problems 
as information comes from different sets of data. 
Se Appendix I ('or a dcscriptian of the Sure eys. 
2 For more into this wide debate see Szekely, M (2000) 
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6.2.1.1 Preliminary methodological considerations on deprivation, 
income poverty and inequality 
Deprivation3 -not including income - is a multidimensional phenomenon, 
reflecting the interaction of complicated factors that have an effect on the 
level of achievement of people. In addition, in some societies there is not 
much to start from due to a severe scarcity of resources, thus a measure of 
deprivation might not mean the same from one country to another. The 
United Nations Human Development Report (1997) offers a Human Poverty 
Index (HPI) that concentrates on deprivation (see Chapter 4). This index 
deals with three essential elements of human life -longevity (people not 
expected to survive to age 40), knowledge (percentage of adults who are 
illiterate) and a decent standard of living. This last element is composed of 
three variables: the percentage of people without access to safe water, the 
percentage of people without access to health services, and the percentage 
of children under five who are moderately or severely underweight. 
The HPI assumes absolute measures of well-being and provides a model to 
follow, giving a similar weight to each of the areas. Since the only surveys 
that can provide micro data about households are income and expenditure 
surveys, I have chosen some social indicators close to the ones the UN uses 
in its human development report to evaluate deprivation. This evaluation can 
only be descriptive. Later, when evaluating the 1990s micro-data, I will take 
into consideration additional indicators, also similar to the ones used by the 
UN. 
To make a preliminary assessment of long-term income poverty I will follow 
Szekely's methodology of analysing micro data in income and expenditure 
surveys, completing his estimates for the 1990's. (Szekely, 1998, pp. 10-18) 
Remarkably, Szekely's study offers the only long-term estimate of poverty 
and inequality available for Mexico. To calculate income poverty, Szekely 
uses among other measures the head count ratio, which is the percentage of 
See Appendix I for a precise conceptualization of deprivation. 
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the population below a poverty line (see Chapter 4)4. Other measures of 
poverty used by Szekely are distribution sensitive because they can attach 
greater weight, if required, to the lowest incomes. I will mainly use the head 
count ratio for practical reasons. Later on I will manipulate the income and 
expenditure surveys' income distribution to enquire hypothetically what sort 
of rule for a just distribution a distributor should use. To measure inequality I 
will use the Gini Coefficient, which is the most commonly used index. 5 
6.2.1.2 Long-term trends in deprivation 
Table 6.1 provides a general long-term view of deprivation in Mexico. This 
table includes common social indicators related to deprivation used mostly in 
developing and agricultural countries6. The reason for including in Table 6.1 
the population working in the primary sector is that in Mexico this group has 
generally earned much less and had worse living conditions that other groups 
of the population. 
Table 6.1 Social indicators in Mexico, 1950-2000. 
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 1995 2000 %Change 
1950-2000 
Life expectancy at birth 
(years) 
46.9 57.5 60.9 66.2 70.8 73.6 75.3 62.2 
% of illiterate of 15 years old 
and over 
na na 25.8 17.3* 12.6 10.7 9.5 -62.4 
% of population working in 
the primary sector 
60.9 54.5 41.8 36.7* 23.4 22.6 16.1 -73.5 
Dwellings with running water 17.1 23.5 61 71 ` 80 85.7 87.5 411.2 
Dwellings with electricity na na 58.9 74.6* 87.5 93.3 95.1 61.4 
Dwellings with drainage na 28.9 41.5 45* 64.8 74.9 78.5 170.2 
Sources: INEGI, Datos sociodemograficos de Mexico, Mexico, LUUU. Na: Data not available. 
*UN: Statistical Yearbook, 1983-84, New York, 1984. 
** Computed by the author. 
Observing the social indicators presented in Table 6.1, there has been a 
clear improvement in the living standards of the entire population in the 
country since the 1950's. For example, deprivation in services (as a measure 
4 See appendix I for poverty lines. I will follow Szekelys methodology to analyse household surveys. 
Ile follows standard practice in poverty analyses by using monthly household total gross income per 
capita, data which is easily obtained without much manipulation from the original microdata in 
income and expenditure household surveys. 
51 will use monthly household total gross income per capita series to perform 
inequality calculations. 
Sec appendix I for the method used to calculate inequality. 
6 See Dasgupta, P: 1993, p. 77-S 
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of human development) has steadily dropped, even though the population 
has doubled. However, something remarkable to note in Table 6.1 is the slow 
down of improvement between 1995 and 2000, compared to changes 
between 1990 and 1995 for instance. The most probable cause of this slow 
down is the financial crisis of 1995. However, it is during the last five years 
when the change from Pronasol to Progresa was implemented: a move from 
an umbrella program mainly directed to infrastructure to a nutrition program 
mainly directed to individuals. It could be that the change of emphasis from a 
more general idea of community development to an individualistic idea of 
well-being has something to do with the slow down. 
On the other hand, at this rate of improvement, and if social expenditure is 
maintained, the deprivation profile of the country could improve so that the 
effort would lie in making available quality services to all. This aggregate 
picture of improvement has to be contrasted with a detailed view of which 
groups are still lacking these services. Since from the 1960's onward all of 
these services have been public, we would expect an even provision of 
services between all groups. To be able to evaluate deprivation and poverty 
in the 1990's under economic liberalisation, which is one of the main 
objectives of this thesis, I will use an income poverty line in constant prices, 
which includes basic services. I will consider the proportion of the population 
under this threshold. 
6.2.1.3 Long-term trends in income poverty 
From 1950 until 1977, income and expenditure surveys in Mexico included 
data only for household's deciles. These data can be disaggregated to 
provide information about individual's income poverty; ' but, unfortunately we 
cannot do the same for house's services, as we require micro data for each 
household. As a proxy for the availability of services, we can assume an 
income threshold that would cover a minimal basket of goods and services in 
constant prices. 
or 
7 Sec Altimir, 0: 1982, quoted in Szekely, M. 1998. 
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In Figure 6.1, taken from Szekely (1988) the first poverty line is set in 
constant prices at a survival level, where people below this line would not 
have sufficient income for a food basket that would meet their nutritional 
needs. The moderate poverty line is set in constant prices to provide enough 
income for a basic food basket and a very low standard of housing, as well 
as very basic access to health and education. The third line is set at 4.5 
times the moderate poverty one. Finally Szekely describes the rest of the 
population simply as rich. (Szekely, 1998, pp. 11-13). 8 To have an idea in 
these lines in US' dollars terms, they are more or less similar to 1 US dollar 
per capita a day, 2 US dollars per capita a day and 9 US dollars per capita a 
day. 
In Figure 6.1 Szekely (1988) used micro data from the ENIGs until 1992 to 
obtain total household monthly per capita income. He used these data to 
calculate the head count poverty measure for each group. I followed the 
same methodology to measure the head count poverty measure for each 
group, from my own databases, obtained from micro data from the same 
household surveys series, from 1992 onwards. I obtained the same poverty 
results as Szekely's for 1992. This is important as most poverty researchers 
in Mexico use the same data and sometimes the same methodology but 
obtain different results. 
8 See Appendix -' 
for poverty lines. 
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Figure 6.1 Distribution of population by socio economic group in 
Mexico 1950-2000 
d6, I 1. 
30% 
20% 
1950 ( 1956 1958 1963 1968 1977 1984 1989 
IIl$IlIggstIIMj 
L.. 
1992 1994 1996I 1998 2000 
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O Moderate Poor 41.9 25.6 27.4 32.8 32.4 18 18.8 17.8 17.2 15 21-4 19.8 16.4 
0 Extremely Poor 31.3 32.6 30.9 23.1 12.3 15 11.4 1 
11.5 11.4 6.7 14.5 17.8 11.4 
Source: Szckcly, M: 1998, p. 13 for 1950-1989. For years 1992-2000, own calculations from household surveys, 
INEGI, 2000, INEGI 2001. Note: Calculations take into account total household per capita income. For poverty 
lines see Appendix 2. 
Observing the percentage component bar chart in Figure 6.1, and 
considering that public services were not extended, we can speculate that in 
the 1950's, only a small group of people in the country could afford minimal 
services. Figure 6.1 shows that during the 1960's and 1970s the income 
distribution changed dramatically, extending the middle classes and allowing 
a larger portion of the population to afford minimal goods and services. This 
pattern of improvement did not continue from 1984 onwards, suggesting that 
liberalisation did not produce the expected results. The general trend, 
however, shows an inconclusive picture of the relation between services and 
income, something that can only be analysed with household micro data. 
From 1950 to 1984 there was a constant expansion in size of the middle 
classes, and a steady drop in the proportion of the population who were 
extremely poor. The main long-term trend in Figure 6.1, however, shows that 
1Q4 
since 1984 the portion of the population in each socio-economic group has 
been almost the same, rising and diminishing with the economic crises and 
peaks of the economic cycle, sometimes dramatically as in the economic 
crisis of 1995. A preliminary conjecture about this state of affairs is that the 
liberal model of development implemented since the 1980s is not helping the 
poor and that they may be caught in a poverty cycle. It would seem in 
aggregate terms that if the economic outlook is good, the very poor close to 
the threshold become moderately poor, but once the economic conditions 
worsen, this group becomes very poor again. This is highly speculative of 
course, as there are no panel data, following the lives of the same families 
throughout the time in order to verify it. However a recognizable trend does 
emerge, a trend that can make us doubt the effects of the new liberal 
economic measures and its weak sufficientarian policy. 
The new institutional liberal model of development implemented by 
successive governments since 1984 stressed the idea of offering new 
economic opportunities linked with self-reliance in the labour market, while 
eliminating subsidies, price controls and lowering the real value of the 
minimum salary. It would seem that in this environment most programmes 
designed explicitly to alleviate poverty were not enough to lift the poor even 
from extreme poverty. 
In order to further describe this trend, let us consider the share of total 
income held by five equal groups of the populations 
6.2.1.4 Long-term trends in income inequality 
In Table 6.2, modified from Szekely's (1998, p. 13), I consider the share of 
total quarterly household income accruing to each quintile of the population in 
descending order from the richest 20% to the poorer. Data from 1950 to 1977 
has been corrected by Altimir (1982) to account for underreporting; from 
1994 onwards the percentages were taken directly from the ENIGH (INEGI, 
2000,2001). 
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Table 6.2 Income distribution in Mexico. 1950-2000. 
of Total Quarterl H ousehold Income by Q uintiles 
Quintil 
e 
1950 195 
6 
1958 
* 
1963 
* 
1968 
* 
197 
7 
198 
4 
198 
9 
199 
2 
199 
4 
199 
6 
199 
8 
200 
0 
V (High) 59.6 55.8 58.5 62.9 59.9 53.7 49.5 53.5 54.2 54.5 52.5 54 56.9 
IV 15.7 21.9 19.9 16.2 16.4 21.6 21.8 20.4 20.3 20.1 20.5 20.4 19.5 
111 10.2 10.5 9.6 9.9 11.5 13.2 14.2 13.2 12.8 12.9 13.3 13 12.3 
II 8.5 6.9 7 6.7 7.6 8 9.5 8.5 8.4 8.5 8.9 8.3 7.9 
I(Low) 5.9 4.3 4.9 4.3 4.5 3.5 4.8 4.4 4.3 4.3 4.8 4.2 4.0 
Gini % 
Coeff. 
52 52 53 57 54 49 44 48 47 48 45 48 48 
Sources: *Modified from Szekely, 1988, p. 13. 
Remarkably, Table 6.2 shows, in broad terms, rather small variations in the 
income accumulation by quintiles, despite the economic growth during the 
last fifty years. In particular, Table 6.2 shows three different trends in the past 
fifty years. The first trend is observed from 1950 to 1963, similar to the 
second trend observed from 1984 to 2000. During these years there is a 
constant growth in the concentration of income in the top quintiles widening 
the gap between the groups and making the society more unequal in income 
terms. In the third trend (1963-1984) income inequality measured by the Gini 
Index drops from 57 percent to 44 percent and there is a decline in the 
bottom quintile. 
These three periods align perfectly with two different liberal groups in power 
in Mexican history, developmental liberals and institutional liberals. The first 
group governed from 1968 to 1982, increasing the State's control of the 
economy; and intervening through social policies to close the income gap 
among families, at least in the middle quintiles. The second group governed 
in the other two periods, 1950-1967,1983-2000, sustaining anti- 
interventionist economic policies, and were not strictly concerned about the 
widening of the gap, but were more concerned with increasing total wealth. 
The fact that during the first period of institutional liberalism (1950-1967) 
there was a substantial advance in the provisions of services and the 
increase of income purchasing power makes us consider why in the second 
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period of institutional liberalism from 1984 to 2000 there has not been a 
similar process. 
Part of the problem can be found in several economic and financial crises 
that have plagued the Mexican economy. The first crisis took place in 1976, 
the second in 1982 and the third in 1995. These crises usually hit the poor 
hardest. In 1995 when the economy decreased in real terms by 6% of GNP, 
and the number of very poor more than doubled (Figure 6.1), it was the only 
year when the bottom 20% increased its share of total income (see Table 
6.2) After 1996, when the economy started to recover, the lower quintile 
immediately decreased its share of total income; however, a reduction in the 
number of the poor in absolute terms did not happen at the same pace (See 
Figure 6.1). This fact suggests that economic growth during recovery was not 
benefiting the extremely poor in absolute terms. On the contrary, only middle 
classes and better off groups were experiencing economic recovery. After 
1996, it would seem that poverty alleviation programmes (such as 
PROGRESA) stopped the poor from getting poorer, but did not help in their 
economic progress. It seems then that the changes implemented by the 
liberalised economy model, over 1984 -2000, have had a significant effect 
over the distribution of economic benefits and burdens, but have not 
benefited the economic condition of the lower 40% of the population. On the 
contrary, the relative income share of the bottom 20% dropped from 4.8% in 
1984 to 4% in 2000. 
However, we need a more detailed analysis of specific changes in the 
distribution of income and services to be able to better appreciate whether 
there has been an unjust distribution of benefits and burdens. One 
hypothesis could be that while income inequality has increased, the living 
standard of the poor has also improved because they have gained better 
access to public services. This might be an acceptable situation, provided we 
can find a clear pattern in the distribution of benefits and burdens suggesting 
an improvement in the condition of the severely poor. 
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6.2.2 Deprivation, poverty and inequality, 1992-2000 
When public services like health, education and social security do not reach 
all the population, those who are left without them, suffer different types of 
deprivation. We are unable to measure directly the costs of sickness, 
ignorance and insecurity. However, evaluating some of the proxies for the 
lack of these services, as well as income, can provide us with a very clear 
picture of how unfair the Mexican society of the 1990s really was. 
In assessing the fairness of particular distributions we can say that much 
rides on how we select the worst off group from the whole population. We 
have to decide how to describe deprivation in a specific culture and how to 
understand different levels of human development. For instance, the UN 
poverty index intends an international standard of comparison, taking 
account of the highest standards and the lowest to create the index. The 
result measures the ranking of a particular country or region between the 
lowest and the highest mark. In this sense, the index would not help much if 
we want to evaluate a particular country, as average standards in the country 
could be far away from higher international standards. However if we keep in 
mind that there are some essential areas in human development, as well as 
levels of achievement in these same areas, we can describe precisely what 
we mean by deprivation and human development. In the current poverty 
debate much also rides on the selected poverty line, and it has become a 
standard practice to measure poverty according to different poverty 
thresholds, not only to assess the robustness of the poverty measure, but 
also to assess general development 
6.2.2.1 Methodology 
As we are interested in observing shifts in human development throughout 
time, census data could provide us with comparable information at different 
times. Mexican national surveys of income and expenditure (ENIGH), for 
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instance, provide information about household deprivation separately from 
precise information about income and expenditure. However they lack some 
important data, especially related to health matters. Nonetheless, ENIGHs 
provide large micro databases (up to 11000 cases) that allow us to collate 
variables and create new ones. I selected specific variables and created 
others to form a database for each year, 1992,1994,1996,1998 and 2000, 
with socio-demographic information and income and expenditure information 
for each household. 9 
In order to analyse changes in deprivation I have selected similar variables to 
the UN definition of deprivation, close to those used by the Mexican 
government to select very deprived areas and incorporate them in 
PROGRESA. 10 The Mexican government uses the following variables to 
select those areas with high level of deprivation: Percentage of illiterate 
persons over 15 years old, percentage of dwellings without running water, 
percentage of dwellings without drainage, percentage of dwellings without 
electricity, percentage of dwellings with soil flooring and percentage of people 
working in the primary sector. Once the deprived area has been selected, 
extremely poor households are selected according to the monthly monetary 
income of members over 15 years old. The households to be included in 
PROGRESA and targeted for other programmes are those whose income is 
below the cost of a basic food basket multiplied by a factor of 1.34 to cover 
further cooking costs and their social indicators show that they are deprived. 
As I am interested in the starkest of conditions, I will consider the deprived 
group as the population with the following characteristics: having dwellings 
without running water, without drainage of any kind and soil flooring and with 
one or more illiterate household members over 12 years old. I will not 
consider income when selecting the deprived group, as the first threshold of 
basic capabilities does not depend on income, (see Chapter 3). After the first 
threshold, income poverty is considered. 
9 See Appendix 11. 
10 Sec the agreement to establish the rules of Progresa (poverty alleviation program), 
in 
www. progre"'a. goh. im. 
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In relation to income I will consider seven income poverty lines to observe the 
disparity of results depending on the poverty line used. An extreme and 
moderate poverty line used by Coplamar (1983), including a minimal basket 
of goods and services (moderate poverty), set at 2940 pesos as of April 
2001, and a sub-minimal one (extreme poverty) with some goods and 
services, set at 1132 pesos. I will also include a lower moderate and extreme 
poverty lines, calculated by Szekely (1998), that are close to the World Bank 
lines of one and two dollars per capita a day. These last two lines take only 
food and some other goods from the minimal baskets of Coplamar. They are 
set at 392 pesos and 707 pesos respectively. The above four lines consider 
monthly total household income. 
A fifth poverty line will be close to the one used by the government to make 
preliminary selection of those households which should receive direct 
benefits from poverty alleviation programmes like PROGRESA. This poverty 
line takes into account the monthly gross household monetary income 
earned by household members over 12 years old and considers extremely 
poor those households with income below the price of a food basket 
multiplied by 1.34. This line is set at 525 pesos per month in April 2001 per 
household member over 12 years of age. The sixth line considers moderate 
poverty in terms of monthly gross household monetary income earned by 
household members over 12 years of age and is set at 990 pesos of April 
2001 per members over 12 years old. The seventh is a relative measure of 
poverty, set at half the median monthly household total income per capita, 
per survey year. 11 
To evaluate inequality I will look in detail at the distribution of income by 
percentiles, considering the differences between those households in the top 
5%, the median 5% and the lowest 5%, in order to speculate about the 
possible reasons for the great difference in shares of income. 
II Sec appendix 11 for explicit poverty lines. 
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Figure 6.2 shows the head count for each income poverty line set at fixed 
prices, and the head count of the deprived population. Comparison of these 
poverty lines show the actual disagreement in Mexico over which poverty line 
should be used. The problem is reflected in the huge disparity between the 
percentages of the population below the thresholds, ranging from 2.5% to 
83% it is simply very different to create a policy for 2.5% of the population 
and to create one for 83%. It's important to point out that all fixed income 
poverty lines shown above are based on different elements of the same 
basket of goods, the one described by Coplamar in 1983 and reflected in the 
line Coplamar Moderate Poverty in the above figure. In this respect they 
represent different perspectives on what sort of goods should be considered 
as basic. These perspectives can go from considering a decent set of goods 
equivalent to those a non poor person would acquire in a well developed 
country (for instance the moderate income poverty line of Coplamar would 
amount to 310 US monthly dollars per capita in April 2001) to the lowest 
income poverty lines (such as the one represented by Zsekely's Extreme 
Poverty, which takes into consideration only the food element of the basket, 
and is close to one US dollar per capita per month). 
A relevant feature to consider in Figure 6.2 is the clear trend followed by the 
deprived group of the population. In 1992 6.6% of the population were 
deprived, but in the year 2000 it was only 2.5%. Another important feature to 
note in the results is the dramatic increase in the number of poor in 1996. 
The results on all income lines from 1994 to 1996 show the financial and 
economical crisis suffered by Mexico in 1995. The rapid recovery from 1997 
onwards, on most measures does not hide the fact that the poverty head 
count is similar to 1992, providing a reminder of what economic crisis mean 
in terms of the loss of development progress. 
Another important result to note is the behaviour of the median income 
measure, the only relative measure of those in the Figure. Though between 
1992 and 1994 results show a reduction in poverty measured against a 
basket of goods, the median income show almost no change. Though in 
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1998 all results show again a reduction of poverty, the median shows an 
increase in relative poverty. The only explanation for this is that the crisis 
deepened the gap between the poor and the non poor. 
It is important to note the behaviour of PROGRESA's poverty line in Figures 
6.2 from 1998 onwards (Progresa's lines measure monetary income while 
the others measure total income). Considering that this poverty alleviation 
program started to function fully at the beginning of 1997, providing income 
supplements to extremely poor families, we could expect different results 
than those for other poverty lines. Both sets of PROGRESA's results in 
Figure 6.2 (extreme and moderate poverty lines) have kept on falling from 
1997 but at almost the same rate as the rest of the results, with the exception 
of Zsekelys' extreme poverty line in 1998. The fact that the extreme poverty 
lines of PROGRESA and Zsekely show the same results in 1998 while taking 
into account different income measures might show that income transfers for 
the extremely poor are working, maintaining a certain level of income while 
other income activities recuperate. The slow pace of the recovery of other 
income generating activities, like self production, for the extremely poor is 
reflected in the increase of poverty under Szekelys's extreme poverty line in 
1998, contrary to all the rest of income poverty lines. 
Differences in the behaviour of PROGRESA's extreme poverty line compared 
with Zsekely's extreme poverty line and the median poverty line might 
suggest an important change in the pattern of poverty in Mexico. A change 
towards a minimal protection of the monetary purchasing power of 
households in poverty, with some disregard for other income generating 
activities and a disregard for equality concerns. This is suggested by how 
Progresa's lines which measure monetary income did not drop as far as 
other measures that take into account total income. It is also suggested by 
the increase of relative poverty. 
As one of the changes in 1997 is the introduction of a monetary transfer for 
the extremely poor, PROGRESA seems to be working insofar as increasing 
the monetary income even when other sources of income are affected. The 
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fact that the large drop is not maintained in 2000, comparing it with the 
closest lower line, might indicate that the extremely poor rely heavily on non- 
monetary income that includes presents, and self-consumption. Table 6.3 
provides some data that suggests that this is the case. 
In Table 6.3, the whole population is represented, divided into different 
groups: the first group is the deprived one, that was selected not taking into 
account income. 12 The rest of the groups are those not considered deprived, 
but below different income thresholds. These total income thresholds take 
into account those poverty lines considered before. 
i 
12 Close to 90% of this group has total household per capita income below 707 pesos. 
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Table 6.3 Distribution of Household Monthly Total Per Capita Income 
anu gis Lonstituents by Deprivation and income tiroups. "' Mexico: 1yyL-LUU 
Deprived and Income Groups. 
Portion of National Total Income Held by Group. 
Between parenthesis portion of total population in each group 
(Percentages) 
Deprived D-392 392-707 707-1132 1132-2 940 2940 + 
Pesos Million Years Total 
Income 
117,118. 1992 100 (7)' 2 (7)* 1 (14)` 4 (19)' 8 (33)' 28 (17)' 57 
239,633. 1994 100 (5)* 1 (4)' 0 (12)` 3 (17)' 6 (36)' 25 (26)` 65 
151,603. 1996 100 (4)* 1 (11)" 2 (20)` 7 (20)* 11 (31)* 33 (12)' 46 
166,954. 1998 100 (4)* 1 (16)' 2 (18)` 6 (19)' 10 (29)` 30 (13)' 51 
206,954. 2000 100 (2)' 1 (10)" 1 (16)' 4 (19)` 8 (36)' 31 (17)' 55 
Constituents of Total Income 
Salary 
1992 42 36 38 44 51 49 37 
1994 38 25 46 54 52 44 34 
1996 45 35 41 46 48 48 41 
1998 45 35 36 44 48 49 43 
2000 47 37 39 49 53 52 43 
Own Business 
1992 19 23 23 22 17 14 21 
1994 27 37 8 10 13 25 49 
1996 18 11 58 31 21 12 9 
1998 20 22 24 15 14 18 29 
2000 17 13 14 17 16 21 24 
Transfers 
1992 5 4 5 6 5 6 5 
1994 4 8 11 9 8 6 3 
1996 7 9 8 8 7 8 5 
1998 8 8 14 10 10 8 6 
2000 8 11 17 10 9 7 8 
Cooperatives, Rent of properties an d Other sources of Income 
1992 2 1 0 0 1 1 3 
1994 2 1 0 0 1 1 2 
1996 2 1 0 0 1 1 3 
1998 2 1 0 1 1 1 3 
2000 2 0 0 0 1 1 3 
Non Monetary I ncome 
1992 24 32 32 26 24 26 23 
1994 19 28 29 24 23 23 17 
1996 23 31 27 24 24 25 21 
1998 21 31 30 26 24 21 18 
2000 20 31 22 20 20 21 19 
Financial Mone tary and Non Monetary Income 
1992 8 4 2 2 3 3 11 
1994 4 3 2 2 2 2 4 
1996 6 3 2 2 3 3 9 
1998 4 2 2 2 2 3 6 
2000 6 3 2 2 2 3 9 
0 
Source: Own calculations from Income and Expenditure Houserioic surveys oy INLL I, using mommniy [otai 
household per capita income and pesos of April 2001. 
Numbers between parentheses refer to percentage of group members. In 92,96 and 98 there is a1 to 3% of 
error. 
" The population has been divided among income groups and a deprived one. See appendix I for poverty lines. 
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Table 6.3 contains calculations based on Income and Expenditure Household 
surveys of INEGI, using monthly total household per capita income and 
pesos of April 2001. In this table we are able to appreciate that, between 
1996 and 2000, the group below 392 pesos increased its income by more 
than 100% through money transfers. It is important to point out that these 
transfers come from institutions' donations, presents and donations 
originating inside the country, income coming from other countries, and 
others. From these components, transfers from institutions increased by 70% 
compared with an average of 5% from the rest of the components of the 
transfers. This increase might suggest that governmental transfers are 
noticeably increasing monetary income for the poor, though is clear that this 
is not enough to place people above the threshold. 
Furthermore, Table 6.3 shows that only the very deprived group had steadily 
decreased by 71 % between 1992 and 2000, while the rest had shown an 
erratic behaviour. This factor confirms the increasing importance of income 
poverty in the country, but does not necessarily prove that the poor have 
increased their standard of living. However, when comparing income and 
service deprivation we are able to observe that the extreme poor have not 
improved their access to services. Most improvements have been 
concentrated in the rest of the groups (see Table 6.4) 
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Table 6.4 Percentage of Individuals in Mexico lacking basic services and 
relevant social indicators by deprived and income groups, luuz-Luuu. 
DEPRIVED AND INCOME GROUPS* 
(Percentage) 
Relevant National 
Social Total Indicators 
(%) Deprived Dcpri ved. -392 392-707 707-1 132 1 132- 2940 2940 4- 
(pesos) (pesos) (pesos) (pesos) (pesos) 
Population 
1992 
1994 
1996 
1998 
2000 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
7 
5 
4 
4 
2 
6 
4 
11 
14 
10 
14 
12 
19 
18 
16 
19 
17 
20 
19 
19 
33 
36 
31 
29 
36 
17 
26 
12 
14 
17 
Soil Flooring 
1992 15.20 6.60 2.40 2.60 2.00 1.40 0.20 
1994 12.50 5.10 1.20 2.20 2.00 1.80 0.20 
1996 11.90 4.30 3.30 2.30 1.20 0.70 0.10 
1998 9.24 3.50 2.60 1.60 0.80 0.70 0.04 
2000 11.33 2.50 4.00 2.70 1.50 0.60 O. 03 
No Drainage 
1992 31.19 6.57 4.57 7.44 6.11 5.58 0.92 
1994 27.96 5.14 2.48 5.66 6.45 6.68 1.56 
1996 31.08 4.33 7.51 9.33 5.58 3.91 0.42 
1998 26.20 3.50 8.40 6.21 3.85 3.54 0.70 
2000 25.24 2.50 7.49 7.03 4.06 3.78 0.39 
No Running Water 
1992 18.27 6.57 1.82 3.25 3.29 2.87 0.49 
1994 16.71 5.14 1.28 3.45 2.92 3.14 0.79 
1996 14.40 4.33 3.25 3.12 2.06 1.53 0.12 
1998 10.94 3.50 2.57 2.08 1.29 1.23 0.27 
2000 10.14 2.50 2.41 2.43 1.46 1.19 0.15 
One or more il literate m ember over 12 years old i 
1992 27.46 6.57 3.44 5.78 5.48 5.41 0.78 
1994 25.53 5.14 2.26 5.37 3.62 7.51 1.63 
1996 26.31 4.33 5.56 7.02 5.01 3.88 0.52 
1998 22.22 3.50 6.13 4.96 3.41 3.51 0.71 
2000 24.05 2.50 5.11 6.84 4.27 4.75 0.59 
(leads working in rural activities 
1992 21.29 4.39 4.22 4.90 3.83 3.27 0.69 
1994 24.14 4.80 2.50 4.31 5.65 5.20 1.68 
1996 19.48 2.73 5.67 5.26 2.93 2.44 0.45 
1998 22.71 1.14 5.32 4.87 4.31 5.22 1.86 
2000 21.34 2.50 1.90 3.41 3.11 6.90 3.51 
Never in school or incomplete primary 
1992 45.82 5.96 5.13 9.39 10.34 12.47 2.53 
1994 44.41 3.60 3.23 7.79 9.77 15.09 4.92 
1996 38.71 3.70 7.98 8.38 8.80 8.55 1.30 
1998 39.95 3.25 9.58 10.90 6.92 7.28 2.03 
2000 na na na na na na na 
Average Num ber of household Membe rs 
1992 5.87 7.0 8.1 7.1 6.3 5.3 4.2 
1994 5.75 6.7 7.9 7.2 6.4 5.4 4.4 
1996 5.68 7.8 7.8 6.6 5.6 4.8 3.8 
1998 5.42 5.7 7.4 6.0 5.5 4.6 3.8 
2000 5.17 6.6 7.1 6.0 5.3 4.8 3.8 
Sourcc: Own calculations from Income and Expcnditurc Surveys, 
INLk-II (ZUM) anCu IIVL'VI (Lull ). 
* The six groups account fear the total population in each year. The national total represent the total of- the social 
indicators in the year and their relative percentages in each column. 
I calculated the percentages of individuals within each group using the 
collated data provided by the Income and Expenditure Surveys, INEGI (2000) 
and INEGI (2001) The first group of deprived individuals considers people 
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living in dwellings without running water, without drainage, with soil flooring 
and with one or more illiterate members in the household. The rest of the 
groups are income groups using different poverty thresholds. I have used 
total monthly household income to select groups, using pesos of April 2001 
(see Appendix II for methodology). 
The results presented in Table 6.4, suggest that while the rest of the groups 
have reduced the proportion of individuals lacking each service, those below 
392 pesos and 707 pesos have increased their proportion of individuals 
without services. Although the portion of the population without services is 
getting smaller, making the group of the totally deprived of services lower, 
most service improvements have been towards those groups with higher 
income or with the capacity to make use of the new economic opportunities. 
The general improvement in basic services for higher income thresholds 
might suggest that although the extremely income poor are increasing their 
income, on average by almost 5.5% per year, due to direct governmental 
transfers, they have not received the same direct benefits as higher income 
groups. Furthermore, we may expect that with a special program the living 
standards of the extremely poor should have risen faster than the rest of the 
groups. But we can observe in Table 6.4 that this has not happened. 
As we can note a clear relation in Table 6.4 between more income and 
having more services satisfied, we should further enquire what is the 
situation of the income poor. Assuming that PROGRESA is mainly directed to 
the rural areas, (cities with population of less than 2 500 persons), the 
deprived and the extremely income poor earning up to 392 pesos per capita 
a month would have to be in a better situation than the urban poor. To 
appreciate this consider Table 6.5 
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Table 6.5 Socio-economic indicators by deprived and income groups, Mexico 1992- 
2000. 
Relevant Social Indicators TOTAL 
Deprived 
Deprival and Income groups* 
(percentage) 
Depr.. -392 392-707 707- 1132 
( esos) (pesos) (pesos) 
1 132- 2940 
(pesos) 
2940 + 
(pesos) 
Percentage of individuals in group 
living in cities of 100 000 or more 
1992 47.27 0.23 0.41 3.23 8.34 20.95 14.10 
1994 51.10 0.19 0.31 2.97 6.90 21.16 19.57 
1996 48.05 0.24 1.43 6.80 10.30 20.04 9.24 
1998 58.77 0.19 4.68 9.57 11.86 21.40 11.07 
2000 47.09 0.05 0.59 3.21 8.25 22.37 12.63 
Percentage of individuals in group 
living in cities of 2 500 to 99 999 
1992 24.38 1.12 1.65 5.23 5.98 7.95 2.44 
1994 23.4 0.54 0.87 4.21 4.45 9.03 4.3 
1996 23.80 0.36 2.84 5.46 5.84 7.39 1.91 
1998 15.50 0.33 2.81 3.67 3.68 3.94 1.08 
2000 27.47 0.23 2.02 5.50 6.56 9.57 3.60 
Percentage of individuals in group 
living in cities of less than 2 500 
1992 24.89 5.22 4.36 5.53 4.92 4.06 0.80 
1994 25.34 4.41 2.77 5.29 5.34 5.92 1.61 
1996 25.59 3.73 6.55 7.23 4.21 3.12 0.75 
1998 23.65 3.02 8.00 5.14 3.43 3.22 0.83 
2000 25.45 2.21 7.20 7.09 4.17 4.03 0.75 
Median Total Income Per Cap. 
1992 1268 453 306 552 908 1741 4789 
1994 1543 564 315 563 909 1766 4978 
1996 1077 384 296 556 901 1696 4701 
1998 1125 386 275 542 893 1731 4769 
2000 1358 438 288 1552 909 1759 4638 
Median Total Exp. Per Cap. 
1992 1239 429 336 574 906 1672 4595 
1994 1542 475 344 535 839 1508 4007 
1996 1098 406 335 291 925 1683 4640 
1998 1134 397 303 569 922 1707 4650 
2000 na na na na na na na 
Median Total Exp. 
in Food Per Cap. 
1992 356 132 130 219 315 464 754 
1994 336 131 132 186 269 383 684 
1996 321 134 142 230 311 450 762 
1998 328 137 116 206 297 465 897 
2000 na na na na na na na 
Median Monetary Income 
Per members over 12 years old 
1992 1294 399 376 666 1037 1642 4134 
1994 1522 544 411 692 1035 1706 4565 
1996 1083 351 361 635 935 1546 4127 
1998 1143 357 458 758 1049 1525 3118 
2000 1307 421 352 634 958 1641 4244 
Sourcc: Own calculations frone Income and Expenditure Surveys, INEGI (2000) and INEGI (2001). 
** 'l-hc six groups account for the total population in each year. The national total represent the total of the social 
indicators in the year and their relative percentages in each column. The first group of deprived individuals 
considers people living in dwellings without running water, without drainage, with soil flooring and with one or 
more illiterate members in the household. The rest of the groups are income groups using different poverty 
thresholds. I have used total monthly household income to select groups, using pesos of April 2001. 
Table 6.5 also shows a mixed picture of socio-economic conditions in 
Mexico. On one hand we can observe a direct improvement of social 
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conditions of those with higher income; on the other hand there is no income 
security as we can observe how the economic crisis of 1995 placed a large 
group of the population in lower income groups (Table 6.4). Not until 2000 did 
head counts become similar to those of 1994. The highs and peaks of 
income loss cannot be compensated by the slight general improvement in 
basic services. As the loss of income increases, living conditions deteriorate 
rapidly, as we can observe, but take a long time to recuperate. We can also 
observe in Table 6.4 and Table 6.5, at least in descriptive terms, a relation 
between income and the improvement of social conditions. As individuals 
become better off in income terms they tend to live in bigger cities, to have 
smaller families and to be better educated. 
Table 6.5 also shows that even when using the median, a measure that 
controls for groupings in either extreme of our range selection, the results 
show larger drops in income and expenditure in poor groups. This might 
suggest that the extremely poor cannot sustain any exogenous economic 
situations like a crisis or a normal economic downturn cycle, not even, as the 
results show, with the support of existing poverty alleviation programmes. 
The evident inequality in this situation, where people with higher income can 
have access to better services, sustain economic crisis, and escape bad 
situations more quickly should be looked in detailed. Consider Table 6.6. 
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Table 6.6. Income distribution in Mexico by deciles and 
Gini Coefficients. 1984-2000 
Deciles Income Share Change in deciles income 
(%) 0 
Years 1984 1989 92 94 96 98 2000 During 
84-89 89-92 92-94 94-96 96-98 98-00 92-2000 
Lower 0.71 0.70 0.24 0.40 0.25 -1.41 65.71 66.67 -62.2 -64.78 1 
5% 
na na na na 1984-2000 
1 1.6 1.3 1.6 1.5 0.7 1.0 0.8 -19.4 23.3 -3.1 -55.8 52.9 -75.0 -51.25 
II 2.9 2.4 2.4 2.1 1.4 1.7 1.8 -16.6 -2.5 10.2 -33.7 23.6 4.1 -37.71 
III 3.8 3.3 3.2 3.1 2.1 2.4 2.7 -12.7 -3.6 -2.2 -31.8 11.8 11.8 -29.89 
IV 4.7 4.2 3.9 3.9 2.9 3.3 3.6 -10.6 -8.1 0.0 -25.5 15.6 7.2 -24.15 
V 5.9 5.3 5.1 4.9 3.9 4.2 4.8 -11.0 -3.8 -2.4 -21.9 7.8 15.9 -18.44 
VI 7.3 6.6 6.5 6.4 5.1 5.6 5.9 -10.3 -1.4 -1.9 -19.3 8.6 5.9 -19.39 
VII 9.2 8.3 8.0 7.9 6.8 7.2 7.8 -10.0 -2.9 -2.1 -13.6 5.9 8.6 -15.03 
VIII 11.9 10.6 9.8 10.0 9.5 10.0 10.5 -10.6 -8.2 2.1 -5.3 6.4 5.0 -11.76 
IX 16.5 15.5 14.3 15.6 15.7 14.2 17.0 -6.1 -7.5 8.4 1.0 -9.4 19.7 3.03 
X 36.1 42.5 45.3 44.6 51.9 50.1 45.1 17.6 6.5 -1.5 16.4 -3.5 -10.0 24.93 
92-2000 
Top 5% na na 32.2 31.8 38.1 37.7 32.0 na na -1.2 20.1 -1.2 -15.1 -0.5 
Top 1% na na 10.7 15.4 17.1 18.8 15.6 na na 43.2 11.8 9.4 -17.0 45.38 
Value index Proporti onal ch ange (%) 84- 
00 
Gini % 46 51 52 51 50 55 52 11.07 0.51 -0. 17 -3.15 10.13 -5.68 12. 
10 
Source: Own calculation from the household income and expenditures surveys by INEGI 2000 and 2001, using 
total household per capita incomes. Data from 1984,1989, household income and expenditure surveys using per 
capita incomes, are from Szckely, M:, (1998) p. 2 I 
Table 6.6, shows that between 1984 and 2000 there was a major increase (of 
almost 24%) in the proportion of total income held by the tenth decile of the 
population. This concentration is remarkable when compared to the great 
loss of income between 1984-2000 (-51.25%) of the lowest decile of the 
population. In descriptive terms, there is a clear trend showing that 
throughout the years the groups with less are the ones who lose the most. 
In short, while individuals were poorer in relative income terms in 1984, they 
became even worse off in 2000, in relative terms. 
If we make yearly comparisons of these worse off groups (see Tables 6.4 
and 6.5) we can see that a decline in access to services and rises in income 
poverty levels coincide. Looking at the data of Tables 6.4 and 6.5 we are also 
able to note that even though the group of extreme poor is lower it has the 
highest levels of service deprivation. It is worthwhile mentioning that the 
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reduction of the extremely poor between 1998 and 2000 might be attributed 
to PROGRESA (see Figure 6.2). 
However, the high proportion of the population in income poverty suggests 
that during economic crises the poorest sectors are most vulnerable. 
Considering these results it is possible to assume that liberalisation of the 
Mexican economy during the 1990's has imposed heavy and increasing 
burdens on the worse off. Moreover, the major programmes of poverty 
alleviation, such as PROGRESA have only provided a minimal safety net for 
the deprived, avoiding the complete impoverishment of the society, and are 
very far from solving the problem of chronic poverty. 
In order to evaluate whether the new economic model has been unfair we 
need to analyse the potential alternatives to be implemented by the 
government. To do this I will now evaluate the distribution mechanisms of 
scarce resources implemented in the main poverty alleviation program 
between 1994-2000, Progresa. 
I 
6.3 Conclusion 
Comparing distributive criteria 
Since 1990 the Mexican liberal government has followed a standard and not 
especially sophisticated sufficientarian distributive rule for distributing direct 
benefits in its social transfers for the whole population. For the very poor it 
has set the level of benefits in absolute terms with disregard to individual 
differences. Development institutions in Mexico target limited resources only 
to very low income and deprived groups of the population. The rest of the 
population receives indirect benefits. The low-income groups though, have 
been selected from the rest using clear criteria outlined earlier. From 1990 to 
1994, deprived villages (lacking basic services) were selected and resources 
were targeted on basic infrastructure and local businesses. The selection 
criteria changed from 1994 onwards. Since then, families have been selected 
through a mixed criteria of severity of deprivation in services and a poverty 
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line set in absolute terms related to the average cost of a basic food basket. 
When priority reasons are used to select the worst off, the same benefits in 
cash are distributed to every worst off family. Therefore, each family 
considered among the worst off receives the same package of help. 
In order to select families for assistance, PROGRESA takes into account 
household monetary income among members over 15 years old13, as a first 
sign of poverty and includes a weighted measure of deprivation, which is not 
publicly available. 
""PROGRESA has been designed to support those families that 
live in a condition of extreme poverty, with the aim of enhancing 
and improving education, health and nutritional status... federal 
resources for this program are provided in the form of federal 
subsidies and, because of this, they are subject to criteria of 
selectivity, equity, objectivity, transparency, temporality and 
publicity. The beneficiaries of PROGRESA should be clearly 
identified... " (Presidential Decree for the 2001 fiscal budget). 
Accordingly, Progresa's designers, despite having extensive information 
about each family, have chosen to distribute cash for nutritional help equally 
to each family, not taking into account either the composition of the family or 
the total income each family earns. 
Taking a selected income group of people similar to the one selected by 
PROGRESA as an example, let's compare the justice of various distributions. 
As a reminder, a basic equal treatment would demand that all those selected 
as the worse off are equalised in their benefits. Priority in its maximin form (or 
Rawls's maximin) would argue that we should assign more weight to the 
worst off. Progressive sufficiency would seek to maximise the number of 
people who reach the first threshold, then the second and so on. 
`I will use members over 12 years old, as until 1998 this age was considered 
in household surveys as 
the age when children could start to work and supplement income. 
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6.3.1 Comparing the justice of three hypothetical distributions with the 
same resources 
In December of 2000 Progresa helped 2,455,783 families with a household 
monetary income below 525 pesos (pesos of April 201), for members age 12 
and above and satisfying further deprivation criteria (Progresa, 2001). 
Progresa considered them to be extremely poor and deserving of direct and 
indirect help. In contrast, those between 525 and 990 pesos were considered 
moderately poor and deserving indirect help only - direct help was in the 
form of a monthly cash transfer of 140 pesos (the amount given to families 
for food help in the second semester of 2000, in pesos of April 2001) given to 
the woman in charge of preparing the food. Additional income supplements 
and medical help were given to mothers for each child of school age. 
Congress approved 324,850,189 pesos of April 2001, for food cash transfers 
in December of 2000. (Progresa, 2001) Using the Income and Expenditure 
Survey for 2000, I have ranked families by their monthly household monetary 
income for members aged 12 and above, from the lowest income upwards, 
trying to replicate Progresa's list of selected families. 
In Table 7.1 I provide results of the calculations distributing 140 pesos for 
each family in the case of Progresa; and distributing what each family 
requires to reach the threshold taking into account the total amount to be 
distributed. In the case of Maximin the distribution starts from the worst off 
upwards and in the case of Progressive sufficiency from the poverty line 
downwards. Table 6.7 shows what would be the head count of the population 
below and above the threshold of 525 pesos after the direct transfer. 
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Table 6.7 Matrix of options for a distributor 
Below 525 p. Above 525 p Gini 
Coeff. 
Extremely (%) (%) (%) (%) 
Poor 
Population 
Original Distribution 12,292,945 100 12,292,945 100 --- - 23 
After a hypothetical 
distribution. 
Equity/ Progresa 7,753,133 63 4,539,812 37 18 
Maximin 7,551,908 61 4,741,037 39 1 
Progressive 1,910,941 16 10,382,004 84 14 
Sufficiency 
Source: Uwn calculations from ENIGH, 2000 and ENIGH 2001. 
6.3.1.2 Progresa 
Not withstanding that Progresa has detailed income and deprivation 
information about each family receiving aid, for equity reasons the 
government distributed 140 pesos monthly to every poor family. Officials in 
charge of the program explicitly argued in terms of a just distribution in order 
to justify for their decision of providing the same amount to each family. 
Specifically they argued that in order to respect the poor, all of them should 
be treated equally (Progresa, 2001). They also claimed that this was the 
simplest way to distribute the assigned resources to people. The first reason 
can be considered as a simplistic approach to equal treatment. As we have 
shown equal treatment has to recognize differences among people's ways of 
transforming resources into well-being. As for the second reason, which is 
the most likely reason for this distribution, it only solves some administrative 
problems as the distributor holds precise income and categorical information 
for each community, which would allow him to diversify his answers to 
different needs. 
A distribution such as Progresa's has two potential effects. Firstly, it leaves a 
large number of extremely poor people below the poverty threshold (63%) 
see Table 6.7, while simultaneously placing a relatively small number of 
people (37%), see Table 6.7 well above the threshold. Secondly, those left 
below the threshold would have been originally the worst off members of the 
group. The government option is only working in so far as it selects the poor 
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and targets direct resources to them. Nonetheless the very poor are left 
without sufficient help. However, it is obvious that there is an improvement 
with respect to the original distribution. The original distribution previous to 
transfer has a Gini Coefficient of 23%, compared to a Gini Coefficient of 18% 
after transfers. Also Progresa's distribution has the virtue of simplicity, as 
there are almost no administrative costs once families have been 
incorporated in the list for benefits. 
If Progresa's criterion of distribution is not satisfactory, let us consider, a 
prioritarian distribution instead. 
6.3.1.3 Priority 
A distributor contemplating maximin as a criterion would aim to benefit all of 
those who are considered worse off, giving more weight to those who are in 
worst condition. Taking into consideration the same list of households, a 
distributor following maximin would start distributing resources from the 
family with the lowest income and proceed up the list until resources run out. 
Implementing the prioritarian distribution would leave a large number of 
people below the threshold (58%) (See Table 6.7) and place 42% within the 
threshold. The difference between Progresa and the prioritarian distribution 
would be that those left below the line in Progresa would be the ones 
reaching the line using Maximin. This is reflected in the Gini Coefficient of the 
maximin distribution that would decrease from 23% to 1% (see Table 6.7). 
In relation to administrative simplicity, maximin would be subject to the 
important objection that it would be very difficult to implement as it depends 
on very specific information. A possible solution to this hurdle is to assume 
that information collected at the start of the year would not change during the 
year. We could then assign a minimum and maximum average income 
transfer, according to the original condition of the family. There might also be 
other ways to solve administrative problems. The point in question is that 
given that the information is available, there exists a trade off between 
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providing a little to all knowing that for some it is too little, or providing what is 
required for those in the bottom of the distribution. 
6.3.1.4 Progressive Sufficiency 
A third distribution to be considered is progressive sufficiency. Here the aim 
is to maximise the number of people who reach the threshold. In this case we 
would start distributing, as in maximin, what each household requires to 
reach the threshold. However, in this distribution we are giving increasing 
priority to graded thresholds, assuming that providing little to many is worse 
that providing enough to some. To distribute resources in this way we would 
start from the household closest to the income threshold of 525, and continue 
distributing downwards until resources run out. According to my calculations, 
using a progressive sufficientarian distribution would place 85% of the 
group's members above the threshold, with a Gini Coefficient of 14% (see 
Table 6.7). 
However, Progressive Sufficiency has the same problem as Maximin, where 
very specific information is required for each household. The same possible 
solutions suggested to maximin could be implemented. The important point 
to note in this type of distribution is that with the assigned budget it would 
have the effect of leaving without any help those who are the worst off 
members of the group. In deciding about the fairness of these distributions, a 
distributor should take into consideration not only the number of people who 
will benefit from the distribution but the options available to those who are left 
out or below the threshold. For instance those below the threshold under 
Maximin would have an average income of 408 pesos, those below the 
threshold under progressive sufficiency would have an average income of 
131 pesos. Both groups are left out from the distribution, the vital difference 
is that those left out from Maximin were the better off members of the group 
and those left out by Progressive Sufficiency were the worse off members. 
Perhaps one of the important differences between maximin and progressive 
sufficiency is the assumption that in progressive sufficiency thresholds can 
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be negotiated in Congress, as well as the budget. Furthermore, in the case of 
maximin we would always have to consider the interest of the worse off 
above the rest, leaving a specific distributor without many options to cater for 
other social goods in the society. By contrast, Progressive Sufficiency 
demands priority to the worse off but not overall priority. 
Summary 
The empirical analysis of Mexican income and expenditure surveys show 
clear trends towards the preservation of an unequal status quo. The fact that 
poverty estimates remain more or less similar throughout the years suggest 
that poverty responds more to the economic downturns in the country and it 
is not influenced by resources transfers. Such transfers in the form of poverty 
alleviation programs serve only the purpose of creating a very low safety net. 
In considering different distributive rules we can observe with the available 
data that even with the limited resources devoted to poverty alleviation there 
are fairer distributions than the one selected by Progresa. The fact that this is 
not done, I suggest, is due to the idea that the poor are partially responsible 
for their situation and a distributor should distribute considering options open 
to them, thus incentives are created towards the end of promoting work. I 
suggested earlier (Chapter 3) that there are reasons for us not to consider 
responsibility at this low threshold of advantage, thus transfers and 
opportunities should aim instead to reach a threshold where basic 
functionings are met. After the first threshold is met, choices become 
important and should be considered. Responsibility I suggest is better 
handled by a distributive rule that takes into account a general sufficientarian 
proposal. 
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Chapter 7: PROGRESSIVE SUFFICIENCY 
7.1 Introduction 
The liberal debate on egalitarian distributive justice that has influenced policy 
decisions around most of the world was originally developed with affluent 
occidental countries in mind. I asked whether the liberal egalitarian 
distributive question has a different answer when we consider countries with 
a different social justice tradition, severe scarcity of resources and 
institutional weaknesses, such as Mexico. My theoretical answer, I believe 
better interprets a political conception of social justice for a poor society, and 
within this general distributive principle provides specific theoretical 
distributive criteria for the design of poverty alleviation programmes. In this 
respect, this thesis is an interdisciplinary work drawing on normative political 
theory and social policy, something not usually done in the literature. 
I have considered distributive problems in the general context of developing 
countries, suggesting an improvement to the sufficientarian answer to the 
distributive problem, an option not well discussed in the literature. Such a 
modified answer, I believe is a better option than other distributive answers 
when severe scarcity of resources do not allow all individuals to reach a 
relevant threshold. This option presents theoretical problems, mainly 
problems in the definition of morally relevant thresholds. I built on this 
normative conception and applied this conception to the poverty debate. I 
suggest that the poverty debate can be seen naturally as part of the debates 
in relation to the distributive rule and the currency of distribution. 
My case study has been Mexico and its recent poverty alleviation 
programmes (1992-2000). In terms of developing countries, the Mexican 
case is interesting because most of its institutions and policies have being 
inspired by liberal ideas that have succeeded in creating a moderately strong 
economy, but have failed in the fair distribution of scarce resources. This 
failure is clearly observable between 1992 and 2000, precisely since the 
implementation of a wider program of economic and institutional liberalisation 
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took root. Throughout this period total income in the country increased almost 
77% in real terms yet the poor lost almost 65% of their relative income share 
between 1992 and the year 2000 (Chapter 6 of this thesis). The wider income 
gap between the poor and the rest of the population is striking, especially in 
the light of the creation of poverty alleviation programmes throughout this 
period. 
7.2 Distributive rule 
I believe that Progressive Sufficiency, as I have called a mix distributive rule, 
is a better conception of social justice under severe scarcity of resources 
than Equality, especially because some forms of egalitarianism have 
understood equality as sharing scarcity, which, I believe, is unfair. In 
particular I have advanced some ideas as how progressive sufficiency can 
better express some of our just intuitions in distributive problems under 
situations of extreme scarcity. 
have argued that relational egalitarianism is implausible under conditions of 
severe scarcity, and that prioritarianism veers between extremism and 
practical indeterminacy. A turn to sufficientarianism would solve the practical 
problems of prioritarianism by setting a clear threshold to be reached. This 
conclusion is important because many individuals in developing countries live 
under such conditions. 
Advocates of the sufficiency approach often present their approach as an 
alternative to more egalitarian or prioritarian approaches, and employ only a 
single decency threshold when defining their favoured principle. So 
construed, standard sufficientarianism implies that if a number of distributions 
guarantee enough for each individual, then there is no reason to rank those 
distributions by means of further egalitarian or prioritarian principles. Despite 
its popularity, it is not obvious that we should accept the standard assumption 
that sufficientarians should employ single threshold principles, and flatly 
reject the convictions that make egalitarian and prioritarian principles 
appealing. Instead, I think we should employ multiple thresholds, and aim to 
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ensure that as many people as possible reach the first standard, then the 
next, and so on. 
I would further argue that our collective responsibility to satisfy an individual's 
claim to be benefited diminishes in inverse proportion to the increment of the 
capacity of the individual to achieve the good. This can be managed arguing 
that the claims of those under the first threshold have greater moral 
importance because without reaching such an absolute level of advantage, 
their individual freedom is curtailed. As freedom to choose different life plans 
is increased when reaching higher thresholds, the collective responsibility to 
benefit them diminishes in most cases, until it ceases. In this sense, the 
approach is prioritarian, but sufficientarian in the sense that when people 
reach the highest threshold, they should not receive common resources. As 
we consider inequalities bad for people, we should close the gap between 
thresholds by preventing people from falling between thresholds and by 
pushing people up to a threshold in lexical order. 
7.3 Currency of the distribution 
I 
I have asked which standard of interpersonal comparison should be 
employed to determine when one individual is better off than another? In 
evaluating the sufficiency approach establishing the relevant threshold is very 
important. It would seem however that this view presents a double problem, 
not only do we have to know what standard of interpersonal comparison 
should be employed to determine when one individual is better off than 
another, but also what level of this standard constitutes enough. 
Progressive sufficiency presents the problem of where to draw the line of 
these differently relevant moral thresholds. It also sets constraints as to how 
to characterize these thresholds, due to its graded progressive nature. The 
problem of what we should consider morally relevant in the human 
experience for distributive purposes concerns all forms of distribution, and is 
directly related with how we specify that a person is worse off than another. 
Progressive sufficientarians, for instance, would identify the worse off in 
»ý 
ý" 
those individuals whose claims are morally most urgent and would 
recommend minimising their number below some low sufficiency threshold. 
After the last threshold, by contrast with prioritarians further benefits are not 
considered even if people are worse off in some sense than other people 
further above. 
Progressive sufficiency for instance would recommend thresholds in 
advantage with the first one described in absolute terms and the second and 
third described in relative terms. This recommendation sets constraints as to 
what area of human experience would be appropriate for each threshold. I 
claimed the first threshold can only be described in terms of basic capabilities 
in order to capture people's different abilities to transform resources into well- 
being. This description, I suggest, cannot properly incorporate personal 
responsibility as the low level of functionings should always make us to 
respect people's claims. Further thresholds should incorporate personal 
choices of life plans and consider distributing resources. As further 
thresholds should be set in relative terms, we could speculate that if resource 
scarcity is not a problem, welfare should be considered in a graded form, that 
is accepting claims in some particular areas and up to a certain stage. 
I suggest that both analysis either of the distributive rule and the currency of 
the distribution naturally fit together, as the how question in fact limits our 
answers to the what question. This is particularly important as this would 
imply that the debate of personal responsibility should be taken back to the 
how question instead of the what question. 
Furthermore, the egalitarian debate argued from the perspective of a poor 
country should consider the process towards a just society. In not 
considering this process, I suggest the egalitarian debate is not giving us 
adequate political guidance to sort problems of injustice in poor countries. 
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7.4 Distributive considerations when designing anti-poverty policies. 
I have suggested that a just social distribution should consider different 
answers to what to distribute depending on the different morally relevant 
thresholds set by a distributive rule, from the lowest one in absolute terms 
better described by functionings, to the highest one in relative terms better 
described in terms of income and opportunities. 
In order to enquire how unfair a society is in the above terms, and what type 
of policies should be applied to redress possible unfairness, we should look 
first into how the worse off, or in our case the poor, are selected. We needed 
to know, at least whether our normative distributive criterion affects poverty 
definitions, poverty measures and poverty alleviation program designs. 
In relation to poverty definitions, I have suggested in section 4.3.1, that if we 
accept progressive sufficiency we should consider poverty in a graded form. 
The first threshold should be defined in absolute terms related to functionings 
and the rest in terms of resources and opportunities. If we accept this division 
we should consider lack of capabilities as a greater moral problem than 
income poverty. 
The results in Table 4.2 show the importance of the poverty line in the case 
of graded welfare. If we accept different thresholds with a diminishing moral 
value, just as in general weighted prioritarianism would do, that would mean 
that one Euro for the group under the first threshold has more value than for 
following thresholds. Within thresholds we would accept that one Euro for 
those closer to the threshold has increasing moral value. 
I suggest that in relation to poverty measures, accepting progressive 
sufficiency would present an axiomatization problem, as we would need to 
solve the problem of measuring both linear poverty with the HPI and non- 
linear poverty with the FGT index. As the HPI index does not include income 
and FGT index measures income differences, a problem could emerge 
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where both indexes meet. For instance a person not considered to be poor in 
income terms could be suffering a handicap which limits his functionings. 
Furthermore in section 4.2.3 we considered how different distributions 
produced similar results in the FGT index when taking into account higher a, 
even if the proportion of the poor has been reduced to a third. I suggest that 
the distributors should have a clear alleviation poverty reduction aim when 
designing programs. Furthermore if we accept the progressive sufficientarian 
notion that when benefiting the worse off, reaching a threshold for most has a 
higher moral relevance than benefiting all worse off with little, we should 
consider an inverse priority in order to maximise the portion of those 
benefited, maximax within thresholds and weighted prioritarianism between 
thresholds. This assumption would suggest that the FGT measure should be 
refined to capture differing priorities between and within thresholds. 
In considering poverty alleviation policies, I suggest, that governments should 
be clear in their aims when referring to the targeted efficiency of the policy in 
question. It is possible to apply different priorities to different groups of the 
population. Also, when considering incentives in the design of poverty 
alleviation programs, personal responsibility should not play a part in the 
lowest threshold. 
7.5 Poverty alleviation programs during liberalisation in Mexico (1988- 
2000). 
Most developing countries during the eighties and nineties facing political, 
financial and economic crisis, opted for liberal structural reforms as a new 
model of development. In Mexico, one of the most important reforms involved 
a reform of the State. The new liberal State changed its conception of social 
justice, from one aiming for equality of condition to one accepting inequalities 
as the price to pay for more economic growth and more opportunities. 
have described an incomplete moral distributive option that attempts to 
solve some of the problems of other distributions under extreme scarcity and 
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suggested that this option could be an adequate normative political guide to 
follow in the design, for instance, of poverty alleviation programs. 
It is clear that in Mexico social institutions have not been able to provide 
basic social rights and economic opportunities for a large group of the 
population. In relation to the distributive rule used by the government to apply 
its social policy, I asked whether was fair to use a very basic sufficientarian 
approach towards the very poor including a high factor of individual 
responsibility in the incentive structure of the program. I suggested this as 
unfair. 
7.6 Empirical analysis of deprivation and poverty during liberalisation. 
Results of poverty alleviation programs. 
Asking about shifts in the distribution of benefits and burdens amongst social 
groups in Mexican society helped me to evaluate whether during the 
liberalisation of the 1990s the shifts in benefit and burdens in Mexico were 
fair or unfair according to different distributive criteria. 
Using the Income and Expenditure Survey for 2000, I ranked families by their 
monthly household monetary income for members aged 12 and above, from 
the lowest income upwards, trying to replicate Progresa's list of selected 
families. 
A distribution such as Progresa's has two potential effects. Firstly, it leaves a 
large number of extremely poor people well below the poverty threshold, 
while simultaneously placing a relatively small number of people well above 
the threshold. Secondly, those left below the threshold would have been 
originally the worst off members of the group. The government option then is 
only working in so far as it selects the poor and targets direct resources to 
them. Nonetheless the very poor are left without sufficient help. 
A distribution such as the one proposed by progressive sufficiency could be 
considered as a fairer distribution if we assume the high value attached to 
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those below the first threshold, if this is so it will always be better to place 
more people in the threshold than less. We would be alleviating poverty with 
clear further distributive just aims. 
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Appendix I Data and definitions 
The National Institute for Statistics, Geography and Informatics of Mexico 
(INEGI) has carried out household surveys at a national level, since 1950. 
Since 1984, INEGI has made strictly comparable its Surveys of Income and 
Expenditure (ENIGH) for 1984,1989,1992,1994,1996,1998 and 2000. The 
same questionnaire with minor modifications has been used during these 
years; the survey has been held in the same periods of each year and has 
used the same sampling techniques. 
The survey's reliability is particularly important when dealing with welfare 
changes, as incorrect data can lead to poverty being under or overestimated. 
The usual method to check a survey's reliability, apart from its sampling 
techniques and information collection, which in this case have not been 
questioned by any researcher, is to compare it with other data. In the case of 
income and expenditure surveys, the usual comparison is with National 
Accounts. 
In the Mexican case, National Accounts (NA) are not compatible with ENIGH. 
According to Hernandez Lagos (Hernandez, 2001), differences between 
ENIGs and NA are very large. Differences between NA and income surveys 
are usually due to underreported income by the highest earners. In order to 
correct for this, it is usual to eliminate the highest earners and the lowest 
ones to smooth the distribution. In the case of ENIGH this is not explicitly 
done, although Cortez (2001) claims that it has to happen to explain the 
enormous difference between NA and ENIGHs. 
Lusting and Mitchell (Lusting, 1995, pp. 3-24) have proposed a method to 
correct this problem, method rejected by Szekely (1998, p. 253), who argues 
that since it is impossible to identify the causes of the difference, it would be 
difficult to obtain robust results with the corrected information. Furthermore 
Szekely argues that even with the usual corrections his results present the 
same behaviour as before the correction. 
This is important to note as I follow 
Szekely's methodology not correcting the data with NA. 
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Surveys of 1992,1994,1996,1998,2000.1 
The surveys provide socio-economic information on households and 
household members. In relation to social characteristics, each dataset 
provides information on the number of members, occupation, educational 
attainment, employment benefits received, age, gender and size of the city 
where they live. They also provide data about dwelling conditions, including 
the type of building materials used for walls, floor and roofs, as well as 
services in the house, type of water connection, drainage, electricity, and 
telephone availability. 
As each data set provides separate lists for expenditure, income, members of 
household and dwellings, in order to make comparisons between data sets a 
common list is needed. In order to create this list it is necessary to create 
some common variables, making certain assumptions. These assumptions 
can also affect poverty estimates. The first and most important one is what 
type of household we are talking about. Here I follow the guide in the surveys 
for the creation of variables and consider all members in the household, with 
the exception of absent heads of household, domestic servants and guests. 
As more than one family can live under one dwelling, I will consider the 
same dwelling characteristics for each household living under the same roof. 
This is important for my purposes, as I consider the deprived to be the group 
lacking certain services in their dwellings. In the data set, dwelling 
characteristics for the second household under the same roof are not 
considered, so I will take the same characteristics as the reported first 
household's dwelling. This will not affect the data for income and expenditure 
as this is reported for each household as well as data referring to members of 
the household. 
The final data set for each year includes socio-demographic and economic 
information for each household. This limits the data set, since I cannot make 
1 In the next part I will follow Szekelys, pp. 
251-254 
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calculations for education attainability for each household member; to do so 
would make the list of variables too long. Thus I only consider education and 
labour data for the head of the household, and social benefits for the head 
and its partner. 
In the economic area, disposable income is divided into monetary and non- 
monetary incomes. Monetary sources include wages and salaries, 
entrepreneurial rents, property rents (consisting of payments received from 
real estate ownership, interests from financial instruments and loans to third 
parties, interests from stocks, and returns to other assets), incomes from 
cooperatives, transfers and other monetary sources. Non monetary income 
includes auto consumption, payments in kind, gifts and imputed rents. 
Household expenditures are also divided into monetary and non-monetary. 
By definition, non-monetary expenditures are identical to the non-monetary 
incomes. With regard to monetary disbursements, they include food, clothing, 
housing, housing services, appliances, health, transport, vehicles, 
educations, transfers and others. (Szekely, M: 1998, p. 254) 
Financial income and expenditure are also reported. Financial income is in 
the form of property rents and expenditure accounting for the acquisition of 
housing, construction materials, housing repairs and extensions, life 
insurance, credit card payments, real estate purchases, machinery and 
equipment acquisitions, loans to third parties, savings and investments, 
inheritance and gifts to non household members. 
Definitions 
Matters of definition in relation to poverty are extremely relevant as they can 
mislead governments as to what are the real causes of poverty and who the 
poor are, possibly misdirecting policy priorities. 
As for the data, three transformations were required following Szekely's 
methodology. The first was to inflate incomes and expenditures 
to April 2001 
pesos using an average of the 
Consumer's Price Index of the previous six 
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months to the survey. The second transformation was to convert quarterly 
data into monthly data. This was done for practical expository reasons as 
most people in Mexico think of income and expenditure in monthly terms. 
The third transformation concerns an equivalence scale to the number of 
persons in the household. Equivalence scales need to take into account 
economies of scale in consumption to assign a weight to adults and children 
in the household. In Mexico, as everywhere else in the world, there is no 
agreement as to which would be the right scale. Thus I assume that income 
and expenditure is divided equally among members of a household. This 
assumption of course can affect results, especially in relation to small and 
large families. For the most part in this thesis, unless is specified, I use total 
household per capita income. 
Deprivation and income poverty. 
In this work I will consider the deprived as the group of people who have 
dwellings without running water, drainage of any kind, and with soil flooring 
and with one or more illiterate member in the household over 12 years. In 
fact, deprivation is only severe poverty, but for analytical purposes, 
deprivation will not include income. Poverty will mean income poverty. 
In relation to income poverty, in Mexico the most commonly used source 
concerning basic needs requirements and prices is the study realized by the 
National Plan for Deprived Zones and Marginal Groups (Coplamar for its 
initials in Spanish). Coplamar in 1983 estimated two basic baskets of goods 
and services. The first one (Minimal Basket) includes the minimal costs for 
food, housing, basic expenses on hygiene and health care, basic cultural and 
recreational services, transport and communications, clothing and shoes and 
small expenses on personal care when in public. The monthly cost per capita 
of this basket in pesos of April 2001 is 2940 pesos. The second basket of 
goods (sub-minimal) includes the minimal costs for food, housing and some 
minor expenses in hygiene and health care and expenditure on basic 
educational materials. The monthly cost per capita of this basket of goods in 
pesos of April 2001 is 1132 pesos (Hernandez, E., 2001, p. 15) 
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Another set of two poverty lines, extreme and moderate poverty, are the ones 
which include only the food basket from Coplamar's basket of goods and a 
very low minimum standard. The price of a food basket, which can be 
interpreted as an extreme poverty line was estimated by Szekely for 1992, 
inflating the cost to pesos of April 2001, would result in 392 pesos. A 
moderate poverty line would include the income to acquire a minimum 
standard of food, housing, health and education, calculated for 1992 and 
inflated to prices of April 2001 would cost 707 pesos. (Szekely: 1998, p. 255). 
A further line is included by Szekely, a line that divides the rich from the 
middle classes. This is placed at 4.5 times the moderate poverty, equal to 
3181 pesos of April 2001. 
The extreme poverty line used by the government takes into account 
monetary income earned by household members over fifteen years old and 
compares this total with the price for an average food basket per capita, 
multiplied by a factor of 1.34 to account for other costs. The food basket is 
the same calculated by Szekely (1998), from Coplamar, equal to 392 pesos 
of April 2001. The poverty line is set at 525 pesos of April 2001. To calculate 
the moderate poverty line in monetary income, a line that it is not explicitly 
described by the government I use Szekely's moderate poverty line, 707 
multiplied by a factor 1.34, resulting in 990 pesos of April 2001. 
In order to calculate inequality, I have used the program INEQ developed by 
Professor Frank Cowell at The London School of Economics. This program 
asks for an income distribution and it calculates different inequality 
measures. 
In order to control my results, and given that I followed Szekely's estimates 
for previous years, I used year 1992, the last of Szekely's estimates, as a 
control year. This is important, as the 
literature about poverty lacks 
consistency and each researcher can obtain 
different estimates from the 
same sources, using different methods. 
I followed Szekely's methods and the 
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same data set and I obtained the same results as Szekely in 1992, giving 
some confidence about the comparability between previous years' estimates 
calculated by Szekely and the following years that I calculated. 
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Appendix II Regions of Mexico 
Regions of Mexico by preschool infant mortality rate and adults in productive 
age mortality rate. 
Region A (Low infant and low adult mortality rates). 
Quintana Roo, Nuevo Leon, Baja California Sur, Campeche, Durango, 
Nayarit, Morelos, Sinaloa. 
Region B, (low infant and average to high adult mortality rate). 
Coahuila, Distrito Federal, Hidalgo, Jalisco, Michoacan, Tamaulipas, Sonora. 
Region C, (high infant and low to average adult mortality rate). 
Guanajuato, Tlaxcala, Yucatan, Zacatecas, Tabasco. 
Region D, (average to high infant mortality rate and average to high adult 
mortality rate). 
Chiapas, Chihuahua, Oaxaca, Puebla, Veracruz, Mexico, Baja California, 
Guerrero, Queretaro. 
Preschool infant mortality rate relates to the number of children between 1 
and 4 years old death by 1 000 children. This rate has a rank between .4 and 
1.4. I consider low mortality the rates between .4 and . 
8, average .9 and 
high 
more than . 
9. 
The mortality rate of adults in productive age, relate to the number of adults 
between 15 to 64 years old death by 1 000 adults. This rate has a rank 
between 2 and 3.5. I consider low mortality rate the rates between 2 and 2.6, 
average between 2.7 and 2.8 and high more than 2.8. 
